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ARTICLES 
ENGINEERING THE MIDDLE CLASSES: 
CLASS LINE-DRAWING IN NE W DEAL 
HOURS LEGISLATION 
Deborah C. Malamud* 
The likely readers of this Article work for a living, or are study­
ing with the hope that they will work for a living very soon. Unlike 
many other workers in this .society, they do not (and will not) get 
paid time-and-a-half for overtime. In this Article, I tell the story of 
how upper-level white-collar workers - people like the intended 
readers of this Article - came to be exempt from the Fair Labor 
Standards Act's general overtime rules.1 My purpose in telling this 
story is not to participate in the debate on whether the so-called 
"white-collar exemptions" to the Fair Labor Standards Act make 
* Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1977, Wesleyan; J.D. 1986, Uni­
versity of Chicago. - Ed. I dedicate this piece to Ted St. Antoine upon his retirement from 
law teaching, with thanks for the privilege of being his colleague. I have appreciated the 
opportunity to present this paper to the law school faculty workshops at Case Western 
Reserve, Harvard, Iowa, and Utah (as part of my visit as Howard H. Rolapp Distinguished 
Visiting Scholar), and at the 1996 annual meetings of the Law and Society Association and 
the International Network on Transformative Employment and Labor Law. Thanks to the 
many colleagues, at Michigan and elsewhere, who have commented on this project at its 
various stages, with special thanks to Catherine Fisk, Tom Green, Don Herzog, Morton 
Horwitz, Rick Lempert, Lea Vander Velde, and Jim Wooten. Thanks also to the librarians 
and archivists at the University of Michigan Law School, the National Archives, the Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt Presidential Archives, the Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, the 
Department of Labor, and the Archives of Labor History and Urban Affairs at the Walter P. 
Reuther Library at Wayne State University. Finally, my thanks to Jeannine Bell, Melissa 
Plotkin, and Abigail Carter for their able research assistance. 
1. Marc Linder is the scholar who has most exhaustively studied the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) and related legislation. See, e.g., MARC LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS AND 
M!NIMuM WAGES: REGULATING TiiE EXPLOITATION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1992); Marc Linder, The Small-Business Exemption Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act: The "Original" Accumulation of Capital and the Inversion of Industrial Pol­
icy, 6 J.L. & PoLY. 403 (1998); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: 
Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 1335 (1987) [hereinafter Linder, 
Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act]; Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: 
The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 53 (1991); Marc Linder, 
Closing the Gap Between Reich and Poor: Which Side Is the Department of Labor On?, 21 
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1993-1994). The emphasis of Linder's work on exemp­
tion from hours regulations is on lower-level exemptions, through which agricultural and do­
mestic workers - many of them black - have historically been excluded from protection. 
For a siniilar criticism of the FLSA for leaving many women workers without statutory pro­
tection, see Suzanne B. Mettler, Federalism, Gender, & the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 
POLITY 635 (1998). 
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sense, although I will close by suggesting why that question is 
harder than it appears.2 Instead, my aim is to use the historical 
example of New Deal wage and hour legislation to shed light on 
how the law reflects and helps to shape the American concept of 
class. 
The legal academy has generated a rich literature on the ways in 
which law and social practice interact in the creation and mainte­
nance of social categories and hierarchies. Race and gender have 
been the dominant subjects in this literature.3 Class has been all 
but ignored.4 This should come as no surprise. We Americans do 
not accept class as a core part of either our identities or our social 
structure. Most of us believe that we are "middle class," and that 
individuals can so easily move upwards into and within the middle 
classes that it makes little sense to think of Americans as divided by 
class at all. 5 Just as class tends to be invisible to the American so-
2. The statutory exemption for "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, admin­
istrative, or professional capacity" is found in § 213 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(l) (1994). The implementing regulations are found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.0-
.315 (1997). For debate on the exemption, see, e.g., Nicholas Clark, Fair Labor Standards Act 
Reform - It's Not Broke, So Don't Fix It, 11 LAB. LAW. 343 (1996); Peter D. DeChiara, 
Rethinking the Managerial-Professional Exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 43 AM. 
U. L. REv. 139 (1993); William J. Kilberg, Reforming the Fair Labor Standards Act: For 
Congress and the Rest of Us, EMPLOYEE REL. LJ., Spring 1996, at 1; Robert D. Lipman et al., 
A Call for Bright-Lines to Fix the Fair Labor Standards Act, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 357 
(1994); Lawrence Peikes, Tightening the White-Collar Exemptions: The Courts Breathe New 
Life into the Fair Labor Standards Act, 10 LAB. LAW. 121 (1994). In a recent decision, the 
Supreme Court held that the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has con­
siderable discretion to interpret these exemptions, and sustained its interpretation of the "sal­
ary basis" test, one of the more controversial aspects of the exemption regulations. See Auer 
v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905 (1997). 
3. For representative critical race theory anthologies, see, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: 
A READER (Adrien Katherine Wmg ed., 1997); CRITICAL RAcE THEORY: THE CurnNG 
EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); CRITICAL RAcE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT 
FoRMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). For casebooks surveying 
the state of feminist jurisprudence, see, e.g., KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. 
HAruus, GENDER AND LAw: THEORY, DoCTRINE, COMMENTARY (2d ed. 1998); MARY 
BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY (1994). 
4. For a treatment of legal definitions of race and sexual orientation identities, see 
Kenneth Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orien­
tation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263 (1995). This is not to say that the agenda of critical legal studies 
(CLS) did not include the exploration of class as a phenomenon contested in and through 
law. But Robert Gordon observed as late as 1989 - late in the history of CLS as a move­
ment - that "[t]he Critics are still a long way from being able to deliver the brightest 
promises of their Critical program: thickly described accounts of how law has been imbri­
cated in and has helped to structure the most routine practices of social life." Robert W. 
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 79, 102 (Alan C. Hutchinson 
ed., 1989). I consider work one of those routine practices, and see this article as part of that 
program - for all that it issues from a scholar lacking in movement credentials. 
5. Some of the vast academic debate on the .concept of class as it pertains to the middle 
classes and white-collar workers is surveyed in Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirma­
tive Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1847 (1996). For an extremely helpful 
historical and comparative treatment, see JORGEN KocKA, WHITE COLLAR WORKERS IN 
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cial eye, the American legal eye does not see the law as actively 
involved in creating and maintaining class lines. When American 
lawyers look for the hand of the law in the construction of social 
categories, we tend to look in equal protection theory (the creation 
of suspect classifications) and in antidiscrimination law (the crea­
tion of protected groups).6 Class seems invisible to American law 
because neither equal protection doctrine nor antidiscrimination 
law has accorded it legal significance.7 
While class has not been recognized as a category in American 
civil rights jurisprudence, class line-drawing has long been a perva­
sive activity of the Americaµ legal system. At least since the New 
Deal,8 Congress and administrative agencies operating in the fields 
of labor, welfare, and tax law have routinely selected categories of 
people for coverage on the basis of class-like criteria - by which I 
mean social or economic criteria (such as occupation) that are part 
of the complex of social and economic distinctions referred to in 
popular or academic discourse as "class."9 By moving from civil 
AMERICA 1890-1940 (1980). Other significant historical, theoretical, and/or comparative 
treatments include ILEEN A. DEVAULT,  SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF LABOR! CLASS AND 
CLERICAL Woruc IN TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY PrrrsBURGH (1990); RICHARD SoBEL, THE 
WHITE CoLLAR WORKING CLAss: FROM STRUCTURE TO PoLmcs (1989); ERIK OLIN 
WRIGHT, CLASS CmJNrs: CoMPARATIVE STUDIES IN CLASS ANALYSIS (1997); SocIAL 
CHANGE AND THE MIDDLE CLASSES (T1m Butler & Mike Savage eds., 1995). For a discus­
sion of the American rhetoric of class, including the treatment of white-collar and/or middle 
class workers, see Margo Anderson, The Language of Class in Twentieth-Century America, 12 
Soc. SCI. HIST. 349 (1988). 
6. This is beginning to change in the recent critical race theory literature, as the focus of 
critical race theory expands beyond what Juan Perea has termed the "black-white binary" 
and into new areas of social practice. See Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of 
Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, jointly published as 10 LA RAZA 
LJ. 127 (1998) and 85 CAL . L. REv. 1213 (1998). For a leading example, see IAN F. HANEY· 
L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAw (1996), which focuses on statutory immigration cases. 
7. The exception was the effort to treat the poor as a suspect class - which, had it not 
failed, would have required courts to develop a constitutional definition of poverty. But the 
effort did fail. Compare Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On 
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969) with San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In any case, it is likely that the 
result of these efforts, had they succeeded, would have been the definition of poverty as a 
suspect classification. Heightened constitutional scrutiny might not have been brought to 
bear on government action that defines the lines that differentiate non-poor working people 
from one another. 
8. I use the New Deal as a cutoff because the Depression Jed to an unprecedented broad­
ening of the scope of social programs, and because of the New Deal heritage of so many 
existing social programs. The New Deal may also have been the first occasion for compre­
hensive governmental consideration of the economic problems of white-collar workers -
although that claim is in need of further historical testing at the state and federal levels. 
Indeed, the Depression was a crucible for the definition of the federal government's role in a 
wide range of areas. See Alan Brinkley, The New Deal and the Idea of the State, in THE RISE 
AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 85 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 
1989). 
9. See Malamud, supra note 5, at 1854-56. 
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rights legislation to economic legislation, and from courts to admin­
istrative agencies, we can begin to see the role the law has played in 
constructing and maintaining American conceptions of class. 
We are perhaps accustomed to thinking that the government de­
fines "the poor" as a class in the course of enacting and implement­
ing social welfare legislation.10 We are less accustomed to thinking 
that the law plays a role in the way we understand the middle 
classes - or, to address my readers more directly, the way we un­
derstand ourselves. There is, of course, a parallel here to the issue 
of the social and legal construction of race and gender. Tradition­
ally, scholarship on race and gender and the law has focused on the 
law's involvement in giving shape to black race and female gender. 
To use the language of linguistics for a moment, it is as if law were 
seen as doing its work only on the categories "marked" as somehow 
different or problematic. Restricting critical analysis to the 
"marked" categories leaves the "unmarked" categories - those in 
which power resides - seemingly as facts of nature rather than as 
products of culture. Just as race scholarship has now moved in the 
direction of problematizing "whiteness,"11 I wish to problematize 
the American middle classes. 
For scholars interested in the subject of class and the law -
particularly insofar as the middle classes are concerned- the New 
Deal is a pivotal period.12 The Depression had sweeping effects 
across the American class hierarchy, and the breadth of its effects 
was recognized by government administrators. In the words of 
Harry Hopkins, the director of the Federal Emergency Relief Ad­
ministration (FERA), "the whole crowd is caught in this thing, the 
finest people in America."13 "[D]octors [and] dentists," "minis-
10. See, e.g., NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH 
(Constance F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., 1995). 
11. For whiteness literature in history and the humanities, see, e.g., NoEL lGNATIEV, 
How TiiE IrusH BECAME WmTE (1995); ToNI MoRRISON, PLAYING IN TiiE DARK: WHITE­
NESS AND TiiE LITERARY IMAGINATION (1992); DAVID ROEDIGER, TOWARDS TiiE ABOLI­
TION OF WmTENESs (1994); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WmTENESs: RACE AND 
TiiE MAKING OF TiiE AMERICAN WORKING CLASs (1991); WmTE TRAsH: RACE AND CLAss 
IN AMERICA (Matt Wray & Annalee Newitz eds., 1997). As some of the titles cited reflect, 
the whiteness literature is deeply concerned with the role race has played in shaping the 
class-consciousness (or lack thereof) of white American workers. For critical race theory 
literature on whiteness, see CRincAL WmTE STUDIES: LooKING BEHIND TiiE MmRoR 
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997). 
12. See KocKA, supra note 5, at 203 ("Economic distress, unemployment, and public re­
lief during the depression, which for the first time touched significant numbers in the middle 
class, stimulated public discussion of white collar workers at the very time that their middle 
class status was seriously threatened by that same crisis."). 
13. Harry L. Hopkins, NBC Radio Address (Oct. 10, 1933) (Roosevelt Archives, Papers 
of Harry Hopkins [hereinafter FDR, Hopkins Papers], Box 9, Speeches 1933-36). 
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ters,"14 "architects, engineers,"15 and "ever increasing numbers of 
people with clerical and professional training"16 found themselves 
unemployed and needing relief.17 Who were the "finest people"? 
Were all white-collar workers in this group, or only the fanciest 
among them? How was the line to be drawn? Were only white­
collar workers in this group, or did the upper tier of skilled blue­
collar workers qualify? Was their status as "the finest people in 
America" to be considered in determining whether and how to as­
sist them? If so, the drawing of class lines - including class lines 
within the broad category of the American middle classes - would 
need to become a core part of the New Deal project. Would differ­
ential treatment always benefit the "finest people," or would they 
sometimes be excluded from much-needed assistance on the 
grounds that their status as the "finest people" made assistance in­
appropriate? If that was the choice, would the "finest people" cling 
to their high status, or would they fight their classification as too 
"fine" to be helped? 
Take, for example, the field activities of FERA. Lorena 
Hickok, a journalist who became a leading FERA investigator and 
14. Id. 
15. Proceedings, General Meeting, Federal Civil Works Administration (Nov. 15, 1933) 
(FDR, Hopkins Papers, Box 9, Speeches 1933-36); see also Harry L. Hopkins, NBC Radio 
Address (June 24, 1933) (FDR, Hopkins Papers, Box 9, Speeches 1933-36). For a discussion 
of Depression unemployment among engineers and scientists and their role in crystallizing 
the concept of work-spreading as a solution to the problem of unemployment, see BENJAMIN 
KLINE HUNNICUIT, WORK WITHOUT END: ABANDONING SHORTER HOURS FOR THE RIGHT 
TO WORK 267-88 (1988). 
16. Memorandum from Jacob Baker, Director of Work Relief and Special Projects, to All 
Governors and State Emergency Relief Administrations (Oct. 30, 1933) (Roosevelt Archives, 
Official File 444, Federal Emergency Relief Administration [hereinafter FERA], Box 1, 
Chron 1/33-4/34) [documents in the Roosevelt Archives Official File collection hereinafter 
FDR/OF). 
17. Hopkins noted in July 1933 that he was sure the problem of unemployment among 
such groups as teachers, nurses, photographers, actors, and musicians was greater than stan­
dard unemployment statistics showed. See Memorandum from Harry L. Hopkins to Presi­
dent Roosevelt (July 7, 1933) (FDR/OF 264, Unemployment, Box 1, May-Sept. 1933) 
(quoting William Green). He continued to express concern about unemployed professionals. 
See, e.g., Memorandum from Harry L. Hopkins to President Roosevelt (Aug. 14, 1933) 
(FDR/OF 264, Unemployment, Box 1, May-Sept. 1933 folder) (discussing role for unem­
ployed teachers); Press Release from Harry L. Hopkins to the Governors and State Emer­
gency Relief Administrators (Aug. 19, 1933) (FDR/OF 444, FERA, Box 1, Jan. 1933 - Apr. 
1934) (publicizing plan to provide "relief teachers" - unemployed teachers - to teach chil­
dren in rural areas and adults in cities and rural areas). By June 1935, 40,000 teachers were 
employed in FERA's adult education projects. See Memorandum from President Roosevelt 
to Elsie Long (June 29, 1935) (FDR/OF 444, FERA, Box 3, June-July 1935). Data made 
available by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1934 on employment and unem­
ployment levels in the United States from 1930 to 1933 showed that employment levels for 
"management and professional" employees exhibited the same pattern as for other types of 
employment during the period. See American Federation of Labor, Chart: Employment and 
Unemployment in the U.S. (n.d.) (FDR/OF 264, Unemployment, Box 1, May-Sept. 1933). 
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close confidant to Eleanor Roosevelt,18 filed a report for transmittal 
to President Roosevelt in April of 1934 "on the white collar picture 
in Alabama."19 White-collar workers (Hickok specifically men­
tioned musicians, accountants, insurance managers, pharmacists, 
engineers, architects, small business owners, and clerks) presented 
two related problems to FERA field workers in Birmingham: how 
much aid to give them, and how to give it to them. As to amounts, 
Hickok observed: 
They want to cling to some semblance at least of their normal stan­
dards of living. And we can't give them enough relief to make that 
possible . . . .  We can provide overalls, but not tailored business suits. 
We can't keep those white collars laundered.20 
The problem was not merely - or even mostly - the lack of suffi­
cient funds to accord higher hourly benefits for federal work relief 
to these white-collar workers. The problem was how to justify us­
ing the collar-color line in federal programs: 
I don't see what we can do about it. We can hardly increase their 
allotments. Hardly, with the unions howling bloody murder for an 
increase both in hourly rate and number of hours per week for skilled 
labor. BUT - mark my words - you let the unions get away with it, 
18. Lorena Hickok was assigned by the Associated Press to cover the Roosevelt presi­
dential campaign. As of October 1932 she was assigned exclusively to cover Eleanor 
Roosevelt, who became her close friend. Hickok resigned from the Associated Press in June 
1933 because she thought she had lost her objectivity, and in August 1933 became Chief 
Investigator for FERA. See Biographical Description of Lorena Hickok, 1893-1968 (n.d.) 
(Roosevelt Archives, Lorena Hickok Papers [hereinafter FDR, Hickok Papers]). Historians 
have differed in their accounts of the Hickok-Eleanor Roosevelt relationship, with some side­
stepping the question of its sexual nature and others affirming it. Compare, e.g., JosEPH P. 
LASH, ELEANOR AND FRANKLIN 349, 353-56 (1971) and Dorus FABER, THE LIFE OF LoRENA 
HICKOK, E.R.'s FRIEND (1980) with 1 BLANCHE WIESEN CooK, ELEANOR RoosEVELT, 1884-
1933, 478-80 (1992). For Hopkins's decision to transmit Hickok's field memoranda directly 
to Roosevelt and his serious consideration of them, see FABER, supra, at 143. See also id. at 7 
("In 1935 Hopkins told the President's wife that posterity would consider these vivid Hickok 
reports the best available history of the Depression, and his prediction appears to have been 
not far from the mark."). Many of Hickok's reports are published in ONE THIRD OF A NA­
TION: LoRENA HICKOK REPORTS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION (Richard Lowitt & Maurine 
Beasley eds., 1981). 
19. Report from Lorena A. Hickok to Harry L. Hopkins (Apr. 2, 1934) [hereinafter 
Hickok Birmingham Report], attached to Memorandum from Harry L. Hopkins to President 
Roosevelt (Apr. 13, 1934) (FDR/OF 444, FERA, Box 1, Jan. 1933-Apr. 1934). 
20. Id. at 2. But see Memorandum from Jacob Baker, Director of Work Relief and Spe­
cial Projects, to All Governors and State Relief Administrators (Oct. 30, 1933) (FDR/OF 
444, FERA, Box 1, Oct.-Dec. 1933) (stating that his office has always advised the states that 
they "are justified in taking account of the prior standard of living [of clerical and profes­
sional workers] in determining budget deficiencies"). The opposition of the term "men in 
overalls" (rather than the term "blue collar") to the term "white collar" reflects the fact that 
"blue-collar is a post-World War II word; white-collar dates from around 1910." MARGo 
ANDERSON CONK, THE UNITED STATES CENSUS AND LABOR FORCE CHANGE: A HISTORY 
OF OcCUPATION STATISTICS, 1870 TO 1940, at 162 n.21 (1980). 
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if you accede to that demand and fail to increase the allotments of the 
white collar people, too, you're going to have trouble.21 
Just as the white-collar workers wanted federal relief programs to 
recognize their higher status, so did skilled manual workers.22 The 
administration of federal relief programs was becoming a field for 
contesting claims of class privilege. 
Class was a battleground not only for the appropriate benefit 
levels for white-collar workers, but also - or perhaps even more so 
- for the appropriate methods. for delivering benefits to them. 
Hickok described a state-level "Placement Bureau for Professional 
People," which had been extended to "cover the whole white collar 
group. "23 For these white-collar workers, every effort was made to 
preserve their dignity: for example, they received their benefits 
without needing· to visit relief offices, and they were subject to 
fewer home visits by social workers than were ordinary relief recipi­
ents. Hickok observed: 
This method of introducing white collar people to relief is about as 
painless as any could be . . . . But if we should adopt it as a national 
policy, I can see plenty of trouble ahead. From Union Labor. Ever 
let them get wind of the fact that we are granting to the white collar 
group any sort of privilege that we deny their skilled labor, and listen 
to the howl. And let skilled labor in, and then you'll get demands on 
behalf of unskilled labor. Well - we can't take EVERYBODY out 
of the intake.24 
Hickok saw in Alabama in the early days of FERA what became 
increasingly clear during the New Deal period. The government's 
broad power to determine which class differences mattered for the 
purposes of its programs was limited by the power of groups organ­
ized to protect their own interests. The programs that emerged 
from this contest delivered not only economic relief, but also pow­
erful official messages about the nature of the American class 
system. 
No one was sure how white-collar workers would come to view 
their own interests during the Depression. The early 1930s was a 
period of growing union activism and left-oriented political activity 
21. Hickok Birmingham Report, supra note 19, at 3. 
22. On the class position of skilled craftsmen, see, e.g., GA VIN MAcKENzIE, THB Arus­
TOCRACY OF LABOR: THE PosmoN OF SKILLED CRAFTSMEN IN THE AMERICAN CLASS 
STRUCTURE (1973). For a British study, see JoHN H. GOLDTHORPE ET AL., THE AFFLUENT 
WORKER IN THE CLASS STRUCTURE (1969). 
23. Hickok Birmingham Report, supra note 19, at 3. 
24. Id. 
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among white-collar workers.25 Several months after Hickok filed 
her Alabama report, FERA commissioned a set of confidential re­
ports on the situation of white-collar workers around the country. 
One such report - marked by Roosevelt's staff as an item to be 
placed at his bedside - examined the mood of white-collar workers 
on the West Side of Manhattan for signs of potential leftist activism. 
Wayne W. Parrish, the journalist who wrote the report, observed: 
In this white collar neighborhood, those on relief are to� de­
P.ressed and "bowled over" by the shock of going on relief to take any 
action. Only the younger ones would follow a leader. Most still feel 
their problesm [sic] are individual ones and don't blame anybody in 
particular. Relief checks are extremely inadequate for this white col­
lar group, but [the] feeling is that if checks continue to come there will 
be no outward trouble, only serious psychiatric problems.26 
Few white-collar workers were sufficiently organized in the 1930s to 
participate in governmental debates on their place in the American 
class structure. Donald Richberg, a legal realist writer and union 
labor lawyer who became one of the framers and leaders of the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA), complained in 1931 
about the "hordes of 'white collar men' who, lacking the vigor and 
self-reliance to organize themselves for self-improvement, give sup­
port to the claim that their services are nqt worth more than their 
miserable wages."27 Although there were some exceptions (news­
paper reporters most prominent among them), white-collar workers 
generally remained unorganized throughout the Depression.28 
Tuey therefore left it to government actors to represent their inter­
ests in the ongoing debate on whether they were so inherently dif­
ferent from ordinary workers as to require differential treatment -
for good or for ill - in New Deal programs. 
Tue New Deal legislative innovation that occasioned the pe­
riod's earliest and most sustained debate about the legal status of 
white-collar workers was the adoption of comprehensive wage and 
25. See MICHAEL DENNING, THE CuLTURAL FRONT: THE LABORING OF AMERICAN 
CULTURE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 9 (1996). 
26. Report of Wayne R. Parrish to Harry L. Hopkins 9 (Nov. 17, 1934), attached to Mem­
orandum from Harry L. Hopkins to Marguerite A. LeHand (Dec. 10, 1934) (FDR/OF, 
FERA, Box 2). Parrish's report was forwarded to Roosevelt by Harry Hopkins with a cover 
note to Roosevelt's personal secretary stating: "The President was anxious to go over these, 
and I would appreciate it very much if you could give them to him tonight." Id. at 1. There is 
a notation on the top left comer of the page, in handwriting, presumably Miss LeHand's, 
with the word "Bedside." 
27. Donald R. Richberg, The Industrial Liberalism of Justice Brandeis, 31 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1094, 1102 (1931). 
28. For a discussion of exceptions, see DENNING, supra note 25, at 15; KocKA, supra note 
5, at 206-46 & tbl.4.6. 
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hour legislation. In the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 
Congress exempted "executive, administrative, [and] professional" 
employees from the statute's requirement that employers pay their 
employees an overtime premium for the hours they worked beyond 
the statutory maximum of forty hours per week.29 The FLSA's so­
called "white-collar exemptions" - which are still in effect and are 
still the subject of controversy3o - arose out of a prehistory of 
wage and hour regulation during the period of the National Recov­
ery Administration.31 The purpose of this Article is to use the pre­
history and early development of these so-called "white-collar 
exemptions" to explore the importance of the state as a locus for 
29. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1944). The exemption for 
"executive, administrative, [and] professional" employees is found in§ 13 of the statute, 29 
U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The FLSA also contains minimum-wage provisions, but there are no 
upper-level exemptions to the minimum wage. The upper-level exemptions to the FLSA's 
overtime provisions include an exemption for outside salesmen. That exemption originated 
at least in substantial part from the difficulty employers would face in monitoring the work of 
traveling employees, and thus has a different set of cultural resonances. It is for that reason 
not productive to include outside salesmen in this article's discussion. A recent move to 
extend the exemption to certain inside salesmen - on the grounds that they are like profes­
sionals and that the work they do is no different from that of outside salesmen except for its 
location - would be of interest in a parallel study looking at current debates on upper-level 
exemptions. See The Sales Incentive Compensation Act, H.R. 1, 105th Cong. 1998; High­
lights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1135, at A-8 (June 12, 1998); for analysis, see, e.g., FLSA: 
House Committee Agrees to Expand FLSA Exemptions for Sales Staff, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 63, at A-6 (Apr. 2, 1998). 
30. Reform proposals are discussed in the literature cited supra note 2. 
31. Similar themes can be explored in other New Deal programs. The New Deal statute 
whose class implications have been most thoroughly explored is the National Labor Rela­
tions Act, into which an express supervisory exemption was introduced in 1947 after a 
number of years of organizing efforts among supervisors. For the statutory provision, see 29 
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994); for the history, see Virginia A. Seitz, Legal, Legislative, and Manage­
rial Responses to the Organization of Supervisory Employees in the 1940's, 28 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 199 (1984); for significant current case law, see NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement 
Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571 (1994), and for academic critiques, see, e.g., Marion Crain, 
Building Solidarity Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A Blueprint for Worker Empow­
ennent, 74 MINN. L. REv. 953 (1990); George Feldman, Workplace Power and Collective 
Activity: The Supervisory and Managerial Exclusions in Labor Law, 37 Aruz. L. REv. 525 
(1995); Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining with Employee Supervision of 
Management, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1988). As of 1947, the statute specifies that professionals 
have the choice of whether to organize in mixed units or units containing only professionals. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b ). For scholarly treatment, see David M. Rabban, Can American Labor 
Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 
(1990). And the Supreme Court in 1974 approved an extra-statutory "managerial" exemp­
tion. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); see also NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 
444 U.S. 672 (1980); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered 
Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1775 (1989). I am focusing on hours 
regulation rather than the regulation of unionization for four main reasons: (1) upper-level 
white-collar exemptions in hours regulation predate those under the NLRA; (2) their history 
and social significance are less known; (3) they arose \vithin the administrative state over a 
short and well-defined period of time at the core of New Deal labor policy; and (4) class line­
drawing in the field of hours regulation carries less of an implication of "class conflict" and -
ironically, for that very reason - comes closer to speaking about class as most Americans 
understand it. See Malamud, supra note 5, at 1863-66. 
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debates about the American middle class and the role of the state 
as an intervenor in those debates. 
Any effort to tell a story about the relationship between the 
middle classes and the state, of course, raises important antecedent 
questions about both parties to the relationship. Let us begin with 
the middle classes. To what extent was their identity and internal 
structure in question during the pre-New Deal period? How impor­
tant was the collar-color line to the class system? Was the system 
stable or in flux? Did the lines drawn between different types of 
workers in the personnel practices of pre-New Deal industry - for 
example, the distinction between "hourly" work and "salaried" 
work - capture functional differences between jobs? For that mat­
ter, how were cultural distinctions between types of jobs related to 
observable functional distinctions between them? We shall see that 
the nature and scope of the middle classes and the significance of 
the collar-color line were contested and unsettled preceding the 
New Deal, that business practices often set out to manipulate 
worker self-conceptions rather than simply to follow them, and that 
the question of where to locate the line between ordinary and elite 
workers was subject to considerable controversy. 
Turning from questions about the middle class to questions 
about the state, the task of drawing class lines for purposes of hours 
regulation was predominantly located within administrative agen­
cies. How did the denizens of the New Deal administrative state 
understand their role - in general and with regard to issues of 
class? To what extent did many government actors' Progressive 
and Legal Realist leanings influence how they saw their role and 
how they performed it? Did they come to the task with relevant 
expertise, and, if not, did they have the opportunity to develop ex­
pertise on the job? How did political and resource constraints 
shape their actions? We shall find that government actors were 
often stymied in their efforts - efforts their Progressive and Realist 
orientations demanded - to exercise independent judgment in the 
field of hours regulation. Although the regulation of working hours 
was a central part of the New Deal effort to alleviate unemploy­
ment, few administrators had prior relevant experience. Little ob­
jective information was available about the likely efficacy of hours 
restriction for differen� categories of jobs. Because white-collar 
workers were largely unorganized and unrepresented in public 
hearings, agency officials often were faced with the task of advocat­
ing for their interests without a clear picture of what those interests 
were. We shall see that government actors did exercise independ-
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ent judgment in the face of insistent business-community pressure 
to exempt all white-collar workers from hours regulation - but do­
ing so was a constant struggle. 
In addition, the story of the white-collar exemptions readily 
serves as an occasion for asking a normative question. Is govern­
ment involvement in class line-drawing a good thing? When the 
government draws class lines, it puts its imprimatur on a particular 
view of the social world. One would find government involvement 
a bad thing if one thinks the government is likely to be swayed by 
the agendas of powerful interest groups - or, alternatively, if one 
thinks it is important for rival social groups to fight it out in a pri­
vate marketplace of ideas. Conversely, one would find government 
involvement in class line-drawing a good thing if one believes that 
the government has unique expertise, or that power inequalities will 
cause the business community's preferred map of the class structure 
to prevail over workers' interests unless the government intervenes. 
The historical narrative reveals that both scenarios are true to some 
extent in New Deal hours regulation. Sometimes the government 
employed expertise and used it to challenge the predominant views 
and practices of the business community. But sometimes the gov­
ernment capitulated to the business community, and in so doing 
made it more difficult for workers' alternative conceptions of the 
class structure to be heard in future years. We shall see from the 
example of New Deal hours regulation that government involve­
ment in class line-drawing can be either a good thing or a bad thing. 
It depends on the approach the government actors take and the 
skill with which they execute it. 
I focus particularly, then, on the government's various ap­
proaches to class line-drawing. The narrative reveals that govern­
ment actors were best able to exercise independent judgment when 
. they kept a clear focus on the relationship between the lines they 
were drawing and the ultimate goals of hours regulation. In con­
trast, they were generally less effective when they saw their man­
date as the drawing of an all-purpose map, representing their 
perception of the class system. The contrast between the first ap­
proach (which I call "purposive") and the second (which I call "de­
scriptive") is a recurrent theme of this Article. I suggest, at the end 
of the Article, that we should reevaluate the Fair Labor Standards 
Act and its white-collar exemptions in purposive terms. 
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I. PRE-FLSA ANTECEDENTS 
A. Wage and Hour Legislation and the "White-Collar Classes" 
Before the Great Depression 
For well over a hundred years before the New Deal, a social 
movement aimed to reduce the average weekly working hours of 
the American worker.32 The movement had four major goals: im­
proving the health of the working classes by lessening the intensity 
of their exposure to workplace hazards; diminishing unemployment 
by spreading the available work among all those customarily em­
ployed in a particular field; increasing the leisure time of the work­
ing classes to facilitate their education and full participation as 
citizens; and establishing working hours as a sphere of worker con­
trol over the process of industrial production. Each justification has 
enjoyed different degrees of acceptance over time. The first, health, 
characterized pre-New Deal hours regulation; the second, work­
spreading, was the central policy goal of the New Deal's hours pol­
icy; the third and fourth, leisure and worker control, have never 
been embraced by the federal government as a reason to shorten 
the American working day.33 
Almost all pre-New Deal legislation limiting the working hours 
of male workers applied only to "laborers, workmen, and mechan­
ics."34 White-collar workers were not covered.35 There were many 
reasons for this restricted application of hours regulation. The most 
32. For book-length studies of the history of American hours reform, see HUNNicurr, 
supra note 15; TERESA ANNE MURPHY, TEN HouRS' LABOR: RELIGION, REFORM, AND 
GENDER lN EARLY NEW ENGLAND (1992); DAVID R. ROEDIGER & PHILIP S. FoNER, OuR 
OWN TIME: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR AND THE WORKING DAY (1989); RONNIE 
STEINBERG, WAGES AND HouRS: LABOR AND REFORM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
(1982). For a historical study published in the 1930s, see MARION CoTIER CAHILL, SHORTER 
HouRS: A STUDY oF THE MOVEMENT SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (1932). 
33. For a defense of the leisure justification, and a history of its early ascendancy and 
later abandonment in favor of full-employment goals, see HUNNicurr, supra note 15; 
MURPHY, supra note 32. On the issue of leisure as an issue in today's economy, see JULIET B. 
SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1991). 
34. JoHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 265 
(rev. enlarged ed. 1927) (citing the 1912 version of federal employment statute). Of course, 
limiting legislative protection to "laborers, workmen, and mechanics" provided some groups 
the opportunity to test the limits of the category. See KocKA, supra note 5, at 161-64 (dis­
cussing successful demands by unionized draftsmen at war shipyards during World War I to 
be included in the "laborers and mechanics" classification). For an analysis of the coverage 
of early labor standards legislation, see STEINBERG, supra note 32, at 59-87. 
35. Co=ons and Andrews note one exception: the Alaskan eight-hour law "covered all 
workers, including partners and corporation officials, except in certain emergencies," and was 
held unconstitutional in 1918 in federal court because 
[T]he statute, applying as it did to all occupations alike, was not shown to be a health 
measure, but was a "meddlesome interference" with individual rights . . . •  On similar 
grounds the Solicitor-general of the United States declined to allow the case to be ap­
pealed to a higher court, so that no final test was had on this, the only enforceable univer-
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obvious was that pre-New Deal hours legislation was health­
oriented, and the working conditions of white-collar workers were 
not as injurious to health as those of industrial workers. In addi­
tion, the two groups represented in the shorter-hours movement of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century were skilled manual 
workers, represented through their labor unions, and unskilled in­
dustrial workers, represented by the middle-class reformers who 
took on their cause. White-collar workers were not organized into 
unions,36 and white-collar reformers apparently did not see their 
own kind as overworked. 
Indeed, male white-collar workers would have found working­
hours regulation contrary to their own interest. They viewed them­
selves as occupying entry-level positions that would lead to jobs in 
the upper reaches of the business class. They took it for granted 
that they needed to work long hours to gain the training that would 
advance their careers. 37 Furthermore, they would have found 
shorter hours - and, worse, government intervention to secure 
shorter hours - inconsistent with the status they sought to main­
tain in their own and their employers' eyes. White-collar workers 
identified upwards with their bosses, not downwards with mere 
manual workers. Even if white-collar workers in fact needed 
shorter hours, their need to maintain their social status would have 
deterred them from seeking reform. This distinction between the 
instrumental ("what do we need? what is our problem, and what 
will solve it?") and the symbolic ("what does it mean? what does it 
say about us and our place in society?") permeates the discussion of 
hours regulation, both in my period of study and in this Article.38 
We shall have many occasions to return to it. 
How accurate was the self-perception of the white-collar worker 
of the 1920s and 1930s? Was the white-collar group unified, in that 
the members of its lowest tier had more in common with its higher 
tiers than with the most affluent members of the blue-collar class? 
sal eight-hour law covering private employment enacted in America up to the beginning of 
1936. 
JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 140 (4th rev. 
ed. 1936) (emphasis added). 
36. See KocKA, supra note 5, at 178 (noting that "(e]xcept for the large Brotherhood of 
Railway Clerks and the tiny RCIPA, at the end of the 1920s there were no white collar 
unions in the private sector"). For a study of white-collar unionization in the decade follow­
ing the Depression, see NATIONAL INDUS. CoNF. Bo. !Ne., Srooras IN PERSONNEL POLICY, 
No. 101, WHITE COLLAR UNIONIZATION {1949). 
37. See DEVAULT, supra note 5; OLIVIER ZUNz, MAKING AMERICA CORPORATE, 1870-
1920, at 125-48 (1990). 
38. I thank Don Herzog for putting the distinction in these terms. 
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Was the amount and pace of upward mobility from clerk to 
business-owner sufficient to justify the clerk's upward identifica­
tion? These questions occupied a considerable amount of attention 
in the period, from a wide range of writers and scholars.39 
The upward identification of lower-level white-collar workers 
was, as University of Chicago economist Frank William Taussig ex­
plained in 1936, crucial to the operation of the American system of 
class stratification. Taussig recognized five "non-competing 
groups,"40 which ultimately resolved into "the two great classes of 
the soft handed and the hard handed."41 The bottom three groups, 
unskilled, semiskilled, and skilled manual workers, identified with 
one another. The next group up the ladder, the lower middle class, 
was made up of "clerks, bookkeepers, salesmen, small tradesmen, 
railway conductors, foremen, superintendents, [and] teachers in the 
lower grades."42 Taussig observed that the lower middle class iden­
tified with the top group (the "well-to-do"),43 and its "feeling of 
contempt for the manual laborers of all sorts, whether skilled or 
unskilled,"44 was both central to its identity and dangerous to its 
economic health. The democratization of public secondary educa­
tion meant that "[t]here [was] a plethora of persons qualified to do 
[lower middle class] work and a consequent tendency for their 
wages to fall rather than to rise. The earnings of a good mechanic 
[were] in the United States higher than those of the average 
clerk."45 But the lower middle Class failed to respond to market 
39. See infra text accompanying notes 40-81. 
40. 2 F.W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS § 47-6 (3d rev. ed. 1936). The five 
groups are: (1) "day laborers ... who have nothing to offer but their bodily strength ... 
[including] factory employees whose work is of the simplest sort"; (2) "those who, while not 
needing specialized skill, yet bear some responsibility and must have some alertness of mind" 
(for example, trolley motormen and miners); (3) "the aristocracy of the manual laboring 
class: the skilled workmen"; (4) "the group that approaches the well-to-do: the lower middle 
class, which avoids rough and dirty work, and aims at some sort of clerical or semi­
intellectual occupation. Here are clerks, bookkeepers, salesmen, small tradesmen, railway 
conductors, foremen, superintendents, teachers in the lower grades"; (5) "the well-to-do -
those who regard themselves as the highest class and certainly are the most favored class. 
Here are the professions, so called - the lawyers, physicians, clergymen; teachers of the 
higher grades; salaried officials, public and private, in positions of responsibility and power; 
not least, the class of business men and managers of industry, who form in democratic com­
munities the backbone of the whole group." Id. 
41. Id. § 47-6, at 144. 
42. Id. § 47-6(4). 
43. See id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. § 47-7, at 147; accord KocKA, supra note 5, at 178-81 (noting that in the 1920s 
many white-collar workers earned less than skilled manual workers and that widening access 
to commercial and technical education increased competition for white-collar jobs); see also 
DEVAULT, supra note 5, at 24-47 (discussing clerical education). 
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pressures in part because it carried the false hope that routine cleri­
cal work would someday lead to a professional or managerial job -
"the alluring tho [sic] deceptive chance of a prize."46 
Leon C. Marshall, a colleague of Taussig's, also argued that the 
prevalent perception of the superiority of white-collar work was an 
impediment to the labor market's capacity to allocate jobs accord­
ing to natural abilities. In the mid-1920s, Marshall was a professor 
of political economy at Chicago; he went on to chair Chicago's busi­
ness school in the late 1920s, to join the Legal Realists at the Johns 
Hopkins Institute for the Study of Law, and then to play a number 
of important roles in the National Recovery Administration in the 
1930s. Marshall was active throughout his career in writing educa­
tional materials on economics for use in secondary education. One 
of his efforts, The Story of Human Progress: An Introduction to 
Social Studies, echoed Taussig's critique of class stratification. Mar­
shall observed, for example, that "[b ]ecause of a foolish prejudice, 
many persons go into 'white collar jobs' rather than into those re­
quiring overalls."47 For Marshall, "[t]he fact that some jobs give the 
holder social position makes them attractive to certain persons. "48 
But as the phrase "foolish prejudice" sought to make clear, 
Marshall saw the influence of prestige as an unfortunate impedi­
ment to the project of "finding one's place" in the economy based 
on natural abilities.49 
Sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd addressed the question 
whether white-collar workers in the 1920s and early 1930s were jus­
tified in thinking that they were on their way up the social ladder. 
Their famous "Middletown" studies,50 comparing Muncie, Indiana, 
46. TAUSSIG, supra note 40 § 47-7, at 144. 
47. LEON C. MARsHALL, THE STORY OF HUMAN PROGRESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
SOCIAL STUDIES 407-08 (1925). 
48. Id. at 408. 
49. See id. at 407. 
50. See ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN 
.AMERICAN CULTURE (1929) [hereinafter LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN]; RoBERT S. LYND & 
HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANsmoN: A STUDY m CULTURAL CONFLICTS 
(1937) [hereinafter LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANsmoN]. Sociology as a field did 
not take up the problem of class as a major area of research interest until after World War I. 
See Howard E. Jensen, Editorial Note to MILTON M. GoRDON, SocIAL CLASS IN AMERICAN 
Soc10LOGY vii (1950). Despite the fact that "[n]either of the Lynds was a sociologist or had 
primary training in sociology . • . •  [Robert] Lynd became a 'sociologist' of the first order," 
HOWARD W. ODUM, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY: THE STORY OF SOCIOLOGY IN TIIE UNITED 
STATES THROUGH 1950, at 391-92 (1951), and the Lynds' work is now and was in its time 
widely recognized as a major contribution to the field of sociology. The Lynds' work "was an 
instantaneous success" both among popular readers and academics. See JoHN MADGE, THE 
ORIGINS OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIOLOGY 128 (1962). For further discussion of the Lynds, their 
background, and their influence, see GoRDoN, supra, at 63-84; MICHAEL D. GRIMES, CLASS 
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY: AN ANALYSIS OF THEORIES AND 
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in 1925 and 1935, suggest that the lower-level white-collar worker's 
sense that he was on an upward occupational trajectory was becom­
ing increasingly unrealistic. 
When the Lynds first visited Middletown in 1925, they con­
cluded that the community had only two classes, a "working class" 
and a "business class," the latter of which included "an infinite 
number of gradations - all the way . . . from the retail clerk and 
cashier to the factory owner and professional man. "51 Their classifi­
cation system depended first and foremost on the line between 
those who "address their activities in getting their living primarily 
to things" and those who "address their activities predominantly to 
people in the selling or promotion of things, services, and ideas."52 
This distinction was difficult to apply in practice. Is the cashier a 
cash-register operator who deals with things or a salesclerk who 
deals with people? How is one to deal with "users of highly-skilled 
techniques - architects, surgeons, chemists, and so on" who "ad­
dres[ s] their activities in getting a living more to things than peo­
ple,"53 but who were viewed by no one as members of the working 
class? To deal with the difficult or anomalous cases, the "twilight 
belt in which some members of the two groups overlap and 
merge,"54 the Lynds relied considerably on criteria other than jobs' 
functional characteristics. They observed that "since it is the busi­
ness interests of the city that dominate and give their tone, in the 
main, to the lawyer, chemist, architect, engineer, teacher, and even 
to some extent preacher and doctor," and "all their other activities 
would place them with the business class," placing them within the 
business class "by and large accurately represents the facts."55 
MEASUREMENT STRATEGIES 56-62 (1991) (noting that "[t]heir studies of 'Middletown' repre­
sent the first use of class as an organizing dimension in a holistic setting within American 
sociology and served as an important stimulus for subsequent research on the subject"); 
CHARLES HUNT PAGE, CLASs AND AMERICAN SoCioLOGY: FROM WARD To Ross 216 n.7, 
236, 252 (1964). The similar work of social anthropologist W. Lloyd Warner and his school 
on "Yankee City" falls just outside the time frame of this article. See, e.g., W. LLOYD 
WARNER & PAUL s. LUNT, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF A MODERN COMMUNITY (1941); w. LLOYD 
WARNER & J.O. Low, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM OF THE MODERN FACTORY - THE STRIKE: A 
SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1947). 
51. LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN, supra note 50, at 22-23. 
52. Id. at 22. 
53. Id. at 22 n.3. 
54. Id. at 23. 
55. Id. at 23 n.3; cf. MADGE, supra note 50, at 136 (noting the problems, "such as where 
one should place the dentist, who is obviously a professional man although he deals with 
things, that is, teeth, or the sculptor or musician, who equally deals with things," and noting 
with admiration that "[s]ensibly [the Lynds] decided not to be too pedantic about such cases 
but put them in with the business classes"). 
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The Lynds returned to Middletown in 1935, during the Depres­
sion, and published the results of their second study in 1937.56 They 
saw two major changes. The Middletown of 1925 was a place where 
the lines between the two classes were permeable. By 1935, that 
had changed. "Above the foreman's rung, the ladder is ceasing to 
be one ladder: there have virtually ceased to be rungs between the 
foreman and a higher section of the ladder beyond his reach where 
an entirely new set of personnel usually not recruited from 
working-class personnel begins."57 This, they saw, interfered with 
America's "exuberant boast of a classless society."58 The other sig­
nifi.cant change was that the business class itself was splintering. A 
small group at the top of the business class was becoming a "nas­
. cent 'upper class,' " while at the same time there was "the appar-
ently clearer demarcation of another and larger group of families at 
the lower end of the business class as a Middletown 'middle 
class."'59 This was a diverse group of "'small' white-collar folk -
struggling manufacturers with no particular future, the smaller re­
tailers and tradespeople,' salesmen, officeholders, schoolteachers, 
and many of the growing group of hired professional assistants" 
who were hired directly by industry.6° Civil servants, clerks and 
clerical workers were also part of this newly emerging class. The 
Lynds' observations in 1935 no longer supported their earlier view 
that a single business class reached down to include these workers, 
bound together by ties of sociality and expected mobility.61 
In contemplating the emergence of a new and less-privileged 
middle class in Middletown, the key question for the Lynds was 
how this new middle class understood itself - whether it identified 
upwards (with the upper tier of the business class) or downwards 
(with foremen and skilled industrial workers and, below them, with 
semiskilled and unskilled workers). The Lynds noted the work of 
Lewis Corey, a Marxist who argued in 1935 that only self-delusion 
56. See LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANsmoN, supra note 50. 
57. Id. at 71. 
58. Id. at 72-73 ("Should the long term trend actually prove to be toward the contracting 
of working class hopes to the permanent boundaries of nineteen dollar suits, $2.50 shoes, and 
a second hand Chevie, while raises, promotions - all the things associated with 'going up in 
the world' - are largely confined to the three in each ten of Middletown's income earners 
who fall in the business class," then there will be "a system of social organization which no 
one in Middletown is today ready to call 'American."') 
59. Id. at 455. 
60. Id. at 455-56. 
61. The Lynds saw this trend as exacerbated by the Depression but not entirely deter­
mined by it. See id. at 72. This is in part because in the 10 years between the field work 
underlying the two volumes, Middletown first went through a period of boom before going 
through depression. See id. at xi. 
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kept the new propertyless middle classes in alliance with capital and 
that the Depression would fatally undermine this self-delusion.62 
The Lynds rejected the notion that this process had begun. To the 
Lynds, members of the new Middletown middle class still identified 
with the upper classes.63 But the Lynds saw the strain in the middle 
class's efforts to do so: "[They] think of themselves as part of the 
business class and cling hard to their status as white-collar folk -
perhaps the harder because of their slowly growing sense of uneasi­
ness as to their isolation . . . .  "64 
The many tiers of white-collar workers were also a prevailing 
concern of Alba Edwards, the long-tenured director of the Census 
Bureau who was publishing on the subject in the 1930s. Edwards 
saw his project as no less than the drawing of a map of the Ameri­
can class system, expressed as a system of occupational classifica­
tions. 65 Edwards argued that "[a] man's occupation . . . .  indicates, 
with some degree of accuracy, the kind of associates he will have, 
the kinds of clothes he will wear, the kind of house he will live in, 
the kind of food he will eat, and the cultural level of his family."66 
The divisions he saw as most relevant to these issues were, first and 
foremost, the distinction between "head workers" and "hand work­
ers," and then, among hand workers, distinctions based on level of 
62. See LEWIS COREY, THE Crusrs OF TIIE MIDDLE CLAss 16 (1935). Lewis Corey was 
the nom de plume of Louis Fraina. See DENNING, supra note 25, at 99-100. Jurgen Kocka 
identifies Corey/Fraina as a "[r]elatively orthodox Marxist[ ]" who was influenced by the 
German literature on the "new middle classes" long before that literature had come to influ­
ence mainstream sociologists. See KocKA, supra note 5, at 203-05. Denning refers to him as 
"one of the most important Western Marxists in the United States" and "the great theorist of 
the Popular Front social movement," particularly because of the attention he paid to the new 
middle classes. DENNING, supra note 25, at 99. For a discussion of Corey's book The Crisis 
of the Middle Class, see DENNING, supra note 25, at 101. 
63. See LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, supra note 50, at 460; accord Ralph 
G. Hurlin & Meredith B. Givens, Shifting Occupational Patterns, in RECENT SocIAL TRENDS 
IN TIIE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF TIIE PRESIDENT'S REsEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL 
TRENDS, 268, 288-89 (Committee on Social Trends, Inc. ed., 1 vol. ed. 1934) [hereinafter 
REsEARCH CoMMITTEE ON SoCIAL TRENDs] ("The clerical or white collar employees are 
quite as dependent upon modest earnings as industrial wage earners but they are co=only 
jealous of their status as a part of the middle class."). 
64. LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, supra note 50, at 460. 
65. See JAMES G. SCOVILLE, THE JoB CONTENT OF TIIE U.S. EcoNOMY, 1940-1970, at 5-
6, 25 (1969). 
66. CoNK, supra note 20, at 26 (quoting U.S. BUREAU OF TIIE CENSUS, SIXTEENTH CEN­
sus OF TIIE UNITED STATES, 1940: COMPARATIVE OCCUPATION STATISTICS FOR TIIE UNITED 
STATES, at xi) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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skill. 67 His classification scheme emerged in his academic writings 
in the 1930s, and was adopted in the 1940 census.68 
Edwards found clerical workers hard to classify because they 
were not "fully group conscious" - they did not have a ready cate­
gory in which they placed themselves or through which they distin­
guished themselves from the "usually better-educated and better­
paid professional workers and the less well-educated but better­
paid skilled [industrial] workers"69 between whom they stood in the 
status hierarchy. Edwards was able to account for the superiority of 
clerical work to skilled industrial work only by augmenting a purely 
occupational analysis with extrinsic demographic considerations: 
clerical workers were more likely to be native born than the indus­
trial workers, and the increasing presence of women in some classi­
fications of clerical work gave to offices a middle-class gentility 
lacking in industrial plants.70 Sociologists Percy Davidson and H. 
Dewey Anderson complained in 1937 that Edwards had not over­
come "the difficulty of discovering a reliable base for the vertical 
classification of labor," and that the Edwards scale, while "ostensi­
bly social-economic," was "really occupational; or rather, it is both 
to an unknown degree."71 The heterogeneity of broad occupational 
categories belied Edwards's seemingly clean hierarchization of oc­
cupations. And the census's recourse to ranking the qualities of 
jobs' occupants instead of the functional characteristics of the jobs 
themselves made the data less useful for placing industrial organiza­
tion on a "scientific" footing as, for example, writers in the fields of 
personnel management and engineering were trying to do.72 
67. Alba M. Edwards, A Social-Economic Grouping of the Gainful Workers of the United 
States, 28 J. AM. STAT. AssN. 377 (1933). 
68. For a pre-1940 publication of the scale, see id.; for its pre-1940 use, see PERCY E. 
DAVIDSON & H. DEWEY ANDERSON, OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN COMMU· 
NITY 8 (1937). For the use of the scale in the 1940 census, see CONK, supra note 20, at 62. 
69. CoNK, supra note 20, at 63 (quoting Edwards). 
70. For statistics on the femaleness of the clerical workforce, see Alba M. Edwards, The 
"White Collar Workers," 38 MONTHLY LAB. Rav. 501 (1934). The gender-related class impli­
cations are drawn from ZUNz, supra note 37, at 138-48. Feminization's alteration of the class 
definition of occupations is a two-edged sword. Entry of women into an occupation in signif­
icant numbers tends to downgrade the occupation's prestige and income earnings, while their 
initial entry serves to render rough, traditionally male occupations genteel - with the gentil­
ity of female manners being coded as middle class. The way this balanced in white-collar 
work was that women entered these jobs before marriage, but left them upon marriage (often 
by rule). They therefore came to dominate only the lower-level white-collar jobs, and men 
did not have to compete with them for advancement. For men's occupational prestige, this 
was the best of both worlds - while it lasted. 
71. DAVIDSON & ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 7-8. 
72. See CoNK, supra note 20, at 68-69. 
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It should come as no surprise that social scientists as early as the 
mid-1920s were questioning the status relations within the white­
collar classes. Those questions were being explored in the literature 
and popular culture of the period as well. A leading example is the 
novel Babbitt, which Sinclair Lewis published in 1922.73 Babbitt is 
the saga of the self-delusional white-collar man of modest property, 
the "Good Mixer" who asserts that you "couldn't hire me to join" 
the elite club in town and who then immediately joins when 
asked.74 The most important person in Babbitt's life is his one male 
friend, the only person to whom he can admit that he's always 
"blowing" to his wife and kids "about what a whale of a realtor I 
am, and yet sometimes I get a sneaking idea I'm not such a Pierpont 
Morgan as I let on to be."75 Yet for all his doubts, Babbitt insists 
that his son Ted be a "college man," and rejects Ted's plan to attend 
the School of Engineering by saying he'd "be in with a lot of greasy 
mechanics and laboring men."76 The first public sign to Babbitt's 
social set that he has gone "nutty" is his willingness to view striking 
workers as "decent,"77 and the sure sign of his return was when it 
could safely be said that "no one . . .  was more violent regarding the 
. . .  crimes of labor unions . . .  than was George Babbitt."78 In the 
very last page of the book, Babbitt marks the small wisdom he has 
gained from his misadventures by admitting to Ted that "I've never 
done a single thing I've wanted to in my whole life" and consenting 
to Ted's desire to take a factory job in order to "get into mechan­
ics."79 Babbitt was an instant success, precisely because it depicted 
the man in the middle, who sees himself as "at once triumphantly 
73. For earlier popular culture examples, see, e.g., STEVEN J. Ross, WoRKING-CLAss 
HoLLYWooo: SILENT FILMS AND nm SHAPING OF CLAss IN AMERICA xiii, 9, 14-15, 19-20, 
175-80, 198-208 (1998) (exploring silent films and their audiences in the 1910s and 1920s, and 
discussing the class identity of white-collar workers as in flux during this period and as influ­
enced by film images). Ross concludes on the basis of his study that "[t]he 1920s marked a 
turning point . . .  in the formation of modem understandings of class and class relations. The 
proliferation of white-collar employees and the widespread participation of wage earners in a 
flourishing consumer economy created great confusion over modem class identities." Id. at 
175. The centrality of patterns of consumption in class definitioµ in the period make clear the 
identity crisis that would have been suffered by white-collar workers in the Depression -
when, in the already-quoted words of Lorena Hickok, they could no longer afford to "keep 
those white collars laundered." See supra text accompanying note 20; see also CmuSTOPHER 
P. WILSON, WHITE CoLLAR FICTIONS: CLASS AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN 
LITERATURE, 1885-1925 (1992). 
74. SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBITT 55 (1922); see also id. at 155. 
75. Id. at 62. 
76. Id. at 309. 
77. Id. at 319. 
78. Id. at 390. 
79. Id. at 401. 
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wealthy and perilously poor,"80 and who in the end learns that to be 
"one of the ruling caste of Good Fellows"81 is to rule nothing at all. 
Thus, the 1920s and early 1930s were years in which the cultural 
and material status of white-collar work were in flux - and in 
which cultural and material criteria did not always coincide.82 
Marshall and Taussig questioned the pro-white-collar ideology of 
the times, finding the ideology unjustified by an economic reality in 
which skilled manual labor rightly commanded higher wagers than 
did clerical work. The Lynds saw the supposed long-term benefit of 
lower-level white-collar work - upward mobility into business 
management and ownership - being undermined both by the De­
pression and by longer-term changes in job recruitment and com­
munity social life. Sinclair Lewis questioned whether what counted 
as white-collar success was worth having at all. Edwards's census 
work reflected the difficulties inherent in any attempt to chart a 
"socio-economic status" hierarchy in an environment in which 
deeply held cultural distinctions between different types of workers 
often failed to correspond to purely economic differences. 
It comes as no surprise, in light of these observations, that 
white-collar workers did not mobilize to seek government protec­
tion from long working hours. The experts were only beginning to 
see that economic realities were changing, and even they were not 
sure where or how the lines of solidarity should be drawn. It was 
entirely too soon for white-collar workers to embrace the shift in 
perspectives that advocacy for government intervention would have 
required. 
Given this turmoil within the white collar classes, how could 
government administrators effectively decide who needed govern-
80. Id. at 53. 
81. Id. at 42. For the suggestion that Babbitt became too popular to be genuinely chal­
lenging to its readers, see WILSON, supra note 73, at 249. 
82. The contested status of the upper-level white-collar worker in this period is discussed 
in a rich literature within the field of business history. See, e.g., REINHARD BENDIX, WORK 
AND AUTHORITY IN INDUSTRY: IDEOLOGIES OF MANAGEMENT IN THE COURSE OF INDUSTRI· 
ALIZATION 288-319 {1956); CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX 0RGANIZATioNs: A CRmCAL Es. 
SAY 14-58 {3d ed. 1986); Sanford Jacoby, American Exceptionalism Revisited: The 
Importance of Management, in MASTERS TO MANAGERS: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN EMPLOYERS 173, 197 (Sanford Jacoby ed., 1991) [hereinafter 
MASTERS TO MANAGERS] . Taking this theme into the 1940s is HOWELL JOHN HARRIS, THE 
RIGHT TO MANAGE: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS P<;>LICIES OF AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE 
1940s (1982). The business history literature is very important because key debates "about 
the changes in status, technology and the occupational structure took place . . •  in the journals 
of personnel managers and the engineering profession." CONK, supra note 20, at 69. For 
examples from the personnel literature of the 1920s and 1930s, see infra text accompanying 
notes 107-20. And on the general question of the self-understanding of white-collar workers, 
see c. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASSES (1951). 
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ment protection in the form of hours legislation? If the ladder from 
low-level white-collar workers into the upper ranks of professionals 
was disintegrating, should those lower-level workers be given - or 
forced to accept - the protection of hours legislation? Administra­
tors could have determined that protection was necessary but inap­
propriate and inconsistent with peoples' perception of their own 
status and needs. Conversely, administrators could have deter­
mined that widely perceived distinctions along class lines had be­
come inaccurate but that differences between upper and lower-level 
white-collar workers still reflected functional differences between 
jobs - differences that required separate treatment under hours 
legislation. As we shall see, administrators' programs were more 
successful the more directly they confronted these questions: 
Should legislation reflect existing perceptions of class, functional 
distinctions between categories of jobs, or some combination of the 
two? 
Even if white-collar workers had been prepared to recognize 
that their upward mobility was rapidly diminishing, and to reassess 
the appropriateness of governmental intervention in their condi­
tions of work on that basis, judicial constraints would have stood in 
their way. The doctrine of freedom of contract had been widely 
used by the courts as a constitutional obstacle to regulating the 
working hours of men outside of hazardous occupations.83 It would 
have been difficult to argue that working long hours at white-collar 
work was hazardous to the health of male workers. For women, 
however, the picture was different: by 1923, some states had begun 
to restrict the hours of women in clerical work,84 and some even 
restricted the hours of women in jobs classified as professional 
(largely nursing and teaching).85 But there was a long-standing tra­
dition of greater protectionism toward female workers - a protec­
tionism that diminished women's ability to compete with men in the 
labor market. Protection of female white-collar workers was due to 
their gender, not to any broader but frustrated desire to regulate 
the hours of all white-collar workers. 
B. The Black Thirty-Hours Bill 
In March 1933, Senator (later Justice) Hugo Black proposed leg­
islation to limit the hours of certain categories of workers to thirty 
83. See NATIONAL INDus. CoNF. Bo., REsEARCH REP. No. 68, LEGAL REsrrucnoNs ON 
HOURS OF WORK IN THE UNITED STATES: A REFERENCE MANuAL 24 (1924). 
84. See id. at 33 tbl.2 (1923 data) (9 states). 
85. See id. at 38 tbl.2 (1923 data) (4 states). 
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hours per week.86 In constitutional terms, Black's bill was bolder, 
in two respects, than previous hours legislation. First, Black's bill 
reached beyond manual workers. The bill provided that any "arti­
cle or commodity" produced or manufactured in a "mine, quarry, 
mill, cannery, workshop, factory or manufacturing establishment" 
in which anyone was "employed or permitted to work" for more 
than thirty hours a week would be barred from interstate com­
merce. 87 The bill was limited to individuals working in the pro­
ducer's establishment or under the producer's direct employ; it did 
not reach the employees of the shipper, the employees of the 
wholesalers and retailers who sold the goods, and so forth. But so 
long as the link to the producer of goods was present, the bill did 
not limit its thirty-hours requirement on the basis of the work the 
individual. performed. 
Second, Black abandoned health and safety as the rationale for 
hours regulation, in favor of work-spreading as a method of allevi­
ating unemployment.88 Black explained in the cover letter to 
Roosevelt transmitting the proposed legislation that the bill was 
based on "my belief that our unemployed cannot be put to work 
unless the National Government legally requires a shorter work 
week and a shorter work day."89 Black reiterated this theme in his 
radio address to the nation in support of the bill,90 in which he said 
that "[i]t is not just to continue to exact 50, 60, and even in some 
instances 70 hours work per week from men and women while 
others are driven into poverty and misery from unemployment."91 
Making the breadth of the statute's reach perfectly clear, Black ex­
pressed concern with the conditions facing "salaried employees."92 
Thus Black was prepared to go further than prior federal wage and 
86. See S. 5267, 72d Cong. (1932); see also 16 CoNG. REc. 820 (1932) (referring Black's 
bill to the Judiciary Committee). 
87. S. 5267, 72nd Cong. (1932). 
88. Black was directly influenced by the work of Arthur Dahlberg, an engineer whose 
writing on the subject was well-regarded in business circles. Dahlberg's most important work 
on the subject was ARTHUR DAHLBERG, JoBs, MA.CHINES, AND CAPITALISM (1932). For a 
discussion of Dahlberg and his influence, see HUNNICU1T, supra note 15, at 269-78. 
89. Letter from Hugo Black to President Roosevelt, (Mar. 10, 1933) (FDR/OF 372, 
Hours of Labor, Box 1). 
90. See Senator Hugo Black, Radio Speech Concerning S. 5267 (Jan. 9, 1933), in 76 
CoNG. REc. 1443 (1933). 
91. Id., in 16 CoNG. REc. 1444 (1933). Black did place special emphasis on pressures on 
manual work, stressing "the increased productivity of machine America" and its failure to 
"absorb [its) displaced labor." Id., in 16 CoNG. REc. 1443 (1933). But if displaced manual 
work was his main concern, the rest of the address was not limited to that concern, and 
neither was the text of his bill. 
92. See id., in 16 CoNG. REc. 1444 (1933). 
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hour regulation by covering white-collar and salaried employees 
working within the covered industries. That approach still left 
white-collar and salaried workers in commercial rather than extrac­
tive and manufacturing fields uncovered, but it was a step toward 
universal coverage. 
President Roosevelt strongly opposed Black's bill, in large part 
because he rejected the economic theory upon which it was predi­
cated. Black believed, as did a number of economists in his day, 
that the Depression.was the result of capitalist overproduction, and 
that over the long term the economy would need to develop the 
capacity to achieve distributive fairness without new growth. 
Roosevelt would have no part of that economic philosophy.93 In­
stead, Roosevelt developed the view that a sy�tem of federally 
sponsored private industrial planning could reverse the effects of 
the Depression without stunting economic growth. It was this plan­
ning approach that Roosevelt implemented in the National Indus­
trial Recovery Act (NIRA), the linchpin of the early New Deal.94 
II. THE NATIONAL lNDusTRIAL REcoVERY Acr (1933-1935) 
Even though the Roosevelt administration opposed the Black 
bill, wage and hour regulation was a core part of the administra­
tion's NIRA program from the start.95 In the months between the 
defeat of the Black Thirty-Hours Bill and the enactment of the 
NIRA, key Roosevelt advisers began to formulate the administra­
tion's approach. In March, Roosevelt convened a conference "on 
93. See FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEw 194 (1946); see also KENNETH 
FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA'S NEW DEAL 10, 69-71 
(1995). 
94. For leading critiques of industrial planning under the NIRA, see G. WILLIAM 
DOMHOFF, STATE AUTONOMY OR Cr.Ass DoMINANCE? CASE STUDIES ON POLICY MAKING 
IN AMERICA 101-16 (1996); FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 93; ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE 
NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966); MICHAEL M. WEINSTEIN, RECOVERY 
AND REDISTRIBUTION UNDER THE NIRA (1980). For a contemporaneous critique, see 
LEVERE.TI" S. LYON ET AL., THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: AN ANALYSIS 
AND AN APPRAISAL (1935). For a study focusing on NRA labor policy, see DONALD R. 
BRAND, CoRPORATION AND THE RuLE OF LAW (1988). Efforts to achieve thirty-hours legis­
lation continued during the NRA period. See, e.g., Partial Redraft of H.R. 8492 by Frances 
Perkins, Secretary of Labor; Donald Richberg, General Counsel of NRA; William Green, 
President of AFL; and Representative William Conriery, Chairman of the House Labor 
Committee, attached to Letter from Isabella Greenway to Eleanor Roosevelt (May 16, 1934) 
(FDR/OF 372, Hours of Labor, Box 1) (setting thirty hours as the hours maximum for codi­
fied industries, with exceptions based on shown neeq). 
95. The NRA also included § 7(a), which gave labor the right to organize. That provision 
was underenforced throughout the NIRA period. See, e.g., SIDNEY FINE, THE AUTOMOBILE 
UNDER THE BLUE EAGLE: LABOR, MANAGEMENT, AND THE AUTOMOBILE MANuFACTUR­
ING CoDE 75-95 (1963); R.W. Fleming, The Significance of the Wagner Act, in LABOR AND 
THE NEW DEAL 121, 126 (Milton Derber & Edwin Young, eds., 1957). 
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the emergency problems having to do with distress due to unem­
ployment and the method of overcoming the same."96 The agenda 
listed "[s]hort hours as a means of further employment" as an item 
for discussion.97 Donald Richberg98 was among those invited to at­
tend. By mid-April, Frances Perkins, Roosevelt's Secretary of La­
bor, endorsed work-spreading as the theory behind hours 
regulation.99 
A. The First Proposal for a White-Collar Exemption, and an 
Introduction to Government Class Line-Drawing 
In late May, Alexander Sachs, then a member of the Board of 
Directors of the Lehman [Brothers] Corporation who was also en­
gaged in economic research for Roosevelt and who went on to be­
come the first director of the NRA's Division of Research and 
Planning, provided the administration with a detailed memorandum 
on "Suggested Maximum Working Time and Formula for Establish­
ing Minimum Wage and Salary Rates."100 Sachs's memorandum 
expressly exempted "those in executive, administrative and supervi­
sory positions" from regulation.101 Already before the enactment 
of the NIRA, then, workspreading was recognized as the official 
rationale for restricting working hours, and the precedent was in 
place for excluding upper-level workers (however defined) from 
hours regulation. 
The Sachs memorandum is the first reference I found in the 
Roosevelt administration archival record to an exemption for exec­
utives, administrators, and supervisors from wage and hour regula­
tion. The fact that Sachs built an upper-level exemption into his 
proposed program so matter-of-factly raises a question challenging 
the very thesis of this Article. How can the regulation of working 
hours be viewed as a contested field for the middle classes if the 
exclusion of upper-level white-collar workers was sealed from the 
start? 
96. Letter from Frances Perkins to Donald Richberg 1 (Mar. 22, 1933) (Papers of Donald 
Richberg, Library of Congress [hereinafter LC, Richberg Papers], Container 1, Correspon­
dence Feb.-May, 1933). 
97. Id. at 2. 
98. For an introduction to Richberg, see supra text accompanying note 27. 
99. See Letter from Frances Perkins to Editor, WASH. PosT, Apr. 20, 1933, at 1 (FDR/OF 
15, DOL, Box 1, 1933 folder). 
100. Memorandum from Alexander Sachs to Administration 1 (May 23, 1933) (Alexan­
der Sachs Papers, Roosevelt Archives [hereinafter FDR, Sachs Papers], Box 124, Labor: 
Wages, Hours, Stabilization). 
101. Id. at 1. 
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As we shall see throughout this Article, the notion that upper­
level white-collar workers ought to be exempted from hours legisla­
tion had the commonsense quality that marks all uncontestable cul­
tural propositions. But as is so often the case with seemingly 
uncontestable social truths, on closer examination one finds little 
agreement as to what had been agreed upon, or why. Who are the 
upper-level white-collar workers who obviously ought to be ex­
empted from hours regulation? The terms chosen to describe them 
were not uniform from one assertion of this obvious point to an­
other. Precisely what makes the exempted group different? Should 
the exemption include all white-collar workers? Was the logic of 
exclusion in fact related to collar color? Was it related to income 
level so that the exclusion should also apply to well-paid skilled 
blue-collar workers? Or was it something unique to the top tier of 
white-collar workers that exempted them from hours regulation? 
These questions were sufficiently important to reveal the concep­
tually difficult and contested nature of the choices government ac­
tors were required to make. 
So why did Sachs find it necessary to exclude upper-level work­
ers, and why did he draw the class lines in precisely this way? His 
memorandum is silent on these questions: it simply takes the need 
for an exemption and the location of the boundary line between 
regulated and exempt workers for granted. But we ought nonethe­
less to pause here and explore the unspoken reasons that might 
have motivated Sachs to include this exemption. 
It is useful, here and elsewhere, broadly to distinguish between 
the instrumental (talk and action aimed at identifying and solving 
problems) and the symbolic (talk and action aimed at describing or 
representing the world). I shall refer to instrumental approaches to 
class line-drawing as purposive and to symbolic approaches as de­
scriptive. In exploring these approaches and their implications, let 
us not speak of Sachs in particular - since we do not know what he 
in particular was thinking. Let us speak instead of an ideal type of 
government expert going about the task of deciding the coverage 
boundaries of an administrative scheme. Call him the Reasonable 
Expert, or REX for short. 
If REX's orientation were descriptive, his exemptions from 
hours legislation would correspond to the dividing lines that already 
exist in society. If certain types of employees are generally viewed 
as categorically different from ordinary employees, the descriptive 
approach would counsel that these differences ought to be observed 
in federal regulations. In this sense, the descriptive approach is 
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hierarchy-neutral; the government purports to be merely describing 
the social hierarchy that exists independent of the government's de­
cision to describe it. 
If there exists a consensus view of the class system "in the cul­
ture," REX's only task under the descriptive approach is to de­
scribe the consensus accurately - and to fight off the political and 
administrability concerns that might interfere with the achievement 
of accuracy. But what if REX, using his expert knowledge or his 
cultural antennae, discerns conflict in the culture about where the 
lines of stratification should be drawn? What if he determines that 
a previous consensus is eroding, and a new consensus is poised to 
take its place?102 What if he determines, indeed, that the culture is 
not even close to having a consensus view, and that different groups 
have their own distinct perspectives? REX might determine, in 
these circumstances, that he must add a crystal ball to his toolkit 
and predict which of the contested beliefs is most likely to emerge 
as the dominant one in the near future. If he did not feel comforta­
ble with the business of cultural prediction, he might instead con­
clude that his job must be to ignore beliefs and instead to use his 
empirical skills and make his own determination of the true nature 
of the class structure on the basis of observable social facts - or on 
the basis of "scientific" inquiries by experts at the Census Bureau 
or elsewhere.103 REX would experience his new system as 
hierarchy-neutral - based on objective fact - but those in society 
whose views conflicted with REX's map of the class system would 
reasonably be expected to disagree. 
Faced with these problems, REX might well shy away from de­
veloping an objective account of the class system at all. He might 
instead take the view that where no consensus exists, politics or ad­
ministrability are the proper tiebreakers. If REX chooses not to 
admit that he has failed to arrive at a sound descriptivist decision, 
however, those observing the process will wrongfully assume that 
REX's results are consistent with his descriptivist rhetoric. The 
government would inadvertently be placing its seal of approval on a 
102. Cf Com:, supra note 20, at 30 (attributing to Raymond Williams the distinction 
between "a residual cultural form and an emergent one"). 
103. As we have seen, any attempt to defer to the expertise of the census would merely 
build the same problems into REX's models, as the same struggle was taking place inside the 
Census Bureau. See id. at 44 (arguing that the census under Alba Edwards had merely "con­
found( ed] economic or technical classifications of the workforce with the general social or 
cultural divisions of the American population"). For a discussion of Alba Edwards and cen­
sus occupational classification, see supra text accompanying notes 65-72. 
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classification scheme the descriptivist accuracy of which it could not 
defend. 
The second broad approach to class line-drawing is the purpo­
sive approach. REX need not decide that his job is to discover pre­
existing classification schemes "in the culture," or even to find the 
most "accurate" description of the social world through an empiri­
cal analysis of the hard facts. Instead, he could decide that the gov­
ernment's job is to adopt whatever classification scheme most 
closely fits the government's substantive goals. Under this ap­
proach, REX would first conduct a careful analysis of the goals of 
the program he is administering. He would then determine 
whether there exist certain social groups that for some reason ought 
to be excluded from the program - for example, because they do 
not need what the program provides. In making this determination, 
REX might pay attention to culturally-salient distinctions between 
groups. But if he is doing his purposive job right, he would do so 
only if the culturally-salient distinctions happen to closely corre­
spond to factors that are relevant to the government's program. In 
the absence of a close correspondence, REX would recognize the 
need to identify program-salient distinctions on his own, through an 
independent empirical analysis of the social world. Once such dis­
tinctions were adopted, REX would have no reason to present 
them as anything but the product of the government's own goal­
oriented activity. The purposive expert would have good reason to 
hope that the government's purposive classification scheme would 
be hierarchy-neutral - albeit in a different sense than a descrip­
tivist classification scheme purports to be. Here, the hope would be 
that since the government's classification scheme derives from the 
government's purposive goals and makes no claim to be an all-pur­
pose accurate map of the class system, it would have little effect on 
existing social hierarchies or cultural debates about them. 
The purposive approach is not without its own predictable blind 
alleys, however. Determining the precise goals of a government 
program is not always easy, and goals often change even as the pro­
grams themselves remain the same. Purposive classification 
schemes can ossify and thus be rendered goal-inappropriate by the 
mere passage of time. Purposive classification schemes need to be 
tailor-made to particular government programs and thus are likely 
to be slow and expensive to develop. In the interim, sometimes the 
only way to get a program moving is to choose a classification 
scheme off the shelf, as it were, and hope that it can be improved 
over time. But since whatever off-the-shelf scheme is selected will 
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have its adherents within the regulated community, change for the 
sake of purposive accuracy may prove difficult to implement even 
after all the data are in. 
Problems both of administrability and public acceptability might 
stand in the way of the government implementing a purposive clas­
sifi.cation scheme that is sufficiently complex to meet the govern­
ment's goals. Indeed, if the scheme is complex, it will be less 
administrable and less acceptable to the public precisely to the de­
gree that it deviates from culturally-based descriptive norms. Regu­
lated groups never like seemingly arbitrary government action, but 
the incentive to protest is all the greater when the government's 
regulatory scheme is complex and compliance is therefore adminis­
tratively burdensome. Furthermore, a purposive analysis may not 
in practice be able to stand aloof from public debates on class. The 
results of a purposive analysis may not in fact be all that different 
from the results reached by a process of description. For example, 
even if REX selected his class-ranking criterion purely for its pur­
posive relevance, it might well prove to be the case that his selected 
criterion also plays a role as a marker of status within the culture. 
REX is, after all, a product of his culture; he knows intuitively that 
his results will have greater legitimacy if they do correspond to 
culturally-based understandings of the social world. 
Why, then, was Sachs proposing to exempt certain white-collar 
workers from hours regulation? From a purposive standpoint, 
Sachs might have believed that executives, administrators, and su­
pervisors were not suffering significant enough levels of unemploy­
ment to make it worth regulating their hours, but lower-level white­
collar workers were. If so, his view would not have been the uni­
form view of Roosevelt's close advisers. Paul H. Douglas, a leading 
Progressive economist (and later U.S. Senator) who was a key poli­
cymaker on the issue of unemployment insurance,1°4 had recom­
mended as early as January 1933 that "[t]he present depression has 
thrown so many of the white-collared group out of their jobs and 
they have found their own resources so inadequate that there is jus­
tifi.cation for extending the upper limits" of unemployment insur­
ance coverage to include some high-salaried white-collar 
workers.105 Douglas noted that the coverage limit he advocated, 
104. See PAUL H. DouGLAs, IN THE FULLNESS OF TIME: THE MEMOIRS OF PAUL H. 
DouGLAS 70-77 (1972) (discussing his role and his policy conflicts with John Commons). For 
earlier comparative work by Douglas on the subject of unemployment, see PAUL H. 
DOUGLAS & .AARON DIRECTOR, THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT {1931), which does not 
discuss issues of unemployment among white-collar workers. 
105. PAUL H. DOUGLAS, STANDARDS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 51 (1932). 
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"those salaried workers who receive less than $60 a week," would 
"not only protect the clerks, stenographers, etc., but also the lower 
group of executives."106 
Sachs might also have thought that the work of upper-level em­
ployees could not be spread. This view - that the work of upper­
level workers is different from ordinary work in ways directly rele­
vant to the possibility of work-spreading - would have resonated 
with significant traditions within the field of personnel manage­
ment. After all, the tradition of paying white-collar workers on a 
salaried basis fostered the view that white-collar work could not be 
broken down into hourly units. By traditionally being paid on a 
"salary basis," however, upper-level white-collar workers were no 
different from routine white-collar workers - a group Sachs did 
not propose excluding from hours regulation. 
Furthermore, both for routine and supervisory white-collar 
work, tradition was changing in the 1920s and 1930s. The personnel 
literature of the 1920s and 1930s was replete with calls for subject­
ing routine white-collar work to the tools of personnel manage­
ment. Examples include calls for the rationalization of white-collar 
pay scales,1°7 the proper measurement of clerical production and 
the development of production standards and incentive pay 
schemes for clerical workers,1°8 and the reversal of the "fallacious 
and misleading" tendency to rank clerical workers higher than man­
ual workers based on the failure to recognize that "[t]here is no 
106. Id. Douglas is here making recommendations for state and federal legislation. His 
$60-a-week salary cutoff is quite high for his times: in his appendix, he includes the Ohio 
unemployment compensation statute, which excludes from the definition of "employee" (the 
covered group) "any person employed at other than manual labor at a rate of remuneration 
of two thousand dollars a year or more," id. app. C, at 240, or $38 dollars a week. Other 
unemployment insurance proposals expressly excluded upper-leve� workers. See, e.g., Report 
of Unemployment Insurance Committee to Industrial Advisory Board (June 18, 1934) (FDR/ 
OF 121a, Unemployment Insurance, Box 1, 1933-34) (proposing an exclusion for "profes­
sional people, such as physicians, lawyers, engineers," id. at 8, and describing a proposed plan 
by the American Association of Social Security to exempt "non-manual workers with salaries 
of $3,000 per year or more," id. at 27). For a discussion of the problem of the economic 
situation of white-collar workers in the Depression, see KocKA, supra note 5, at 194-95 
("American white collar workers were hit hard by the economic crisis, though somewhat 
later and on the whole a little less hard than manual workers . . . .  On the other hand, blue 
collar workers gained more than white collar employees from the recovery of 1933/34 which 
was supported by the minimum wage and maximum worktime provisions of New Deal 
legislation."). 
107. See Charles J. McGuirk, Am I Underpaying or Overpaying My Men?, 57 PRINTER'S 
INK, Mar. 31, 1927, at 5, excerpted in 26 MGMT. REv. 159 (1927). 
108. See George Filipetti, Instal[l]ment Buying and Business Depressions, 20 MGMT. REv. 
15, 15 (1931); see also F.W. Pierce, Basic Principles of Wage and Salary Administration, 11 
PERSONNEL 111, 112 (1935) (noting that one of the reasons traditionally "salaried" work was 
compensated on that basis was that "the companies have been slow to set up standards for 
this kind of work"). 
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more brain activity" in routine clerical work than in routine manual 
work.109 Applying the tools of personnel management to routine 
white-collar work eroded the distinction between such white-collar 
workers and the blue-collar workers whose labor had long been 
grist for the mill of personnel science. 
The nature of supervisory work was also being reassessed in this 
period, and it, too, was being brought under increasingly close man­
agement measurement and control. "Job analysis" was one of the 
central tools of Taylorite scientific management. By breaking jobs 
down into their component parts, management could assign and 
monitor each part to secure maximum effort and output, 110 and 
could create scientifically based wage systems.111 As one personnel 
author correctly noted in 1934, the use of scientific management 
techniques to manage the supervisory workforce was nothing new: 
"Of course, job analysis of executive positions really started in the 
factory with Taylor's work in functional foremanship. From there it 
spread to certain office and supervisory positions, and is today 
under serious consideration for all executive positions. "112 Articles 
in the 1930s described job analysis as useful for "not only routine 
positions, but those of assistant executives up to department 
heads."113 
The leading example of the trend toward scientific control of 
supervisory workers was the famous industrial research program 
known as the Hawthorne Experiments, which began in 1927 at the 
Hawthorne Works of Western Electric Company in Chicago.114 
109. See J.0. Hopwood, Administration of Wages and Salaries, 11 PERSONNEL 99, 105 
(1935). 
110. See RICHARD GILLESPIE, MANuFAcruRING KNoWLEDGE: A HISTORY OF THE HAw. 
THORNE EXPERIMENTS 11 (1991). 
111. See, e.g., NATIONAL lNDus. CoNF. Bo., lNc., SUPPLEMENTAL BONUSES FOR \VAGE 
EARNERS, SUPERVISORS AND EXECUTIVES (1927). 
112. Pearce C. Kelley, Selecting Executives, 10 PERSONNEL 8, 14 (1934). 
113. C.R. Dooley, The Philosophy and Procedure of a Job Analysis, 10 PERSONNEL 67, 67 
(1934). See A.F. Kindall, Job Description and Rating, 14 PERSONNEL 122, 129 (1938) (finding 
its job analysis and rating program "adaptable to practically all jobs valued at $4,000 a year or 
less"). "This includes factory, office, sales, clerical, salaried, and supervisory jobs held by 
men and women in all sections of the country." Id. With "[c]ertain adjustments,'' readers 
were assured, the system would work for higher-valued salaried jobs as well. See id. 
114. The final report of the Hawthorne experiments is F.J. ROETHLISBERGER & WILLIAM 
J. DICKSON, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER! AN AccoUNT OF A RESEARCH PROGRAM 
CoNDUCTED BY THE WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, HAWTHORNE WORKS, CHICAGO (1939). 
The results of the study were known in the literature long before the book was published. 
See GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 196. The heavily psychological emphasis of the Hawthorne 
project contributed to the creation of a movement called "human relations." See PERROW, 
supra note 82, at 97 (discussing "Hawthorne and All That" in a chapter on "The Human 
Relations Model"). As Gillespie's study of the Hawthorne Experiments stresses, the basic 
thrust of the movement was that "workers . . .  could be satisfied only if managers extended 
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The purpose of the project was to use the methods of experimental 
social science to determine the effects on productivity of such vari­
ables as shop lighting, hours of work, work schedules, and so forth. 
What the Hawthorne investigators found, instead, was that differ­
ences in methods of supervision, rather than differences in the ma­
terial conditions of the test room, in fact caused the observed 
increases in output and improvements in attitude among the stud­
ied workers.115 The investigators turned their attention to methods 
for subjecting supervisors to the techniques of personnel science. 
What did it say about the status of lower-level supervisors when 
social scientific methods started being used to transform them into 
"natives" to be observed and measured?116 Indeed, in a classic ex­
ample of a profession creating the need for its own services,117 one 
of the major uses of the new human relations technology was to 
address the supervisors' very concern that their superior status was 
being undermined by changes in the industrial process.118 Thus, su­
pervisory work was hardly immune from management control, and 
was not categorically different in that regard from lower-level 
white-collar work. 
their control over the social organization of the workplace." GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 
197. Thus the "scientific management" label, in the sense of the use of best-practice social 
and organizational techniques to impose bureaucratic control over workers and their work, is 
appropriate to the Hawthorne study. 
115. See ROETHLISBERGER & DICKSON, supra note 114, at 88. 
116. See GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 200 ("They argued that the attitudes and com­
plaints of workers and supervisors had to be analyzed in the same way that Radcliffe-Brown 
had studied the beliefs and sentiments of the Andaman Islanders." (emphasis added)). Just 
as being subjected to the ministrations of personnel experts was a sign of diminished status, it 
was a sign of the superior status of foremen at Ford in the heyday of its experiments in 
welfare capitalism that "[they] won virtual exemption from the sociology department's inves­
tigations." ZUNz, supra note 37, at 135. 
117. This phenomenon is noted in that icon of the representation of work in 1990s Ameri­
can popular culture: the Dilbert corpus. See Scorr AnAMs, THE DILBERT PRINCIPLE: A 
CUBICLE'S-EYE VIEW OF BossES, MEETINGS, MANAGEMENT FADs & OTHER WORKPLACE 
AFFLICTIONS 1 (1996) ("A major technology company simultaneously rolled out two new 
programs: (1) a random drug testing program, and (2) an 'Individual Dignity Enhancement' 
program."). 
118. Another factor tending to lower the self-perceived status of managers was the union­
ization of their plants. See Jacoby, supra note 82, at 197. For similar conclusions drawn from 
1934-35 fieldwork focusing on a 1933 strike, see WARNER & Low, supra note 50, at 187 (for 
dates of fieldwork, see id. at 5 n.3). In part due to unionization - or its avoidance - but 
also in part due to ideological trends within the field of personnel management itself, some 
personnel managers aimed to reorganize blue-collar work by adopting some of what had 
previously been the definitive markers of white-collar work: for example stable employment 
and well-established lines of promotion. See SANFORD JACOBY, EMPLOYING BuREAUCRACY: 
MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF Woruc IN .AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-
1945, at 82 (1985) (noting the early work of the vocational guidance movement); id. at 255 
("The continuing irony in personnel management was that it best served the purpose of 
thwarting unionism by introducing the same reforms the unions sought."). 
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Perhaps Sachs was motivated by a belief that upper-level white­
collar work could not be spread among workers. Upper-level 
white-collar work was, after all, traditionally compensated on a sal­
aried basis - suggesting that it cannot be broken into hourly incre­
ments and divided between two workers. If work-spreading can't 
work, no government purpose is served by requiring it. 
Two factors weigh against using the wage/salary distinction as 
the basis for a purposive upper-level exemption. First, as already 
noted, lower-level white-collar workers were also traditionally paid 
salaries rather than hourly wages - rendering Sachs's exemption 
underinclusive if salary payment was taken as a sign that work can­
not be spread. Second, there was no reason to assume that salaried 
jobs were functionally different from hourly jobs. The preservation 
of the wage/salary distinction throughout the 1920s and 1930s -
and into the present - in the face of the increasing Taylorization of 
white-collar work did not necessarily reflect a belief in the indivisi­
bility of white-collar work in general. The wage/salary distinction 
was in best practice119 largely a tool in a symbolic process. The 
business community wanted to rationalize white-collar work with­
out undermining the Taylorized white-collar workers' upward class 
identification. Doing so required maintaining the distinction be­
tween salary work and wage work despite the erosion of the func­
tional justification for the distinction.120 
Perhaps, though, Sachs was engaged in a descriptive rather than 
a purposive task when he decided that upper-level white-collar 
workers should be exempt from hours regulation. From a descrip­
tive standpoint, Sachs might have operated on the assumption that 
it would be culturally inappropriate to subject upper-level employ­
ees to hours regulation, even if they could benefit from it in a nar­
row economic sense. Such an assumption was borne out by the 
experience of lower-level supervisors at the Hawthorne Works, who 
reportedly suffered a severe status loss in 1931 when their hours 
119. For the underutilization of "best practice" techniques, see Daniel Nelson, Scientific 
Management and the Workplace, 1920-1935, in MASTERS To MANAGERS, supra note 82, at 86-
89; See also BENDIX, supra note 82, at 319; JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY, supra note 
118, at 154, 157; GERALD E. KAHLER & ALTON C. JOHNSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PER· 
soNNEL ADMINISTRATION, 1923-1945, at 22-23 (1971) (noting the "elaborately organized per­
sonnel department described in the textbooks existed only in some of the large firms" in the 
1920s). 
120. See Pierce, supra note 108, at 112 (noting that the company is "working toward the 
definition of certain intermediate jobs in both the supervisory and clerical forces on fixed 
rate schedules without classifying them as wage-earners"). Similarly, the payment of salaries 
rather than hourly wages to foremen - whose status as white-collar workers has always been 
subject to question - was used as an indicator of their heightened status. See ZuNz, supra 
note 37, at 136. 
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were cut (like the operators' but unlike the upper-level 
supervisors'). 
[They] could not understand why they were asked to take a . . .  cut in 
hours when they, of all supervisors, could least afford it. They wished 
to know, "Where the hell does this company get this two-class system 
anyway?" Group chiefs argued against the "two-class system" on the 
ground that they were put on the same level as the operators. Some 
felt their social prestige had been injured. Friends and neighbors to 
whom they had proudly boasted of being supervisors at the Western 
Electric Co. would no longer believe them and taunted them by say­
ing "Oh, I thought you were a supervisor, but I see your hours were 
cut like the operators'."121 
It might have been obvious to Sachs that subjecting upper-level 
white-collar workers to hours regulation would have so undermined 
their claim to high status that they would have objected to it -
even in the face of the economic need of the group as a whole. 
It is impossible to know from Sachs's bare mention of an upper­
level exclusion whether he was taking a purposive or descriptive 
approach to the problem. Even where the administrative record is 
clearer, it is not always easy to identify a predominant approach. 
But where the predominant approach can be identified, it will be­
come possible to ask whether the difference between the purposive 
and descriptive approaches to class line-drawing carries any norma­
tive significance: whether one approach is in some sense (symbolic, 
instrumental, or both) better than the other. But that discussion 
must await the emergence of the issue of upper-level exemptions in 
a richer historical context. 
B .  The Creation of the NRA (and a Brief Note on the Role of 
the Realists) 
The NIRA became law on June 16, 1933122 and called for the 
creation of the NRA. Roosevelt appointed General Hugh Johnson 
as NRA Administrator. Johnson was an industrial engineer by 
training, was widely acclaimed for his work on the World War I 
draft, and was a close associate of influential Progressive financier 
Bernard Baruch.123 The NRA's staff included many prominent aca-
121. RoETiiLISBERGER & DICKSON, supra note 114, at 340. 
122. For the drafting of the statute, see, e.g., BERNARD BELLUSH, THE FAILURE OF THE 
NRA 9-13 (1975); COLIN GORDON, NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN 
AMERICA, 1920-1935, at 171 (1994). 
123. See FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 93, at 92. Baruch was not flattering in his 
evaluation of Johnson. Baruch is described by Perkins as warning her: "He's been my 
number-three man for years. I think he's a good number-three man, maybe a number-two 
man, but he's not a number-one man. He's dangerous and unstable . . . .  I'm fond of him, but 
do tell the President to be careful." PERKINS, supra note 93, at 200-01. 
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demics and lawyers with Progressive and Legal Realist leanings. 
Most prominent among them in the spheres of decisionmaking at 
issue in this Article were Donald Richberg, the NRA's first General 
Counsel and later head,124 and Leon C. Marshall, the Director of 
the Review Division of the NRA who later became a member of 
the National Industrial Review Board, the body which took over 
the direction of the NRA upon Johnson's resignation in January 
1934.125 Thus, trends in Progressive and Legal Realist thought sig­
nificantly influenced the New Deal class line-drawing enterprise.126 
One of the central aims of thirty years of Progressive and Legal 
Realist thought was to bring independent technical and scientific 
knowledge to bear on social problems.127 These movements did 
124. On the appointment of Richberg and the true nature of his role - far broader than 
the title General Counsel would suggest - see HuGH S. JoHNSON, THE BLUE EAGLE FROM 
EGG TO EARTH 201 (1935); see also HAWLEY, supra note 94; THOMAS E. V ADNEY, THE WAY, 
WARD LIBERAL: A PoLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF DONALD RICHBERG (1970). Richberg was a 
union-side labor lawyer, and Johnson's unfamiliarity with labor issues and lack of a base of 
support within the labor movement was one of the reasons he appointed Richberg. See 
BELLUSH, supra note 122, at 32-33; V ADNEY, supra, at 121. But in the end, Richberg turned 
"away from labor influences in a gesture of fair-mindedness to all interests . . .  (but] suc­
cumb[ed] to business influences - which, after all, were the stronger of the two in the 
NRA . . . .  [a] point that Richberg failed to take adequate account of." VADNEY, supra, at 
123. 
125. See V ADNEY, supra note 124, at 144. Marshall was one of two academics on this 
Board; the other was institutional economist and Yale Law School professor Walton 
Hamilton. See id. In addition, Paul Douglas was a member of the NRA's Consumer Advi­
sory Board and also served briefly as a member of the code authority for the consumer 
finance industry. Both are described by Douglas as disheartening experiences. See DouG­
LAS, supra note 104, at 64-65. 
126. Of course, not all law schools and government agencies participated in Progressive 
and Realist trends to equal degrees. Yale and Columbia were the institutional "seedbed" of 
legal realism in law teaching, and progressive tendencies were strong at Harvard. See PETER 
H. !RoNs, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 7 (1982). FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 93, at 97, 
observe that "NRA lawyers were older, less frequently educated at Ivy League law schools, 
and more experienced in business and politics" than were the lawyers in more liberal agen­
cies. See also IRONS, supra, at 30 (noting that although Blackwell Smith, who administered 
the NRA legal division, was a young Columbia law graduate, he "leaned toward older, exper­
ienced lawyers for responsible NRA posts . . .  with prior business and political experience"). 
The leading studies of New Deal lawyers focus on lawyers in the private sector, see IRoNs, 
supra, or on litigators within government, see RoNEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCER­
TAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995). They have less to offer with regard to 
government lawyers as negotiators and policymakers. On that issue, for a helpful insider 
account from a Yale-trained NRA lawyer who later joined the Yale faculty, see THOMAS I. 
EMERSON, YoUNG LAWYER FOR THE NEw DEAL 18-22 (1991). His experience suggests that 
the aspirations and frustrations of REX, my ideal typical New Deal expert, were alive and 
well in the NRA. 
127. Also central was the Progressive/Realist view that in so doing, they were acting in 
the public interest rather than in the narrow self-interest of any one particular social group. 
An example is Donald R. Richberg's presentation of himself to Congress in testimony on the 
causes of the Depression. Richberg, by then a noted representative of union interests in the 
railroad industry, described himself as having no authority "save that of a life long advocate 
of public interests." See Testimony of Donald R. Richberg before the Committee on Finance, 
United States Senate, Depression Causes and Remedies 7 (Feb. 23, 1933) (LC, Richberg 
Papers, Container 43, Relief for Unemployment). For a fine account of the complexity of 
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not, of course, share internally or with each other precise concep­
tions of what "science" was or how it was to be integrated into the 
political process. But some form of faith in science characterized 
the critique both of corrupt democratic politics and of the abstrac­
tion and formalism of traditional legal thought.12s 
In the Wilson and Hoover eras, the type of social knowledge 
most drawn upon by government was the knowledge of and from 
the world of business and industry. In the Wilson era, it was busi­
nessmen themselves who became involved in organizational reform 
as volunteers in the war effort. For Hoover, it was not the captains 
of industry but their engineer lieutenants who were the most useful 
- not a surprising assessment given the fact that Hoover was him­
self an engineer.129 Precisely because the engineer drew his exper­
tise from intimate involvement in the world of business and was 
dependent for his future insights and reputation on employment by 
or consultation with the business community, the independence of 
the engineer as social policymaker was never free from doubt. For 
this reason, Thorstein Veblen stressed the development of "moral 
responsibility on the part of the nation's new technological elite, its 
'engineers,' "130 to foster their own independence of judgment. A 
new emphasis on "professionalism," including the formation of na­
tional organizations whose uniform standards were imposed upon 
the employers of professionals, helped to foster the belief that pro­
fessionals could maintain their stance of being in industry but not 
progressive lawyers' claim that lawyering for clients can be in the public interest, see Clyde 
Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE LJ. 
1445 (1996). 
128. There is a huge literature on these issues. See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNs OF 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMER­
ICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 0R1HODOXY (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL 
REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); BARRY DEAN KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE 
UNITED STATES FROM 1915-1945, at 60-62 (1983) [hereinafter KARL, UNEASY STATE]; 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM 
AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, 'AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 
AND EMPIRICAL SocIAL SCIENCE (1995); SHAMIR, supra note 126, at 131-57; WILLIAM 
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). 
129. See BARRY DEAN KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION AND REFORM IN THE NEW 
DEAL: THE GENESIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, 1900-1939, at 22 (1963) [hereinaf­
ter KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION] (Hoover era); KARL, UNEASY STATE, supra note 
128, at 39 (Wtlson era). Hoover's confidence in engineers continued long past the end of his 
administration. See, e.g., Calls Lag in Work Job for Engineers, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1939, at 4 
("Former President Herbert Hoover suggested today that the engineers of the nation might 
succeed where economists, politicians and sociologists had failed in finding a solution to the 
unemployment problem . . • . He called engineers the world's 'troubleshooters,' 'the diagnos­
ticians of industry,' and 'the third party between capital and labor.' 'Your profession is to 
make things work,' he said."). 
130. KARL, UNEASY STATE, supra note 128, at 23 (quoting Veblen). 
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entirely of it.131 But in the end, it was the nature of scientific in­
quiry itself that was counted on as the check against bias. The very 
measurability of social phenomena meant that the scientific results 
derived from them could be verified and therefore trusted. 
Engineering, with its ties to natural science, was not the only 
discipline conscripted into advancing social knowledge. The ideol­
ogy of objective science that justified involving engineers in poli­
cymaking and implementation was readily carried over from 
engineering to economics and the other, even softer, social sci­
ences.132 Advocates of social scientific approaches to law and gov­
ernment went so far as to assert that social scientists could be more 
objective than the engineers who had shaped economic policy in the 
Hoover era. One such advocate was Donald Richberg, whose legal 
writings and speeches placed him squarely in the Realist mode in 
the years prior to the NRA.133 For Richberg, the institutional inde­
pendence of social scientists - their location in universities rather 
than in the world of business - gave them the edge in their ability 
to claim intellectual independence.134 He conceded that social sci­
entific knowledge was not at an advanced state, but he had every 
confidence that with increased reliance on social scientific data 
would come convergence within the social sciences on the right an­
swers to social problems. "[O]ut of a thousand [data] fragments can 
be built a fact - a thing that will work always exactly in the same 
131. See id. at 53. 
132. See id. at 72 ("It is possible to view Hoover's faith in academic economics as naive, 
but the faith came naturally to a professional engineer, accustomed to calculating stresses 
and temperatures, and the social scientists shared his faith and aspired to make their new 
science as accurate and objective as his."). For a full account of realism and the social sci­
ences, see SCHLEGEL, supra note 128. 
133. See, e.g., Donald Richberg, Speech to the California Conference on Social Work 21 
(May 15, 1930) (transcript available in the Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, LC, 
Richberg Papers, Box 43, Speeches 1930-Feb. 1933) ("It is essentially the task of those who 
seek social progress to destroy th[e] ruling fiction [of private property] , and all the fictions, 
the illusions, the superstitions that have been so sedulously implanted in the minds of men 
and women that they are blind to their own needs, uncertain of their own aspirations, unable 
to distinguish between the leadership that would enslave them and the leadership that would 
set them free."); Donald Richberg, Economic Illusions Underlying Law, 1 U. CHI. L. Rev. 
96, 96 (1933) ("The ultimate sanction of law making rests upon the establishment of facts . • . .  
In the higher realms of legislative and judicial law making, it becomes a matter of grave 
importance that legislators and judges shall not declare that to be a fact which is not a fact, or 
declare that to be fixed and established which is uncertain and unpredictable. These prelimi­
nary observations may serve to introduce a brief criticism of the efforts of legislators and 
courts to write economic illusions into law.") .  
134. See DONALD R. RICHBERG, TENTS OF THE MIGHTY 214 (1930). Richberg was not 
himself an academic but was enamored of the academics with whom he socialized in the 
University Club at the University of Chicago. He wrote, "It was enlightening to a man who 
worked in 'the City' to contrast the discussion of social problems in the down town lunch 
clubs with the analysis of similar issues at a professor's dinnertable." Id. at 216. 
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way under the same conditions - something which can be made 
and used."135 Richberg's demand that "[t]he men who know must 
run the show" testified to his deep confidence in "the rising author­
ity of scientific leadership."136 
Social science's mantle of objectivity was so capacious that legal 
thinkers of the period became strong advocates of interdisciplinary 
legal work.137 At the Institute for Human Relations at Yale and the 
Johns Hopkins Institute for the Study of Law,138 scientifically ori­
ented legal realists sought institutional independence from law 
schools in research institutes dedicated to empirical social science 
research relating to the legal system.139 The social science they 
sought out was, Morton Horwitz has argued, "the narrowest and 
most naively behavioralist versions of positivist social science."140 
Believers in science had great confidence that the expert's scien­
tific contribution to policymaking could be independent of politics. 
Charles Merriam, a professor of political science at the University 
of Chicago and a leading Progressive era theorist of the relationship 
between science and government, for example, stressed that while 
science could serve politics, it could only do so if science was in­
dependent of politics.141 This meant, to Merriam, that social scien­
tists' investigations needed to be independent of any particular 
government program, lest the search for truth be unduly con­
strained.142 Most social scientists of the period thought that this 
independence from political taint was possible, that, as Purcell has 
observed, "they could remain scientifically neutral while developing 
workable techniques of social control."143 
But this ideology of social science's value-neutrality had intel­
lectually powerful and influential critics. Robert Maynard 
Hutchins, who had embraced the social-scientific approach to law, 
became disillusioned with it when he started doing empirical work 
and realized that data were constrained by the data collectors' as­
sumptions, which were not themselves subject to scientific test-
135. Id. at 247. 
136. Id. at 226, 252. 
137. See PuRCELL, supra note 128, at 78. 
138. See KALMAN, supra note 128; SCHLEGEL, supra note 128 (chapters on Yale and Hop­
kins); TWINING, supra note 128, at 60-65. For a discussion of the Hopkins Institute, including 
Marshall's role, see SCHLEGEL, supra note 128, at 147-210. 
139. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 128, at 66. 
140. HORWITZ, supra note 128, at 181. 
141. See KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 129, at 71. 
142. See id. at 262. 
143. PURCELL, supra note 128, at 26. 
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ing.144 Lon Fuller perceptively argued in 1934 that the Realists 
were so afraid of value choices that they believed that social reality, 
accurately analyzed, would provide its own values. As Horwitz puts 
it, Fuller saw that "in attempting to have law simply mirror society, 
Realism ended up endowing the Is with normative content" - or, 
even more specifically, "endow[ing] economically dominant . . . 
practices with undeserved normativity."145 
Progressive and Legal Realist thinkers considered not only why 
social science should be brought to bear on contemporary 
problems, but also how it might best be brought to bear. They 
viewed the administrative agency as the institutional locus within 
government most likely to put social science research to optimal 
social use. James Landis, who championed the administrative state 
in his 1938 Storrs Lectures, claimed that in the administrative 
agency, unlike in the courts, "the calm of scientific inquiry" would 
reign.146 This made the administrative agency the proper forum for 
developing the law away from the common law's abstraction and 
formalism and towards the "completely adult" jurisprudence the 
Realists sought.147 In Landis's vision of the administrative agency, 
it would matter little whether Congress had given the agency clear 
guidelines within which to work. The mature administrator would 
see himself as having a set of real-world problems to solve, and 
would take his guidance from empirical knowledge of the world, 
not from the prior commands of Congress.14s 
144. See id. at 142. 
145. HoRwnz, supra note 128, at 211 (emphasis added); see also Lon Fuller, American 
Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 458, 461 (1934). Sometimes the constraints were as 
much institutional as intellectual; to get funding for the Hopkins institute, Walter Wheeler 
Cook had to promise that the Institute would not be seeking to change the existing social 
order, but would instead "accept the existing social and economic organization as a basic 
fact." SCHLEGEL, supra note 128, at 155 (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook). 
146. JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938), discussed in HoRwnz, supra 
note 128, at 220, and reprinted in part in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 159-63 (William W. 
Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). 
147. The phrase is Jerome Frank's. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND TIIE MODERN MIND 
253 (1936). 
148. James Landis wrote: 
One of the ablest administrators that it was my good fortune to know, I believe, never 
read, at least more than casually, the statues [sic] that he translated into reality. He 
assumed that they gave him power to deal with the broad problems of an industry and, 
upon that understanding, he sought his own solutions. Limitations upon his powers that 
counsel brought to his attention, naturally, he respected; but there is an enormous differ­
ence between the legalistic form of approach that from the negative vantage of statutory 
limitations looks to see what it must do, and the approach that considers a problem from 
the standpoint of finding out what it can do. 
LANDIS, supra note 146, reprinted in part in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 161 (William W. 
Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). 
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Here again, there were important dissenting views. Roscoe 
Pound's caustic response was that "the postulate of a scientific body 
of experts pursuing objective scientific inquiries is as far as possible 
from what the facts are or are likely to be."149 His counterexample 
was the National Labor Relations Board - an agency that, already 
by 1938, was viewed as so political that it spoke for itself as a cau­
tion against undue confidence in agency "expertise."150 If expertise 
was not the basis for agency action, then politics was, and there 
could be no justification for designing an administrative state that 
was not subject to strong legal checks and constraints.151 
In sum, it was the deep faith of Progressive and Realist thinkers 
that social science, in proper alliance with the administrative state, 
could arrive at objectively correct answers to important questions 
of public policy - answers that drew their legitimacy from agency 
expertise rather than from the political process. But the calls for 
caution from Hutchins, Fuller, and Pound carried an important 
message. If the results of social science brought to the fore by ad­
ministrative agencies were not in fact objective, if instead they were 
significantly colored by the political perspectives of the analysts, 
then the capacity of the administrative state to serve as a progres­
sive force depended solely upon the political perspectives and per­
sonal experiences of key government actors. Perhaps this was the 
reason for the great public interest in the background of New Deal 
administrators - which, in the case of the NRA, took the unflatter­
ing form of reassurances from within the administration that 
Richberg was not a Jew.152 The possibility was recognized that for 
all its claimed expertise and objectivity, social science and Realist 
149. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, Reco=endations 
[known widely as "The Pound Report"], 63rd Annual Report of the American Bar Associa­
tion 331, 344 (1938); see also id. at 345 (noting that "in many fields of administration there is 
no particular expertness"). 
150. See HoRwnz, supra note 128, at 220. 
151. The Taft-Hartley Act and the Administrative Procedure Act were both instantia­
tions of this view, and were both enacted in 1947. 
152. Johnson noted that: 
It was . . .  asserted that I had appointed too many Jews to important posts and Mr. 
Richberg was cited against me on that score . . . .  Just for the sake of the record, I must 
say that Mr. Richberg is not a Jew . . . .  I had several able Jews but they were the scant 
minority [of his staff] and every single one did an outstanding job. Not one was disloyal 
or self seeking. 
JOHNSON, supra note 124, at 212-13. Johnson's suggestion, of course, is that the reader would 
have instinctively assumed otherwise. On the attractiveness of government service to Jewish 
lawyers in the New Deal period, see G. EDWARD WHITE, Felix Frankfurter, the Old Boy 
Network, and the New Deal: The Placement of Elite Lawyers in Public Service in the 1930s, in 
!NraRVENTION AND DETACHMENT: EsSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 149 
(1994). 
2252 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:2212 
lawyering might merely cloak the hegemonic worldview of the 
dominant class - or, worse, the worldview of a still-mistrusted mi­
nority - in the garments of scientific legitimacy. 
What significance can one attach to the Realist/Progressive 
background of NRA officials? Richberg certainly brought his back­
ground into his conceptualization of the NRA's work. He lauded 
the NRA's "utilization of scientifically gathered and organized in­
formation as the basis for business policies, this intrusion of trained 
and impartial economists into the councils of business" - despite 
the business community's discomfort with giving a prominent role 
to "book learning. "153 Does that background suggest anything 
about the approach the NRA officials might have taken to the task 
of class line-drawing? After all, decisions about which classes of 
workers to subject to which New Deal labor policies were minor 
decisions when viewed against the complex backdrop of NRA in­
dustrial policy. It is safe to say that very few NRA administrators 
were appointed to their positions on the basis of past expertise in 
class line-drawing.154 How would REX, our reasonable expert, re­
spond to this situation? 
One might expect to see several strands of principle and prac­
tice, at times harmonious and at times conflicting, woven together 
in REX's class line-drawing work. First and foremost, if he lacked 
prior experience or training on issues of class, he would have be­
lieved that it was his job to develop expertise on the subject by be­
coming intensely involved in factfinding. Furthermore, at least as a 
matter of preference, his orientation would be purposive. His man-
153. Donald R. Richberg, Address at Luncheon of Merchants' Association of New York 
7 (July 6, 1933) (transcript available in LC, Richberg Papers, Container 43, Speeches 1930-
Feb. 1933). Richberg's support of "scientific" policies seemed to end at the door to his own 
department. He strongly objected, for example, to being required to conform the wages of 
his own professional and clerical employees to those mandated by the government's system 
of job classification. See Memorandum from Donald R. Richberg to Hugh Johnson 2 (Oct. 
24, 1933) (LC, Richberg Papers, Container 45, Subject Fiie: NRA, Memoranda Sept.-Nov. 
1933) (complaining that "the classification attempted simmers down to a demand that [staff] 
be paid according to the judgment of someone by whom they are not employed and who is 
not held responsible for their work"). 
154. Although Marshall had written on the subject of class as an economist, see infra note 
289, few NRA administrators had expertise even in the core NRA field of industrial plan­
ning. For the view that the NRA failed because of a failure of state autonomy and capacity 
- i.e., the NRA's failure to set independent goals and to muster the expertise necessary to 
carry them out - see FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 93, at 10, 51-53, 64, 92-103. This 
critique may not apply with equal force to NRA labor policy in general. See BRAND, supra 
note 94, at 288 ("The most revealing characteristic of early New Deal labor policy is . . .  that 
progressive political elites were actively shaping policy to fulfill their own ideologically de­
fined purposes rather than passively responding to interest group demands."). In the area of 
the present study, it is more accurate to say that officials aspired to autonomy than to say 
they achieved it. 
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date, he would have assumed, was to identify and solve real-world 
problems. REX would become frustrated by politics - both by 
political interference in the factfinding process and by political 
pressure to resolve questions before the data were in. Whether 
REX could be an effective actor in the fast-moving world of the 
New Deal would depend upon how well he could function once it 
became clear that the environment of the administrative agency was 
hardly that of the pure scientific laboratory. Thus, when Frances 
Perkins recommended to Roosevelt in 1935 that he hire a political 
scientist, someone with expertise in the workings of the political 
system, the particular person she recommended was not lauded for 
his academic credentials or his methodological purity. She de­
scribed him, instead, as "a real New Dealer but hard-headed and 
realistic. No 'dreams of things to come' for him. Just do it today 
stuff."155 
Finally, at least if the critics of Legal Realism were correct, we 
can expect that REX would have significant cultural blind spots 
that would interfere with his class line-drawing work. REX would 
likely have a bit too much faith in his own objectivity, and would 
likely underestimate the level of vigilance he would need to exert to 
prevent the desires of the dominant classes from becoming law. His 
rhetoric would emphasize government independence. His reality 
would often fall short of the mark. 
C. Upper-Level Exemptions Under the NRA 
We now tum to the "do it today" stuff of class line-drawing 
under the NRA. The NIRA called for the formation of codes of 
fair competition in all industries, and required that all codes of fair 
competition comply with agreed-upon maximum hours and mini­
mum wages. Although the NIRA did not itself specify the permis­
sible wages and hours of labor, NIRA codes were to do so. 
"[S]preading work" was understood to be the major goal of NIRA 
hours regulation - rather than protecting "special types of work­
ers" or eliminating "sweatshop conditions."156 
155. Memorandum from Frances Perkins to President Roosevelt 2 (Mar. 12, 1935) 
(Roosevelt Archives, President's Secretary's Ftle [hereinafter FDRIPSF], Box 57, Depart­
mental Ftle, Labor). 
156. LYON ET AL., supra note 94, at 389-90. Work-spreading preceded the NIRA as the 
focus of administration hours policy. See, e.g., Letter from Frances Perkins to Donald R. 
Richberg (Mar. 22, 1933) (LC, Richberg Papers, Container 1, Correspondence Feb.-May 
1933) (conveying President's invitation to attend a conference on "[t]he emergency problems 
having to do with distress due to unemployment and the method of overcoming the same," 
and listing "short hours as a means of further employment" on the agenda). Arthur 
Dahlberg, the engineer whose work on the concept of work-spreading as a solution to the 
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On the day the NIRA became law, President Roosevelt made a 
speech in which he outlined the statute's intended coverage: it 
would reach all business, and "[b]y 'business' I mean the whole of 
commerce as well as the whole of industry; by workers I mean all 
workers - the white-collar class as well as the men in overalls. "157 
Roosevelt's announced desire to protect "all workers" including the 
"white-collar class" raises the obvious question of how Roosevelt 
defined the "white-collar class," and whether Roosevelt used the 
term to include the "executive, administrative, and supervisory" 
workers Sachs's memo excluded. In an article the following year, 
census superintendent Alba Edwards excluded "managers, officials, 
and professional persons" from his definition of the "white-collar" 
classification.158 Roosevelt might have meant the same, but we can­
not be sure. Indeed, all that remains of Roosevelt's file labeled 
"white collar" is a designation on a list - the contents of the file 
were not preserved by the Roosevelt Archives.159 It seems, how­
ever, that Roosevelt's own administrative staff had its doubts about 
the meaning of the term: an item cross-referenced to the white­
collar file refers to it as the file on "the so-called 'white-collar' 
class."'160 The existence and scope of a "white-collar class" was, 
unemployment problem influenced Hugo Black, see supra note 88, was by January 1934 on 
Sachs's staff at the NRA's Research and Planning section. See Note from Jacob Baker, Fed­
eral Emergency Relief Administration, to Col. Howe (Jan. 16, 1934) (FDR/OF 372, Hours of 
Labor, Box 1, 1934 folder) (referring to Dahlberg as a member of the NRA staff and as "one 
of the best nien on the theory of shorter hours in the country"). 
157. National Recovery Administration Bulletin No. 1, Statement by the President of the 
United States of America Outlining Policies of the National Recovery Administration, in 
LEWIS MAYERS, A HANDBOOK OF NRA LAws, REGULATIONS, CooES 27 (1933), and in 
JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 439. I found no preliminary drafts of or background materials on 
this speech in the Roosevelt Archives. The speech itself is found in Roosevelt Archives, 
President's Personal Ftles (hereinafter FDR/PPF], Speech Ftles, Box 15, No. 637, at 2-3. 
158. Alba Edwards, The "White-Collar Workers," 38 MoNTIILY LAB. REV. 501, 501 
(1934). The term "white collar," as used here, "excludes, on the one hand, proprietors, man­
agers, officials, and professional persons; and it excludes, on the other hand, the 'overalls and 
apron' workers - the skilled, the semiskilled, and the unskilled manual workers." Id. 
159. Per Roosevelt Archives archivists, Dec. 1996. The listing for a "white-collar" file 
places it in Roosevelt's alphabetical files; not all materials in the alphabetical files were pre­
served. This brings to mind the following, in a letter from Roosevelt to Donald Richberg 
when the latter was ill: 
I always remember President Wtlson saying to me once - "Ninety-nine out of every one 
hundred matters which appear to you and me today as of vital Administration policy will 
be completely overlooked by history, and many other little things which you and I pay 
but scant heed to will begin to be talked about one hundred years from now." 
Letter from President Roosevelt to Donald Richberg (Dec. 28, 1934) (FDR/PPF 2418, 
Donald Richberg). Pity the poor archivist with space constraints in light of this too-true 
observation. 
160. See Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins (Apr. 15, 1935) 
(FDR/OF 444, FERA, Box 2, Mar.-May 1935) (cross-referencing in handwriting to the file on 
"the so-called 'white-collar' class"). 
August 1998] Class Line-Drawing 2255 
apparently, up for grabs - despite the fact that Roosevelt was 
making speeches promising to protect it. 
1. Outline of the Spheres of NRA Activity 
The core of administration policy under the NRA was the nego­
tiation, approval, and enforcement of industrial codes.161 The first 
industrial code, the Cotton Textile Code, was approved on July 20, 
1933.162 As we shall see, the status of white-collar and upper-level 
workers was debated during the cotton textile hearings, and the is­
sue triggered Presidential intervention on behalf of the "white­
collar classes." It was not until later in 1933 that the NRA began 
work on the industrial code that would cause the greatest battles 
over the status of white-collar workers: the code for the Daily 
Newspaper Publishing Industry. There, we shall see, the impending 
code-making process triggered the formation of the Newspaper 
Guild, a union of newspaper editorial employees that organized to 
resist the treatment of its members as upper-level employees ex­
empt from hours regulation. 
Because not all industries were sufficiently well-organized or 
compliant to participate or succeed in rapid code-drafting, the ad­
ministration quickly recognized that the industrial-code process 
could not stand alone. In the earliest days of the NRA, the admin­
istration developed a second, alternative strategy: the Blue Eagle. 
The idea was that President Roosevelt would promulgate a boiler­
plate agreement - called the President's Reemployment Agree­
ment (the PRA) - which would specify minimum wages and 
maximum hours.163 Any employer in a noncodified industry was 
eligible to sign the PRA. Employer participation was voluntary, 
161. The code negotiation process was as follows: 
The draft of a code was submitted to the N.R.A. by the trade association or associations 
within a particular industry. Public hearings were held before a deputy administrator, at 
which all parties concerned were privileged to appear and make suggestions for changes. 
The Labor Advisory Board, the Industrial Advisory Board, and the Consumer's Advi­
sory Board were also consulted. Thereupon, a final draft of a code was framed by the 
deputy administrator and submitted to the Administrator. If approved by him, it was 
then submitted to the President, and if, in tum, approved by the President, with or with­
out modifications, was promulgated as a code applicable to the entire coverage of that 
industry. 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., National Recovery Administration: La­
bor Aspects, in BULLETIN No. 616, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 489, 505 (1936) [here­
inafter NRA: Labor Aspects]. 
162. See Exec. Order Approving Code of Fair Competition for the Cotton Textile Indus­
try, Approved Code No. 1 (July 9, 1933), microformed on Presidential Executive Orders and 
Proclamations, CIS No. 1933-51-1 (Congressional Info. Serv.) [hereinafter CIS]. 
163. According to Johnson, not more than 20% of industries and 10% of establishments 
were organized into trade associations, and the non-PRA code process presumed the exist­
ence of such associations to take the initiative in code drafting and to broker the appointment 
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but strongly encouraged through techniques of both persuasion and 
coercion. From the start, Roosevelt proposed "getting a list of the 
big companies who will sign up the voluntary agreements and re­
lease it for [the] morning papers and follow each day with a number 
of big companies[.] I think the little fellows will follow the 
leader."164 Signatories would be authorized to advertise their com­
pliance by displaying the new Blue Eagle insignia in their shops and 
on their products. The NRA would then run an advertising cam­
paign to encourage consumers to support the NRA by boycotting 
nonsignatory businesses. The Blue Eagle program got underway 
with the PRA's promulgation eleven days after the President's ap­
proval of the Cotton Textile Code.16s 
In addition to their work drafting and administering industrial 
codes and the PRA, NRA officials were also involved in broader 
research and policymaking on labor issues. Independent poli­
cymaking had a slow start. From the very beginning of the NRA, 
the organization was criticized for the absence of a coherent strat­
egy for policymaking on a centralized level. As early as one week 
after the enactment of the NIRA, officials elsewhere in the 
Roosevelt administration expressed concern that the NRA lacked a 
coherent economic policy. Top officials in the Commerce Depart­
ment noted that there was a "need for settling at once at least the 
major questions of economic policy, both as to labor and industrial 
questions, which will have to be applied as soon as the administra­
tor and his deputies begin to pass upon codes. "166 There proved to 
be good reason for concern that "if some consideration is not given 
to these questions in advance and a body of principles adopted, one 
administrator may decide one basic question in one way and an­
other in another way and there will be the danger of a good deal of 
confusion and appearance of disorder in the administration."167 
of industry representatives to the code-enforcement authority. See JoHNSON, supra note 124, 
at 254. 
164. Letter from President Roosevelt to General Hugh S. Johnson (July 25, 1933) (FDR/ 
OF 466, NRA, Box 1, July 1933). 
165. See A Plan to Raise Wages, Create Employment, and Thus Restore Business - The 
President's Reemployment Agreement (July 27, 1933), microformed on CIS No. 1933-21-1 
[hereinafter A Plan to Raise Wages]. 
166. Memorandum from John Dickinson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, to President 
Roosevelt, prepared on request of Daniel C. Roper, Secretary of Commerce 3 (June 23, 
1933) {FDR/OF 466, NRA, Box 1, June 1933 folder). Sour grapes may have played a part in 
Commerce's pessimistic appraisal of the NRA's competence. See FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, 
supra note 93, at 56 {discussing Roosevelt's decision not to place enforcement of the NIRA 
in the hands of the Department of Commerce). 
167. Memorandum from John Dickinson, supra note 166, at 3-4. 
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In all of their labor-related activities, NRA officials were in­
volved in formulating official representations of the class system. 
In the discussion that follows, I present the treatment of upper-level 
exemptions roughly chronologically - as reflected in the Cotton 
Textile Code, the PRA, the Daily Newspaper Code, and the labor 
policymaking activities of the Division of Review's policy office 
under the leadership of Leon C. Marshall. 
2. The Cotton Textile Code 
General Johnson approached the codemaking process by choos­
ing one industry - the cotton textile industry - to focus on first, 
with the expectation that other industries would follow suit "and 
work out methods [for] . . .  creating a shorter week and having the 
work shared."168 Three days after Roosevelt's "white collar 
classes" speech, Johnson had worked out the basic terms of the 
code with the industry (with some labor representation). Although 
he was "not completely satisfied with the code," he declared it 
ready for public hearing and expedited action.169 Johnson expected 
that "the first hearing was going to set the entire atmosphere of the 
administration of the act, and emphasized the fact that it should be 
very carefully conducted."170 
A four-day public hearing on the proposed Cotton Textile Code 
was convened on June 28, 1933.171 As presented at the hearing, the 
draft Code provided for a maximum forty-hour workweek and ex­
empted several types of employees: office and supervisory staff, re­
pair shop crews, engineers, 172 watchmen, electricians, and 
firemen.173 I shall refer to all but the office and supervisory exemp­
tion as the exemption for "special crews." There is a marked con­
trast between the hearing's approach to special crews and 
supervisory workers: the approach to special crews was purposive, 
while the approach to supervisory workers was descriptive. As we 
shall see, the purposive approach gave the ·officials presiding over 
168. Discussion of Johnson's co=ents at meeting no. 1 of the Special Industrial Recov-
ery Board 5 (June 19, 1933) (FDR/OF 466, NRA, Box 1, July 1933). 
169. See id. at 6. 
170. Id. at 10. 
171. For the transcript, see National Archives, Record Group 9, National Recovery Ad­
ministration [hereinafter NA/NRA], Records Maintained by the Library Unit, Transcripts of 
Hearings 1933-35, Entry 44 Box 73. 
172. See id. at V-8 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory). From context, it ap­
pears that these engineers were shop-trained rather than college-trained. 
173. It was the job of the "firemen" to maintain boiler and furnace fires - not, as in 
co=on parlance, to put them out. See id. at V-8 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert 
Amory). 
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the hearing (Johnson and W.L. Allen, the NRA deputy administra­
tor for the cotton textile industry) a far better basis for resisting the 
demands of the industry than did the descriptive approach. 
Industry witness Robert Amory defended the special crews' ex­
emption by pointing to the sporadic nature of demand and the 
skilled nature of the work - in particular, the employer-specific 
knowledge the work required. The unpredictability of demand 
made it obvious, at least to the industry, that it would be a waste of 
money to hire multiple crews, since most of the day was spent wait­
ing for something to go wrong and being prepared to handle emer­
gencies.174 And, Amory argued, the need for knowledge of the 
particular shop's equipment meant that you couldn't expect a 
"green man" to be able to step in and do the work.175 Johnson and 
Allen both resisted the notion that work-spreading could not suc­
ceed among these kinds of workers. Johnson demanded to know, 
for example, whether watchmen (who watch the machines to make 
sure they are functioning properly) are under a foreman, with the 
implication being that supervised work can be divided among a 
number of workers.176 Amory insisted that although there is a fore­
man, each watchman is responsible for the whole of the job177 - an 
organization that Johnson and Allen correctly sensed is inconsistent 
with normal workplace hierarchies. Amory further argued that 
these jobs are "supervisory"178 - in the sense that these workers 
supervise mechanical processes and intervene only when they are in 
need of correction, rather than being "processed" as labor by those 
processes.179 Johnson seemed to agree, characterizing the work as 
"an administrative, executive job," one that would take additional 
training.180 But Johnson failed to see why the extra effort could not 
be made to train more workers to do special-crews' work. In pur­
posive terms, Johnson failed to see why there was anything about 
174. See id. at V-8 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory). 
175. See id. 
176. See id. at X-9 (June 27, 1933) (questioning of Robert Amory by Gen. Johnson). 
177. See id. at X-9 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory). 
178. "I know, I have been an engineer and firemen under automatic stokers, and the job 
is purely a supervisory job. It is hard work when something goes wrong; when anything does 
not go wrong it is a question of staying awake to watch the thing. We used to stay on the job 
72 hours." Id. at V-10 (JU'ne 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory) (emphasis added). 
179. The "supervisory" concept was not infinitely malleable even for Amory. He sug­
gested earlier in the hearing that the most skilled hands in charge of the warp tying machine 
- again, the skilled aristocracy of the mill - might be viewed as "supervisory," though he 
backed down from that usage as soon as he suggested it. See id. at H-8 (June 27, 1933) 
(testimony of Robert Amory). 
180. Id. at X-10 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory). 
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the nature of special crews' work that made it ill-suited to work­
spreading. 
Amory's answer was that the extra training would put too much 
of a burden on "our supervisory men, who now work almost to the 
breaking point, [and] would have to work that many more hours 
and . . .  be down at the mill at night."181 Tue most logical answer to 
that problem, over the long term, would of course be to hire more 
such "supervisory men." But Amory asserted that this was not pos­
sible: "Supervisory staff I am passing over; I assume we will have to 
use our regular men."182 Through his answer, Amory shifted the 
debate from the flexible nature of repair work and the scarcity of 
qualified repair men to the indivisibility of supervisory work. That 
move seemed to satisfy Johnson and Allen - or, at the very least, 
to silence them. 
But why? There was an obvious response to Amory's assertion 
that it would not be possible to increase the size of the supervisory 
staff. After all, if a shop ran around the clock, the argument would 
never have been made that the same supervisor needed to be on the 
shop floor for twenty-four hours. Why, then, could the hours of 
supervisors not track the shift hours of the workers they supervised, 
with a short overlap for information-sharing? A purposive analyst 
would have asked that question - but it was not asked. Tue fact 
that Johnson and Allen failed to pursue this line of inquiry suggests 
that, where supervisors were concerned, they were prepared to 
abandon the purposive style of analysis motivating their 
independent-minded response to the proposed special crews' ex­
emption. Perhaps they simply thought, on a descriptive level, that 
regulating the hours of supervisors would be in some sense inappro­
priate - for reasons too obvious to require discussion. 
"Office workers" were also exempted from hours regulation by 
the Code as originally drafted, and no labor representatives came 
forward at the hearing to argue on their behalf. To the contrary. 
Tue most articulate labor representative at the hearing, William 
Batty of the New Bedford Textile Council, argued that "[s]ince the 
purpose of the Act is to spread employment it is clear that the op­
portunity here afforded to absorb unemployed mechanics, engi­
neers, electricians, firemen, etcetera, should not be lost."183 But he 
was prepared to make no such argument for office workers - nor 
181. Id. at X-10 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory). 
182. Id. at X-10; V-11 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory). 
183. Id. at 0-7 (June 28, 1933) (testimony of William E.G. Batty). 
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did he take the position that office workers were not facing unem­
ployment. He simply stated that the exemption for office workers, 
like that for supervisors, was "legitimate"184 - without explaining 
why work-spreading would not aid office workers. 
Johnson spoke up - as did consumer advocates at the hearing 
- and demanded an explanation for the exclusion of office work­
ers. Amory argued to Johnson that office clerks are "working 80 
hours a week" and that doubling them up was not an option.185 
Johnson was not prepared to accept a broad exemption for office 
workers: "I think we have to undertake a little inconvenience. If 
officerworkers [sic] and the white collar class generally are ex­
empted on account of the way they fit into the particular job we are 
going to very, very seriously impair the operations" of the NRA.186 
Here, Johnson was signaling that he was not prepared to entertain 
even well-founded purposive arguments about the indivisibility of 
white-collar work. Consumers' advocate Lucy Mason invoked the 
President's "white collared classes" speech, saying that "I think the 
President meant what he said when he said 'including white collar 
workers.' "187 
In the end, the President did insist on extending maximum 
hours protection to office workers as a condition of approving the 
Cotton Textile Code.188 He did not, however, insist on coverage for 
supervisors. As reflected in the final negotiations over the Cotton 
Textile Code, including white-collar classes came to mean including 
clerical workers but excluding supervisory workers.189 
The seemingly easy decision to exclude supervisory workers 
from hours restrictions did not end the controversy of supervisory 
184. See id. at 0-7 (June 28, 1933) (testimony of William E.G. Batty). 
185. See id. at V-10 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory). 
186. Id. at X-8 (June 27, 1933) (statement by Gen. Johnson). 
187. Id. at 40 (June 29, 1933) (testimony of Lucy Mason). 
188. He accepted unlimited hours for special crews, but insisted that they be paid time 
and a half for their overtime. See NAJNRA, Consolidated Approved Code Industries File 
[hereinafter NA/NRA/CACI], Box 1802, Code of Fair Competition for the Cotton Textile 
Industry as Approved by Executive Order, July 9, 1933, NRA Release No. 331, at 2(4) and 
2(6). 
189. See the negotiations between Johnson and George A. Sloan, the head of the Cotton 
Textile industry board, reflected in Transcript of Hearing 33 (June 30, 1933) (NA/NRA/CACI 
Entry 44 Box 73). Johnson, for the record, summed up their negotiations by saying that "on 
the question of exemptions of hours of labor which formerly applied to the white collared 
man, there is some provision to be worked out." Sloan responded, "Yes sir. We state it 
should be worked out by July 30th as to office employees, with a view to bringing them within 
the provisions of the Code." Id.; see also NRA Press Release No. 25 (June 30, 1933) (FDR/ 
OF 466, NRA, Box 1, June 1933 folder) (describing two days of posthearing consultations 
between Sloan and NRA officials resulting in bringing office workers' hours within the 40 
hour provision). 
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workers under the Cotton Textile Code. Experience under the 
Code revealed that the exemption for supervisory workers was dif­
ficult to administer, because "supervisory" status was difficult to de­
fine.190 In the course of enforcing the Code, the cotton textile 
industry code authority defined "supervisory staff" to include "all 
who direct the activity of others, such as executives, department 
heads, superintendents, paymasters, foremen, overseers and second 
hands."191 Leon C. Marshall and his assistant, fellow economist 
Harry Weiss, took issue with this provision. Marshall reported to 
the Labor Advisory Board that "the definition of the supervisory 
staff seems to me to be not justifiable. It amounts to leaving the 
matter in the discretion of the mill management."192 He objected, 
in this regard, to the open-endedness of the phrase "all who direct 
the activities of others" - an approach later codes had avoided. 
He was prepared to concede that the code authority was under no 
obligation to make changes to conform to other, later-enacted 
codes. But, Marshall argued, "in any event insistence upon the 
non-applicability of the provisions found in other codes does not 
relieve [the cotton textile industry code authority] from the obliga­
tion of defining 'supervisory staff' in such fashion that it will pro­
mote a cooperative spirit between management and workers."193 
The difficulty of defining "supervisory" work was (and remains) 
a major problem for federal hours regulation. Indeed, the terms 
"supervisory" and "executive" have been subject to what now seem 
strange usages. Johnson, for example, was prepared to use the term 
to describe the fireman's "supervision" of a furnace. It was often 
the case that government actors, like Marshall here, rejected an in­
dustry's definition of "supervisory" status without stating their own 
view of what the correct definition should be. Marshall was not 
generally shy about drawing the line between right and wrong. But, 
as he noted, the NRA lacked the power to promulgate official defi­
nitions of supervisory status and to insist that already-promulgated 
190. The definition of office workers was also a problem. Regarding "office" workers, an 
"explanation" tendered by the code authority in June 1934 categorized supply clerks and 
attendants in supply rooms as "office" employees. NRA officials objected to this interpreta­
tion, and it was rescinded. See Memorandum from C.W. Metcalf to R.I. Henry, President, 
Duncan Mills, Inc. (July 19, 1934) (NA/NRA/CACI, Entry 25, Box 1807, Litigation Memos, 
No. A-17). 
191. Explanation of Cotton Textile Code provisions relative to wages and hours, com­
piled and revised by direction of Code Authority 21 (May 15, 1934) (NA/NRA/CACI, Entry 
25, Box 1807, Cotton Textile Code). 
192. Memorandum from Marshall to Ruth Reticker and Clarence Blaue 2 (Aug. 16, 1934) 
(NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. Marshall Papers, Box 3). 
193. Id. 
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industry codes be amended to include them.194 Marshall did have a 
measure of power in his policymaking role; he could shape the posi­
tion that NRA officials would take in subsequent code develop­
ment and enforcement. But in order to exercise that power, 
Marshall thought it was necessary for the NRA to develop in­
dependent knowledge.195 As we shall see, the agency never suc­
ceeded in doing so. Thus, for lack of both power and information, 
Marshall could not use the NRA's expertise to formulate any spe­
cific definition that would more accurately state what it meant to be 
a "supervisor" in the cotton textile industry. 
With neither power nor expert knowledge, the best Marshall 
thought he could do was to defer to the judgment of the industry's 
own experts. At least he would then be able to keep the decisions 
out of the hands of the non-experts in the mills, who could never 
produce uniformity or the perception of fairness - both necessary 
for maintaining a "cooperative spirit" between workers and man­
agement. Marshall made no effort, -however, to shape the industry 
experts' approach to the problem of defining supervisory work -
something he might well have been able to use his position to do. 
He did not recommend to the industry that it take a hard purposive 
look at which types of upper-level workers fell beyond the reason­
able reach of work-spreading. Nor did he refer the industry to po­
tential status-based distinctions that could form the basis of a 
descriptive line-drawing approach (for example, distinctions be­
tween those who routinely perform manual tasks in the course of 
their working day and those who do not). Marshall was not suffi­
ciently self-reflective about the fact that the experts' answers would 
depend upon their questions - whether the experts were inside or 
outside of government. 
Turning to office workers, if Roosevelt and Johnson expected 
that the inclusion of office workers in the Cotton Textile Code's 
system of hours regulation would set the precedent for all codified 
industry, they were wrong. As late as March 1934, the NRA Con­
ference of Code Authorities and Trade Association Code Commit­
tees included on its agenda a discussion about the "Possibilities of 
Increasing Employment by including under labor provisions of 
codes excepted classes of employees such as . . .  Office Workers."196 
194. See id. 
195. See infra text accompanying notes 263-68. 
196. Agenda for the conference of the National Recovery Administration 3 (Mar. 5, 
1934) (FDR/OF 466, NRA, Box 2, Jan.-Mar. 1933). 
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Without constant vigilance on the part of the administration, indus­
tries continued to exempt office workers from hours regulation. 
Why was it so difficult to enforce the administration's stated 
policy of including office workers in the NRA's industry codes? In­
strumental reasons certainly played a role. In many industries, of­
fice workers faced peak seasons - inventory periods, for example 
- and industries resisted being required to increase their perma­
nent workforce to deal with temporary needs. Johnson provided a 
clear answer to that objection: industry would have to find a way to 
deal with the admitted inconvenience of NRA policy. Perhaps an­
other reason for NRA underenforcement was administrability. 
Given the difficulty of defining (excluded) supervisory workers, it 
might have been easier for NRA administrators if the codes treated 
all white-collar workers as excluded. Administrators might have 
found it easier to determine white-collar as opposed to supervisory 
status from job titles or rudimentary job descriptions. Politics also 
likely played a part. Although consumer advocates were defending 
the rights of white-collar workers, the workers themselves were not 
organized - making their interests easier to ignore. But would 
NRA staffers ignore Roosevelt's announced policies merely be­
cause white-collar workers were not organized? The lack of unions 
to defend the interests of white-collar workers might, instead, have 
caused the NRA staff to see the defense of white-collar interests as 
part of their own job - as Johnson did at the cotton textile hear­
ings. It might well be that the best explanation for why office work­
ers were so often excluded from the hours regulation provisions of 
industry codes lies in the symbolic sphere. Despite Roosevelt's 
stated policies, NRA staffers may have subscribed to the view that 
office work carries too high a status to be subjected to hours limita­
tions. One can hardly expect government actors to become advo­
cates for a position they do not believe - especially in the absence 
of effective central policy oversight or interest-group pressure. 
3. Upper-Level Exemptions in the PRA 
Three major groups of employees were recognized in the PRA. 
One group, composed of factory workers, mechanical workers, and 
artisans, was assigned a maximum workweek of thirty-five hours 
and a maximum work day of eight hours, but could be required to 
work a maximum week of forty hours, without overtime, for up to 
six weeks in every year.197 This gave employers the flexibility to 
197. See A Plan to Raise Wages, supra note 165. 
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work their employees longer hours during seasonal peak periods. 
"Accounting, clerical, banking, office, service, or sales employees 
(except outside salesmen)" had a longer maximum work week -
forty hours - but with no provision for seasonal peaks.198 Their 
daily work hours were unrestricted.199 The third group of employM 
ees - "registered pharmacists or other professional persons emM 
ployed in their profession" (regardless of pay) and "employees in a 
managerial or executive capacity, who now receive more than $35 a 
week" - was exempted from any maximum hours provision.200 
Almost as soon as the PRA was promulgated, it became the 
subject of revision and interpretation by NRA officials, either 
across-the-board or in negotiations with particular businesses.201 
NRA interpretations of "other professional persons employed in 
their profession" reflected the difficulties of the line-drawing reM 
quired by the PRA. For example, hospital technicians were 
grouped with nurses and doctors (including interns) as profession­
als, but engineers in radio and "other highly technical professions" 
were only presumed to be professionals, subject to employee disM 
proof.202 Newspaper reporters were deemed professionals, as were 
newspaper photographers, along with "rewrite men and other 
members of editorial staffs"203 - characterizations that were em­
battled from the start and became more so once the Daily Newspa­
per Code was developed. Embalmers were held to be 
professionals, while funeral directors were declared exempt without 
deciding whether they were professionals (who were exempt with­
out regard to salary) or executives (who were exempt only if their 
198. See id. 
199. Note that the minimum wage under the PRA for these white-collar workers was 
lower than the minimum wage for the manual worker group - 371h cents an hour as opposed 
to 40 cents an hour. 
200. See NRA Bulletin No. 3, President's Reemployment Agreement 7 (July 20, 1933) 
{NA/NRA Consolidated Administrative File [hereinafter NAINRA/CAF], Entry 27, Box 
6860). 
201. The PRA was amended, for example, to eliminate the "tolerance" for six yearly 
forty hour weeks for factory/mechanical employees, to permit instead two weeks of extended 
hours for year-end inventories at a time-and-a-half rate, and to alter the wage differentials for 
small communities. See id. at 7-8. At the same time, employers were securing individually­
tailored alterations of the PRA's core wage and hour requirements, often with little scrutiny 
from the agency. Some of these changes entirely excluded office workers or subjected them 
to peak hours provisions. See NRA Press Release No. 180 (Aug. 4, 1933) (NAINRA/CAF 
Box 6860, Entry 27). I found no PRA interpretations in the files on "executive" or "manage­
rial" in the interpretations files. 
202. See General Interpretations and Explanations of the President's Reemployment 
Agreement, made by the Policy Board and Authorized Councils and Officials 24-25 (n.d.) 
(NAlNRA/CAF, Entry 27, Box 6860) (citing NRA Bulletin No. 4, Interpretation No. 6). 
203. See id. (citing NRA Bulletin No. 4, Interpretation No. 19). 
August 1998] Class Line-Drawing 2265 
salaries were $35 a week or more).204 Nowhere did the NRA offi­
cials engaged in this line drawing articulate a set of overarching 
principles that could operate as a definition of "professional." 
The PRA was not promulgated as a set of mandatory minimum 
terms for industrial codes. Nonetheless, Johnson took the position 
that the minimum-salary approach to the definition of executives 
and managers was binding on all industry (including codified indus­
tries), an approach he deemed necessary "in order to prevent eva­
sions and the giving of meaningless titles to minor employees to 
exempt them from the hours provisions":205 
There are provisions in various codes excepting from the limita­
tion upon hours of those described as "managers" or "executives" and 
complaint has been received that in many instances employees are 
classified as "managers" or "executives" either for the purpose, or 
with the result, of exempting them from limitations upon hours. It 
has not been the intention of the Administration in approving such 
exceptions to provide for the exemption of any persons other than 
those who exercise real managerial or executive authority, which per­
sons are invested with responsibilities entirely different from those of 
the wage earners and come within the class of the higher salaried 
employees. 
It will be presumed that no employee receiving less than $35 per 
week will be classified as a "manager" or "executive" . . . . 206 
Industry groups immediately complained, and, as was so often the 
case, the NRA capitulated. For example, when the secretary of the 
Cotton Textile Institute simply pointed out that "in cotton mills 
there are a good many overseers and second hands that direct the 
activity of others who are not paid as much as $35 per week,"207 an 
NRA official told him that the new interpretation "is not meant to 
upset any present interpretation of the Cotton Textile Code."2os 
The failure of the codes to adhere to the $35 per week rule for 
exempt managers was criticized by the National Consumers' 
League, which also saw the issue as one of "code evasion": 
In order to evade restrictions on working hours, many employers 
raise the wages of a worker a few dollars, give him a title of "execu­
tive," and make him work unlimited hours. A South Carolina print­
ing company has a number of operatives called "executives" paid 
between $16 and $18 a week, who work up to 70 hours a week, while 
204. See id. (citing Card No. 1341). 
205. NRA: Labor Aspects, supra note 161, at 502. 
206. Id. 
207. Letter from Paul B. Halstead to W.S. Nicholson (Nov. 1, 1933) (NA/NRA/CACI 
Entry 25, Box 1807, Cotton Textile). 
208. Letter from W.S. Nicholson to Paul B. Halstead (Nov. 2, 1933) (NA/NRA/CACI 
Entry 25, Box 1807, Cotton Textile). 
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a department store in Ohio has "promoted" all the men in one de­
partment to executive rank in order to avoid the limited work 
week.209 
The League's proposal was that "[  e ]very class or group of employ­
ees should be covered by the hours provisions of codes, except ex­
e,cutives and supervisors who receive $35.00 or more per week."210 
This wage minimum for upper-level status was thought to be suffi­
cient to solve the problem of "evasion of the intent of codes 
through misleading classification of employees. "211 
The opinion among those protective of labor interests, then, was 
that fraud and evasion could not be avoided without two elements 
that eventually became central to the FLSA approach to upper­
level exemptions: a "duties" test - that is, a commitment on the 
part of the government to scrutinize the actual duties performed by 
someone whose job is labeled exempt - and a minimum-salary test 
- used to make sure that the employer's representations that a job 
is highly valued is matched by its compensation. The political 
weakness of the NRA, resulting from the centrality of business vol­
untarism under the statutory scheme, meant that NRA officials did 
not have the power to insist on the duties and salary-minimum ap­
proach. But their desire to use those approaches reflected the view 
that government should be acting independent of the business com­
munity, by refusing to take employers' labeling of their employees' 
jobs as dispositive of their true nature. This independence was al­
most impossible to achieve in the political climate of the NRA code 
process. 
In any event, wage-minimum requirements are imperfect mech­
anisms for restricting employers' unilateral power to classify their 
employees. All a wage-minimum requires is that an employer pay 
an employee consistent with the employer's desired categorization. 
The employer can be expected to take this opportunity when, and 
only when, its economic self-interest so dictates - meaning that the 
employer's self-interest is still in control. If the NRA were aiming 
only to protect the economic interests of the employed, a demand 
for consistency would satisfy statutory aims: it would mean that 
employers would be free to call people executives as long as they 
paid them executive-level salaries. But the goal of hours regulation 
209. Statement of Mary W. Dawson, National Consumer's League, at the NRA Confer­
ence in Washington 2 (Feb. 28, 1934) (FDR/OF 466, NRA, Box 6, Codes Misc 1934, March 2, 
1934). 
210. National Consumer's League's Proposed Principles for Labor Provisions of NRA 
Codes 2 (Dec. 7, 1933) (FDR/OF 466, NRA, Box 6, Codes Misc 1934). 
211. Id. at 3. 
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under the NRA was work-spreading. Allowing an employer to 
avoid hiring and training additional workers merely by raising the 
salaries of those workers it already employed would stand in the 
way of alleviating unemployment. 
Duties requirements are better tailored than are minimum sal­
ary requirements to the goal of achieving government control over 
the job-classification process. But duties requirements are difficult 
to administer. While routine payroll records reflect weekly salaries, 
official job descriptions - if they exist - often fail to reflect the 
mix of tasks an employee in fact performs. A true check on em­
ployer power would require a duties test that was built on enforce­
ment through on-site inspection or vigorous litigation, neither of 
which the NRA contemplated. 
Throughout the PRA-triggered discussion of fraud, evasion, and 
the need to limit the exemption to "true" executives, NRA officials 
were never clear about why executives should be exempt. Was it 
because executive work was not amenable to work-spreading? Be­
cause executive unemployment was not enough of a problem to 
bother with? Because it would be inconsistent with the high status 
of executives to force them to punch a time clock? Or because ex­
ecutives were unrepresented in the political process? In other 
words, was the NRA's approach here purposive, descriptive, or 
purely political? The lack of a clear focus likely would have under­
mined NRA enforcement efforts even if the agency had been given 
the power to have its way. 
4. Daily Newspaper Industry Code 
Newspaper reporters and photographers were active in shaping 
the legal treatment of white-collar workers, both under the NRA 
and, as we shall see later, under the FLSA. When the NRA began, 
editorial workers in daily newspapers (writers, editors, reporters, 
photographers) were not unionized - in sharp contrast to the suc­
cessful unionization of the skilled blue-collar workers in the indus­
try. On August 7, 1933, Heywood Broun, an influential and 
politically active leftist columnist,212 published a letter from a dis­
gruntled newspaper reporter that put the status and economic fu­
ture of editorial newspaper workers in the Depression directly at 
issue: 
212. For a discussion of Braun's radical activism and influence, see DENNING, supra note 
25, at 14-15. 
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The men who make up the papers of this country would never look 
upon themselves as what they really are - hacks and white-collar 
slaves. Any attempt to unionize leg, rewrite, desk or makeup men 
would be laughed to death by these editorial hacks themselves. 
Union? Why, that's all right for 'dopes' like printers, not for smart 
guys like newspapermen.213 
In response to this letter, Broun committed himself to forming a 
union of newspaper editorial workers.214 The NRA was an impor­
tant part of his motivation as well. The agency scheduled hearings 
on a proposed industry code for the Daily Newspaper Industry for 
September 22, 1933, and Broun held the mass meeting that 
culminated in the founding of the Newspaper Guild on September 
17 - in time for the Guild to participate in the planned hearing.21s 
And participate the Guild did. The Guild's position was that 
editorial workers were in grave need of work-spreading, and that a 
forty-hour maximum week should apply to them as well as to pro­
duction workers.216 The proposed code said nothing specific about 
the hours of editorial workers. Instead, its Paragraph 8 exempted 
"professionals" and "executives" earning $35 a week or more from 
hours regulation. Little was said at the hearing by industry wit­
nesses about how far down the editorial ranks this exemption would 
go. Representations had been made that reporters would be sub­
ject to hours regulation, but as counsel for the Guild in New York 
pointed out, "a careful scrutiny of the code will reveal that that as­
sumption is unwarranted by anything that is contained in the code 
itself."217 The Guild had good reason to worry. The PRA's official 
interpretation had classified "newspaper reporters, editorial writers, 
rewrite men and other members of editorial staffs" as profession-
213. Script and Program for the Heywood Broun Memorial Meeting, Manhattan Center 
5 (Feb. 12, 1940) (Roosevelt Archives, Gardner Jackson Papers, Box 12, Folder, Heywood 
Broun) (quoting letter). 
214. For a discussion of the activity of other white-collar unions in the period, see 
DENNING, supra note 25, at 15; KocKA, supra note 5, at 206-34. The Newspaper Guild was 
unique in its level of participation in the NRA process. In contrast, for example, the Retail 
Clerks' International Protective Association (RCIPA), a union of retail clerks that affiliated 
with the AFL in 1888, was not strong enough to play more than a "minor role" in the forma­
tion of the NRA Retail Code in 1933. See id. at 55 (formation); id. at 211 (NRA role). 
215. On Braun's motivation, see Heywood Broun, NRA Set Up a Spring Board and it 
Worked, GUILD REP., Nov. 23, 1933, at 1 (on file in Wayne State University Archives of 
Labor and Urban Affairs, Newspaper Guild Papers [hereinafter WSU/Guild]) ("The Na­
tional Recovery Act was the direct inspiration for the organization of the Newspaper Guild 
of New York."). 
216. For discussions of work-spreading, see, e.g., Hearing on Code of Fair Practices and 
Competition for the Newspaper Publishing Industry (Code 507-1-05) 1392 (Sept. 22, 1933) 
[hereinafter Sept. 1933 Newspaper Hearing] (NA/NRA/CAF Entry 44, Records Maintained 
by Library Unit, Transcripts of Hearings, Box 95) (testimony of Lloyd White). 
217. Id. at 1362 (testimony of Alexander Lindsey). 
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als.218 It would have been foolish to trust that the Code would be 
different. 
Guild witnesses objected on clearly purposive grounds to any 
provision that would exclude editorial workers from hours 
regulation. 
Since the publishers have admitted the principle of the forty hour 
week in their proposed Code, any exemption of a particular group of 
their employees should be supported by a clear showing by these pub­
lishers of insurmountable technological or economic difficulties which 
would dictate such an exemption. 
In the case of editorial workers this cannot be demonstrated from 
the facts of daily newspaper editorial operation. 
Granting that the production of an editorial worker cannot be me­
tered, we submit that the production of news and other editorial con­
tent does not differ from the production of any other commodity in its 
essentials or in the meaning of the Recovery Act.219 
To the Guild, the mere fact that editorial employees could not, "like 
mechanical and factory employees . . .  start and stop with the whis­
tle,"220 was not a sufficient functional justification for exempting 
them from hours regulation. In the view of Guild witnesses, if re­
porters (particularly on afternoon papers) were "working 70 hours 
a week when no emergency existed," "[t]he simple solution . . .  is to 
hire reporters to absorb this excess work."221 
Guild witnesses conceded to the industry that some editorial 
workers ought not be subject to hours regulation. The question was 
drawing the line. Here again, the Guild's orientation was purpo­
sive. Guild witnesses harshly criticized the notion that some report­
ers were "professionals," and that they could be identified by high 
salary or by the possession of a by-line or by status as a colum­
nist.222 As to the boundaries of "executive" status, the Guild was 
willing to "except editors in chief and managing editors . . .  because 
they are executives in fact," but found it inappropriate to exempt 
"sub-editors" because "[t]heir work can well be spread over a 
greater number of men."223 
Guild witnesses also signaled that even if the classification 
scheme in the proposed code were understood in descriptive terms 
218. NRA Press Release No. 147 (July 28, 1933) (NAJNRA/CAF Entry 27 Box 6860, 
PRA). 
219. Sept. 1933 Newspaper Hearing, supra note 216, at 1393-94 (testimony of Lloyd 
White). 
220. Id. at 1421 (testimony of Andrew Parker). 
221. Id. at 1411 (testimony of Lloyd White). 
222. See id. at 1419-21 (testimony of Andrew Parker). 
223. Id. at 1395 (testimony of Lloyd White). 
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as embodying a set of status distinctions, the Guild was willing to 
make the status sacrifice necessary to come within NRA hours reg­
ulation. That stance transgressed cultural norms - so much so that 
the hearing transcript notes that many of the Guild's witnesses' 
comments were met with laughter. Among them were the 
following: 
We object to being classified as professional men and women for the 
purpose of depriving us of the NRA.224 
[Designating reporters who earn more than $35 a week as profession­
als] is the highest compliment that has been paid to us since Edmund 
Burke looked above the clock in the House of Commons one day and 
dubbed us the Fourth Estate.225 
We feel that we are members of a craft. 
Professionals, as we understand it, are persons engaged in a life 
work which has some minimum requirements for enterance [sic] into 
it, some test for competency, and some examination, and perhaps 
even a code of ethics. Of these we have none. We have none except 
as the decency of the individual might dictate . . . .  
. . . . My own proposition is that we would like to be brought in as 
simple craftsmen and taken up on the heights of the Blue Eagle in­
stead of being let down in the valley of ragged [sic] individualism.226 
Why laughter? Part of the reason must have been that the very 
eloquence of the testimony belied the claim that the witnesses were 
simply "members of a craft." But not all of the statements that trig­
gered laughter had the self-aware and ironical turns of phrase that 
so often marked the Guild's testimony. I suspect, then, that part of 
the laughter was nervous laughter - laughter at the awkwardness 
of white-collar workers violating the norins of social hierarchy by 
committing status hara-kiri on the witness stand. Their message 
was clear: false consciousness on the part of newspaper reporters 
was standing in the way of their economic interests. Witnesses 
commented that "newspaper men . . .  have lived in an atmosphere 
of quixotism . . . . Their idealism has been their weakness to be 
exploited by the publishers,"227 and they have been "lulled to sleep 
by publishers who make them believe that their jobs are 
exalted. "228 
The NRA response to the forceful participation of the Guild 
was to express frustration that so little information was available on 
224. Id. at 1366 (testimony of Doris Fleeson, New York Daily News). 
225. Id. at 1367 (testimony of Edward Angly). 
226. Id. at 1367-68. 
227. Id. at 1402-03 (testimony of Lloyd White). 
228. Id. at 1419-20 (testimony of Andrew Parker). 
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editorial employees. The NRA's Division of Economic Research 
and Planning noted in a November report that salaried workers 
made up close to half of the newspaper workforce and that it was 
important to pay close attention to them. But the Division ac­
knowledged that "there are no figures available reflecting employ­
ment conditions pertaining to office and editorial workers in the 
newspaper industry" and that "lacking any definite statistical basis 
it is impossible to make any estimate of the probable increase in 
employment that the adoption of the code provisions will entail."229 
Furthermore, the proposed code would set not only maximum 
hours, but also minimum wages for different categories of employ­
ees in the industry. Little was known about existing and historic 
compensation levels for editorial workers. Absent better data, 
NRA officials felt helpless. 
By December, the Newspaper Guild had succeeded in getting 
President Roosevelt's attention. Roosevelt was aware of the 
Guild's complaints that the proposed code as written did not sub­
stantiate Johnson's assurances that reporters would not be treated 
as "professionals."230 Roosevelt met with Guild leaders on Decem­
ber 11, 1933,231 and with Broun on February 1, 1934.232 Although 
Roosevelt approved the industry's proposed code on February 17, 
his executive order provided that additional work would be done to 
pin down the status of editorial employees: "[t]he determination of 
hours and wages for news department workers shall be made not 
later than 60 days hence."233 And in his public announcement, 
Roosevelt added the following: 
The publishers of newspapers having a circulation of seventy-five 
thousand or more in cities of seven-hundred and fifty thousand popu­
lation or more are requested to install a five day, forty hour week for 
their staff of reporters and writers with the purpose of giving employ­
ment to additional men and women in this field. A report on this will 
be made at the end of sixty days.234 
229. Saul Nelson, The Newspaper Industry {1st ed. Nov. 11, 1933) (NAINRA/CAF Entry . 
26, Box 6410, NRA Division of Economic Research and Planning). 
230. See Memorandum from S.T.E. to Mr. Mcintyre (Dec. 8, 1933) (FDR/OF 466, NRA, 
Box 5, Codes N) (noting upcoming meeting with the Guild). 
231. See WSU/Guild, What the Guild Told Roosevelt at a Tea Party, GUILD REP., Jan. 12, 
1934. 
232. See Note Appended to Telegram from Heywood Broun to President Roosevelt (Feb. 
1, 1934) (FDR/OF 466, NRA, Box 5, Codes N). 
233. Executive Order, Code of Fair Competition for the Daily Newspaper Publishing 
Business, Feb. 17, 1934, CIS 1934-E0-6606-G. 
234. Letter from President Roosevelt to General Hugh S. Johnson (Feb. 17, 1934) (FDR/ 
OF 466, NRA, Box 5, Codes N). 
2272 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:2212 
In response to Roosevelt's request, the Guild and the Industry 
both went about the task of gathering data on the occupational and 
wage structure of editorial work. The Guild worked in cooperation 
with the NRA Division of Planning and Research in developing its 
data.235 In December and January - well off the sixty-day mark -
a hearing was held at which conflicting data sets submitted by the 
Guild, the industry, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics236 were dis­
cussed and the proposals of the industry and the Guild were ad­
dressed.237 Thereafter, the Research and Planning Division 
continued to study the issue, and the proposed amendments were 
considered by NRA officials from February through April of 1935. 
The Guild was relatively late in coming forward with its pro­
posed amendments, submitting them on January 17. What the 
Guild proposed was a five-day, forty-hour week for editorial work­
ers throughout the country, with exceptions for emergencies, and 
with premium pay for overtime. The Guild's hours proposal did 
not come as a surprise, given the tenor of its earlier testimony. The 
Guild's minimum wage recommendation was $45 per week,238 
which was in excess of what Guild witnesses had recommended in 
the initial hearings,239 in excess of the industry's proposal of a mini­
mum wage ranging from $12 to $25 per week depending on city 
size,240 and was later characterized by the NRA's Research and 
235. See Transcript of Public Hearing Called by the Code Authority of the Daily Newspa· 
per Publishing Business 51 (Apr. 30, 1934) (NA/NRA/CAF Entry 44, Records Maintained by 
the Library Unit, Transcripts of Hearing, Box 96, Code 507-1-05) (testimony of Jonathan 
Eddy at the Waldorf Astoria in New York); see also Letter from Jack Tate to Jonathan Eddy 
(Dec. 20, 1934) (NA/NRA, Amendments, Box 1923) (referring to "the survey conducted by 
the Division of Research and Planning of the National Recovery Administration in coopera­
tion with the Guild"). 
236. See Transcript of Hearing on Code of Fair Competition for the Daily Newspaper 
Publishing Industry (Dec. 5, 1934) (NA/NRA/CAF Entry 44, Records Maintained by the 
Library Unit, Box 95). The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor got in· 
volved in data-collection and analysis at the request of the Guild. See Letter from Jack Tate 
to Jonathan Eddy (Dec. 20, 1934), supra note 235, at 1. 
237. See Transcript of Hearing on Code of Fair Competition for the Daily Newspaper 
Publishing Industry (Dec. 5, 1934), supra note 236. 
238. For the proposal, see Guild Seeks $45 Minimum for News Men; Asks National Five­
Day Week in Code Plan, GUILD REP., Jan. 15, 1935 (NA/NRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 
1923). 
239. See Sept. 1933 Newspaper Hearing, supra note 216, at 1363 (testimony of Alexander 
Lindsey) (urging "a minimum scale for all newspaper writers, as follows: $20 [per week] for 
all newspaper men of less than one year's experience; $30 for all newspaper men having 
between one and two years of experience; and a minimum of $40 for all newspaper men of 
over two years experience" on all papers). 
240. See NRA Press Release No. 9685, Press Memo No. 1 (Jan. 17, 1935) (NA/NRA 
Consolidated Approved Industry Ftles, Amendments, Box 1923). 
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Planning Division as "far in excess of anything the publishers would 
agree to, if not in excess of a fair proposal."241 
The Guild's position on the minimum wage for editorial workers 
is of relevance to the hours-regulation inquiry because the Guild's 
insistence on a high salary minimum may well have undercut its 
argument that editorial workers were ordinary workers with no spe­
cial status.242 Why might this have been the case? After all, there 
need not have been any contradiction between resisting profes­
sional status and insisting on high wages. At the 1933 hearings, 
Frank Morrison, the Secretary of the American Federation of La­
bor, had complained that editorial workers "on the average receive 
weekly salaries far below the wages paid to the skilled workers em­
ployed in the production of the same publications. "243 Seeking par­
ity with skilled blue-collar workers would not undercut the Guild 
witnesses' notion that "[n]ewspaper editorial knowledge is . . .  the 
same type of knowledge as that possessed by the bricklayer who has 
learned by practice to build a wall to plumb."244 But the reason 
Morrison gave for his demand for higher wages did not rest on par­
ity with equivalent skills across the collar-color line. Instead, he 
drew on the perceived class superiority of the editorial workers. He 
noted the "higher degree of education required and the higher stan­
dard of living expected" of editorial workers when he said: 
There is no more influential or more important body in our country 
than those who gather, write, or edit the news. The public look to 
them for unbiased reports of the doings of our everyday life. We ex­
pect them to be capable and fair. In order that these men and women 
may be able to live in decency and comfort it is essential that they 
receive a minimum weekly salary which will permit of their maintain­
ing such a standard of living.245 
Here the story is one of status, pure and simple, and is redolent of 
the Lynds' argument that engineers, teachers, preachers, and so 
forth should be considered part of the business class because the 
"business interests of the city . . .  dominate and give their tone to" 
241. Letter from Spencer Reed, Chief, Unit 9, Research and Planning Division, to Gustav 
Peck, Assistant Administrative Officer, and Jack Tate, Administrator, Division VII (Mar. 22, 
1935) (NA/NRA Consolidated Approved Industry Ftle, Amendments, Box 1923). 
242. To keep the scope of this article clear, I am not exploring the issue of maintaining 
appropriate "wage differentials," particularly regarding "wages in the higher brackets." But 
this was a question of pervasive concern throughout the NRA period and is an important 
part of the broader story of class line-drawing through New Deal programs. I hope to tum to 
it in subsequent writing. 
243. Sept. 1933 Newspaper Hearing, supra note 216, at 1451 (testimony of Frank 
Morrison). Tue AFL represented five locals of newspaper writers. 
244. Id. at 1402 (testimony of Lloyd White). 
245. Id. at 1451-52 (testimony of Frank Morrison). 
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them.246 If the newsreading public - the middle-class public - is 
to trust newspaper reporting, it has to be able to see news reporters 
as members of their own class, and for this reason news reporters 
must be paid well enough to keep them middle class. 
Indeed, testimony at the hearings on behalf of the Guild by Dr. 
Willard Bleyer, a journalism professor at the University of Wiscon­
sin and a spokesman for the Council on Education for Journalism, 
underscored the status-based arguments in favor of a high wage for 
journalists. 
It has been shown that representative newspaper editors of both 
large and small daily newspapers have gone on record, as favoring the 
recruiting of their news and editorial staffs from college graduates. 
Any scale of minimum wages for news and editorial workers on 
daily papers must be sufficiently high to encourage young men and 
young women to obtain a college education . . . .  
The newspaper reading public is entitled to have the day's news, 
as 'the food of opinion,' gathered, written, and edited by mature, 
competent, well-educated reporters, correspondents, and copy read­
ers, and to be protected against unsatisfactory reporting and editing 
by immature, half-educated youngsters.247 
This testimony was far from the tone of the Guild's 1933 testimony, 
and made clear that the view of "newspapermen" as members of 
the working class was contested from within the academy by the 
contrary view of "journalism" as a budding profession. 
It would have been possible for the NRA both to accept this 
justification for high wages and to accept the argument, where 
hours are concerned, that editorial workers are merely skilled 
craftsmen whose tool of choice is the pen rather than the trowel. 
The NRA could have done so by taking a descriptivist approach to 
wages and a purposive approach to hours. The NRA could have 
concluded that editorial work is just as susceptible to work­
spreading as is skilled manual work, even though editorial work is 
higher in social status and thus ought to command a higher wage.248 
246. See discussion of LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN supra text accompanying notes 50-
55. 
247. NRA Press Release No. 9685, Press Memo No. 4, at 3 (Jan. 17, 1935) (NA/NRA 
Consolidated Approved Industry Files, Amendments, Box 1923); see also NRA Press Re­
lease No. 9685, Press Memo No. 5, at 3 (Jan. 17, 1935) (NA/NRA Consolidated Approved 
Industry Files, Amendments, Box 1923) (discussing statement by Mrs. Gladys Whitley 
Henderson, national president of Theta Sigma Phi, professional fraternity for women in jour­
nalism: "the proposed minimum wage is not even a decent living wage, much less an incen­
tive for spending four years or more obtaining the academic and professional training that 
editors now demand"). 
248. Of course, it was not always clear that higher status meant that a job should receive 
higher pay. See NRA Press Release No. 9685, Press Memo No. 3, at 2 (Jan. 17, 1935) (NN 
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But this would have required a degree of self-reflection about the 
different approaches to class line-drawing that was never achieved 
by the NRA. For this reason, the Guild's insistence on a high mini­
mum wage undercut its position on the susceptibility of editorial 
workers to hours regulation. 
In February, the Research and Planning Division wrote to the 
officials in charge of formulating the NRA's position on the amend­
ments (Jack Tate, the Divisional Administrator in charge of the 
Graphic Arts Division of the NRA,249 and Gustav Peck, Assistant 
to the Administrative Officer), objecting to the industry's proposed 
hours provisions. The industry insisted on a maximum work week 
of forty-eight hours for small cities on the grounds that otherwise a 
reporter might have to be pulled from an assignment in midstream. 
This argument was deemed "specious," in that "many competent 
editorial men now out of work could be had when necessary," and 
that exceptions "could be granted to avoid proven hardship."250 
The NRA's Labor Advisory Board also objected to the proposed 
amendment because of its failure to adopt a clear definition of cov­
ered "news department employees" and its failure to adopt a forty­
hour limit on weekly work for news department employees in all 
markets.251 Nonetheless, Tate recommended to the National Indus­
trial Recovery Board in April that the amendments be approved 
without change - despite the contrary recommendation by his Re­
view Officer that "[t]his amendment is not believed to be consistent 
with policy."252 
Tate opened with the following comment - taking an official 
stand on the long-fought question of the craft versus professional 
nature of reporting: 
NRA Consolidated Approved Industry Files, Amendments, Box 1923) (testimony of Guild 
Counsel Morris Ernst) {"We have heard that one of the reasons for a low wage scale is that 
there is romance in the business . . . . The man who owns the newspaper is not a competent 
judge of the romance. The workers would prefer a decent wage to romance - they can get 
the romance outside the office."). Alternatively, minimum wages could have been set solely 
on the basis of the ability of the industry to pay. See id. 
249. Tate was a lawyer; he was identified as Division Counsel in May of 1934. Letter 
from Jack Tate to Solomon Barkin (May 2, 1934) (NAINRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 1923). 
250. Memorandum from Spencer H. Reed (Feb. 13, 1935) (NAINRA/CACI, Code Histo­
ries, Box 1937). 
251. See Memorandum from Clyde Mills to Jack Tate, Division Administrator (Mar. 2, 
1935) {NAINRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 1923). 
252. Memorandum from Jack B. Tate to National Industrial Recovery Board 1 {Apr. 27, 
1935) (NAINRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 1923). For the Review Officer's memo, see 
Memorandum from Review Officer to Division Administrator, Graphic Arts Division (n.d.) 
{NAINRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 1923, Serial No. 9190). 
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I think it is open to question whether a policy applicable to a manu­
facturing industry . . .  should be considered as necessarily applicable 
to such an industry as that of newspaper publishing . . . .  [T]he nature 
of the work done by News Department Employees is such that it may 
be considered as falling within an unchartered [sic] area between 
craftsmanship and a profession.253 
For this reason, Tate rejected the Review Officer's insistence on the 
forty-hour week: 
The Review Officer, in his first exception, recommends that any 
deviation from the strict policy of a 40 hour week . . .  cannot be sup­
ported. I believe that no specific answer is possible to this exception, 
but the general arguments listed above do apply, in particular that 
argument having to do with the nature of the work done by these 
employees and the fact that such work is closer to a profession than a 
craft.254 
The Review Officer also objected to the scope of the amendments' 
exemption of upper-level editorial workers. The amendment pro­
vided an exemption from hours regulation to "persons employed in 
a managerial, executive or personal capacity, to editorial writers, to 
employees on out-of-town assignments," and to certain correspon­
dents.255 These exemptions were in fact broader than those listed in 
the original code. The Review Officer took the position that 
"[p ]olicy demands that the employees enumerated in this section 
receive not less than $35 per week before allowed exemption from 
the maximum hours provision."256 Tate's response was that "[i]t is 
my opinion that while such a minimum may be desirable for the 
majority of coded industries, it is not necessarily sound policy for 
this industry."257 The memorandum to Leon Marshall recom­
mending approval made no mention whatsoever of the conflict over 
hours limits and hours exemptions.258 The amendment was ap­
proved by the National Industrial Recovery Board on May 2.259 
Thus after two years of work, the Newspaper Guild failed to 
secure its desired combination of high status for purposes of the 
253. Memorandum from Jack B. Tate to National Industrial Recovery Board, supra note 
252, at 1. 
254. Id. at 2. 
255. Id .. 
256. Memorandum from Review Officer to Division Administrator, Graphic Arts Divi­
sion, supra note 252, at 2. 
257. Memorandum from Jack B. Tate to National Industrial Recovery Board, supra note 
252, at 2. 
258. See Memorandum from Gustav Peck to Leon C. Marshall 2 {Apr. 29, 1935) (NA/ 
NRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 1923). 
259. See Amendment to Code for the Daily Newspaper Publishing Business 1 {May 2, 
1935) {NAINRAICACI, Amendments, Box 1923). 
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minimum wage and "ordinary worker" status for the purpose of 
hours regulation. The Guild did, however, provide a valuable coun­
terweight to industry power. The Guild forced the industry and the 
NRA to take its claims seriously, as the length of the proceedings 
and the division of opinion among NRA officials attests. 
D. Upper-Level Exemptions in NRA Policymaking 
Johnson thought he had the process of policy development 
firmly in hand through his involvement in the promulgation of what 
he hoped would be a "model" code - the Cotton Textile Code. 
But his expectation that all industries would follow the template of 
the Cotton Textile Code proved to be wrong. Great variability de­
veloped in code approaches to wage and hour regulation. 
Another reason for concern about too heavy reliance on the in­
dustry code process was the inadequate representation of labor in­
terests in code making and code administration. The NRA was 
often criticized for failing to ensure that labor interests were repre­
sented.260 Indeed, the Department of Labor occasionally stepped 
in to ask the President directly to reject NRA codes that went too 
far in exempting categories of workers from hours regulations.261 
Secretary of Labor Perkins fought hard against the NRA's bid to be 
given the power to approve, end, and modify codes without review 
by the President. She told Roosevelt in June 1934: 
New problems are constantly arising, often intimately affecting labor 
. . .  and, if past experience is any criterion, those new problems would 
be disposed of by rules promulgated by General Johnson with a mini­
mum of study, thought, and discussion. The parties most vitally con­
cerned might not even hear about it until after the regulation had 
come into effect.262 
The NRA's top officials were not inclined to see their job as one of 
facilitating adequate interest group representation. Instead, they 
continued to believe that independent governmental action was the 
way to assure the fairness of the NRA. 
260. See, e.g., Su=ary of Telegram from William Connery, Representative from Boston 
and Chairman of the House Committee on Labor, to President Roosevelt (Nov. 26, 1933) 
(FDR/OF 466, NRA, Box 2, Nov.-Dec. 1933) (insisting that FDR "instruct Johnson to ap­
point a true representative of the organized industrial workers as co-administrator on each 
approved code"). 
261. See, e.g., Memorandum from M.H.M. to President Roosevelt (Nov. 16, 1933) (FDR/ 
OF 15, Department of Labor [hereinafter DOL], Box 1, 1933 folder) (noting that Frances 
Perkins called, asking Roosevelt to reject the Hotel Men's code as allowing overly long hours 
and exempting certain classes of employees). 
262. Memorandum from Frances Perkins to President Roosevelt (June 18, 1934) (FDR/ 
OF, OF 466, NRA, Box 2, June-July 1934). 
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Leon C. Marshall, as a labor policymaker in the NRA's Review 
Office, made it his task to find a way to break through the barriers 
of NRA voluntarism using independent government fact-finding. 
When Marshall first came to the NRA's policy office, he believed it 
was essential that the government spearhead the development of a 
system of definition and classification of occupations through the 
use of job analysis. Without a thorough job analysis, Marshall ar­
gued, the NRA would be unable to maintain wage differentials be­
tween skilled and unskilled workers, stop evasions of wage and 
hour agreements, or institute collective bargaining. He called for 
the formation of an "impartial agency . . . .  under the jurisdiction of 
the United States Department of Labor," which would encourage 
and supervise industries in the job classification process.263 
Marshall called for choosing a director of this job-classification 
agency "who has performed such work in industrial plants or at the 
very least has supervised such work."264 Staff working with Mar­
shall contended that the process should include "definition and 
classification of all positions, even supervisory ones" not covered by 
wage provisions. 26s 
There was certainly precedent for governmental use of job anal­
ysis. The Bureau of Labor Statistics had developed a job analysis 
for the Federal Employment Service as a method for the standardi­
zation and classification of occupations and pay rates in federal em­
ployment. 266 Indeed, the Department of Labor eventually 
compiled a Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the first edition of 
which was published in 1939,267 that served - and continues to 
serve through later editions - as a comprehensive classification of 
all jobs in the American economy. But Marshall was not given au­
thorization to initiate the work or exercise control over it. The re­
sponse from higher levels of NRA management was that the issue 
263. Definition and Classification of Occupations in Industries, attached to Memorandum 
from Stanley I. Posner to Leon C. Marshall § 11-2 (Aug. 6, 1934) (NA/NRA/CAF Entry 265, 
Box 3, Ftles of Leon C. Marshall, Folder 62, Definitions, Classification, Explanation). I attri­
bute this to Marshall from context. 
264. Id. 
265. Memorandum from C.R. Dooley to Leon C. Marshall (June 4, 1934) (NA/NRA/ 
CAF Entry 265, Box 1, Ftles of Leon C. Marshall). 
266. See DANIEL NELSON, MANAGERS AND WORKERS: ORIGINS OF THE NEW FACTORY 
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1920, at 151 (1975); see also JACOBY, supra note 118, at 
150. 
267. DIVISION oF STANDARDS & REs., U.S. DEPT. oF LAB., DICTIONARY OF OccuPA· 
TIONAL TITLES (1939) [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL DICTIONARY]. 
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was "very large" and that the Department of Labor rather than the 
NRA should head up any such effort.268 
Even absent comprehensive government-generated data on oc­
cupational classification, however, Marshall was committed to cen­
tralizing NRA labor policy in his office. One of Marshall's 
initiatives was the drafting by NRA officials of a "Basic Code," a 
"best practice" code that could be recommended to newly codifying 
industries. Although Marshall had argued that the NRA should 
permit exemptions and exceptions only when they "fit[ ] into a co­
herent policy,"269 he never succeeded in stating a coherent policy 
on exemptions. Indeed, Marshall never articulated the policy un­
derlying the exemptions he took for granted - in particular, the 
exemption for "the executive classes" that he invariably sup­
ported.210 He seemed supremely confident that such an exemption 
would not be unduly complex, despite all of the concerns with 
"fraud" and "evasion" that had followed "executive" exemptions 
from the earliest NRA experience. 
Marshall's initial draft of an hours provision - which left blank 
the number of hours in the maximum work week - called for ex­
empting (without defining) "persons employed in a managerial or 
executive capacity who earn regularly $35 per week or more," cer­
tain emergency maintenance and repair crews, as well as "any other 
class of employees which the Administrator shall find" appropriate 
to exempt on the application of industry representatives.271 He 
gave no guidance about when it would be "appropriate" to exempt 
other classes of employees. At times he relied on precedent from 
past codes and PRA substitutions, despite the fact that past code 
268. See Note from Blackwell Smith to Leon C. Marshall (n.d.) attached to Memorandum 
(Aug. 8, 1934) (NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Box 3, File No. 62, Definition, Classification, Ex­
planation). Blackwell Smith was second to Richberg in the office of General Counsel and, at 
this stage, was the person Marshall reported to on matters of labor policy. Thomas Emerson 
describes him as "an extremely able lawyer, keen, acute, skilled at negotiation and compro­
mise, resourceful in thinking up ideas. He was not a torch-bearer and not adept in initiating 
policy. But in terms of carrying out policy and adjusting differences he showed unusual abil­
ity." EMERSON, supra note 126, at 17. 
269. Note from Leon C. Marshall, Some Notes on Labor Policy 2 (n.d.), attached to Note 
from Leon C. Marshall to Blackwell Smith {Aug. 6, 1934) {NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Papers 
of Leon C. Marshall, Box 2). 
270. See Memorandum from Leon C. Marshall, Comments on NRA Operations with Par­
ticular Reference to Labor Situations 1 (n.d.) (NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. Marshall 
Papers, Box 2, Comments, No. 53) (including this as the only exemption in the simplest pro­
posal he came forward with: "A simple statement of forty {40) hours per week, eight (8) 
hours per day, six ( 6) days in seven (7), with time and one-half for overtime, and with execu­
tive classes excepted"). 
271. Draft of Basic Code, attached to Memorandum from Blackwell Smith to Leon C. 
Marshall et al. (June 12, 1934) (NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. Marshall Papers, Box 2). 
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practice was hardly the product of coherent policymaking. As one 
observer cautioned, substitutions to the PRA had been "forced 
through under pressure with a very small amount of time for con­
sideration. "272 The experience of the NRA under the Cotton Tex­
tile code reveals that the NRA was not able to force what it saw as 
optimal provisions into the industry codes. Why, then, should ex­
isting practice be the guide when determining current policy? In­
deed, Marshall did not view precedent as the outer limit for the 
exemptions he was prepared to propose. One of his drafts of a 
maximum hours provision exempted "executives and supervisory 
employees and their secretarial assistants, foremen, and profes­
sional and scientific employees who receive regularly not less than 
$35 a week." This led the Labor Advisory Board to urge him to 
"[ d]elete secretarial assistants, foremen and 'scientific employees' 
for which there are few precedents."273 
The tendency of Marshall's classification decisions was to em­
phasize collar-color over the functional requirements of jobs or 
scarcity of qualified workers in deciding whether to allow employ­
ers greater flexibility in hours of work. For example, Marshall's 
draft Basic Code permitted "office, clerical, or accounting employ­
ees" to work one forty-four-hour week per month because of the 
needs of the billing and inventory cycles, but allowed no similar 
exemption for factory employees on emergency maintenance or re­
pair work.274 The Labor Policy Board criticized Marshall's pro­
posed one-week-per-month "tolerance" for clerical workers, 
272. Memorandum from A. Heath Onthank, Assistant Review Officer, to Leon C. 
Marshall 4 (Oct. 22, 1934) (NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. Marshall Papers, Box 3) 
[hereinafter Onthank Memo]. 
273. Memorandum from Solomon Barkin, Labor Advisory Board, to Leon C. Marshall 7 
(Oct. 1, 1934) (NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. Marshall Papers, Box 3) [hereinafter 
Barkin Memo]. It is hard to tell from the syntax here whether the $35 per week requirement 
applied to all or just to the professional and scientific employees (which I suspect is the case). 
Barkin's objection makes more sense if the exemption for foremen was not subject to the 
dollar minimum, since previous rulings under the PRA had placed foremen in the supervi­
sory/executive category if their salaries were high enough. Similarly, A. Heath Onthank ob­
jected that this exemption 
goes further than any past policy of which I am aware. Heretofore, it has been possible 
to exempt from hour restrictions executives and supervisory employees who receive reg­
ularly not less than $35 per week. The present inclusion of the secretarial assistants of 
executives and supervisory employees and, in addition, foremen and professional and 
scientific employees broadens former exemptions. 
Onthank Memo, supra note 272, at 2. Onthank added, however, that he would not object so 
long as the newly excluded employees earned $35 or more per week. 
274. See Draft of Codification of Labor Policy 2-3, attached to Memorandum from Leon 
C. Marshall to Walton H. Hamilton (Aug. 24, 1934) (NA/NRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. 
Marshall Papers, Box 3). The PRA had also used the collar-color line in setting maximum 
hours, but it had in fact given employers greater flexibility in hours for blue-collar than for 
white-collar workers. 
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observing that it saw "no reason for an exemption to this class 
which has bene:fitted least from N.R.A."275 
Had the NIRA survived, there was a good chance that the 
collar-color approach would have carried the day. Leon C. 
Marshall was appointed by Roosevelt to serve on the National In­
dustrial Recovery Board which took over running the NRA after 
Johnson's resignation. Late in the life of the NIRA, the NIRB con­
sidered a proposed position statement that declared, inter alia, that 
there is "no generally accepted conclusion as to the wisdom or pos­
sibility of . . .  limitation of hours of work for 'white-collar' work­
ers."276 That was a far cry from Roosevelt's original insistence that 
the protections of the NRA were to be extended to the "white col­
lar classes." 
In sum, the NRA's consideration of upper-level exemptions 
shows that the agency never reached internal convergence on the 
proper approach to class line-drawing. In the end, the agency 
would likely not have had the power to impose the approach of its 
choosing on the industrial codes, where problems of capture by in­
dustry were so pervasive. But where those constraints were not 
present, in the PRA and in the agency's policy planning, the agency 
never articulated a single clear policy on upper-level exemptions. 
Marshall's greatest desire was to use "objective" data to draw up 
his own map of the class system. But when the data were unavaila­
ble, he embraced the business community's contested beliefs as the 
government's own and thus relied on the very line Roosevelt ex­
pressly rejected in his :first speech on hours regulation. 
E. Lessons from the NIRA 
By the NIRA's judicially mandated end, two years of experience 
under the statute had generated great variability in practice, but 
also a measure of consistency in excluding certain upper-level em­
ployees from statutory protection. There remained important dis­
agreements as to who the "upper" workers were and whether it was 
in the end appropriate to protect any of them - including ordinary 
white-collar workers - through maximum hours legislation. Even 
Leon C. Marshall, who had some prior expertise on class issues and 
who was in the best position to make global labor policy judgments 
for the NRA, was never able to articulate where the lines should be 
275. See Barkin Memo, supra note 273, at 7. 
276. Draft of "Open letter addressed to a number of representative groups by the Na­
tional Industrial Recovery Board," 1, attached to Memorandum from Blackwell Smith to 
Williams (Nov. 24, 1934) (NA/NRA, Donald Richberg Subject Ftle, Entry 3, Box 2). 
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drawn between different groups of employees, and, even more so, 
why they should be drawn. 
Perhaps the NRA's failure to attain a coherent vision of which 
employees ought to be exempt from hours regulation was a result 
of its failure to secure the independent knowledge base Marshall 
strove for and never obtained. After all, the entire point of scientif­
ically oriented Legal Realism was that correct policymaking would 
flow from the facts. That orientation left administrators without 
guidance if, as proved to be the case, they were required to act 
before the facts were in. 
But suppose it had been otherwise. Suppose that Marshall had 
completed his job analysis in time to make "scientifically" grounded 
decisions across the range of NRA labor policy issues he faced. 
What might he have learned, and how might his approach to class 
line-drawing have changed as a result? The answer, I suspect, is 
that the job analysis of the American economy Marshall sought 
would not have answered any of the specific questions posed by a 
purposive approach to hours regulation. 
Two major analyses of the structure of American occupations 
were undertaken in the 1930s: Alba Edwards's census and the De­
partment of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles. We have al­
ready seen that Edwards wrapped functional and status-related 
attributes of occupations into a single classification scheme, and 
that its utility to social scientists was consequently impaired. The 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles fared no better. The Dictionary 
was developed within the Department of Labor, as part of the Oc­
cupational Research Program of the Division of Standards and Re­
search of the U.S. Employment Service, in order to aid in the 
appropriate job placement of workers left unemployed during the 
Depression.277 The Dictionary grew out of the "vocational gui­
dance" movement that had the schools as its original locus, and 
aimed to render scientific the process of matching unemployed (or 
underemployed) workers with appropriate jobs.278 Like the census, 
the Dictionary claimed that it was evaluating occupations based on 
their required "skills and abilities." But within the vocational gui­
dance movement, the appropriateness of jobs turned as much on 
their social status as on their functional characteristics. Recall that 
this was a tendency that Marshall criticized in his writings, precisely 
277. The Dictionary was published after the enactment of the FLSA but before the pro­
mulgation of the 1940 amended upper-level exemption regulations discussed infra, notes 363-
405. 
278. On the vocational guidance movement, see, e.g., JACOBY, supra note 118, at 65-97. 
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because it made it impossible to match people to jobs based on ob­
jective factors.279 Thus, the Dictionary explained that "[n]o single 
criterion [was] followed in determining what constitutes a job classi­
fication. For some, it is the duties of the jobs; for others, the indus­
trial surroundings or circumstances in which the jobs exist."280 In 
that sense, the Dictionary was like the census in being unable to 
define "jobs" solely in relation to their functional characteristics.281 
In light of the 1930s census and Dictionary experiences, it seems 
exceedingly likely that an NRA-driven "job analysis" would also 
have intermixed functional and status considerations. For if it did 
not do so, too many "anomalies" would emerge - just as the Lynds 
found when trying to evaluate high-status workers like engineers 
and architects whose orientation is toward "things" rather than 
"people." A governmental job analysis of the sort Marshall con­
templated and that the census and Dictionary projects achieved 
purports to be a stand-alone, all-purpose snapshot of the occupa­
tional structure of the American economy. Although it is grounded 
in "expert" analysis of the skills and functions of different jobs, it 
aims to reflect intuitive understandings of the existing status hierar­
chy. It is thus a poor tool for answering the particular question 
raised by purposive hours regulation: how amenable are different 
tiers of white-collar work to work-spreading? 
The purposive approach would ultimately have depended on the 
government's capacity to distinguish between jobs that legitimately 
cannot be divided and jobs that are commonly deemed nondivisible 
- because of either the economic desires of employers or the sta­
tus needs of employees - but are not so in fact. It might have been 
possible for NRA administrators. to do_ independent factfinding on 
this question, but Marshall never proposed doing so. Instead, the 
closest the NRA came to securing the information required by a 
purposive approach was through tlie give-and-take of hearings -
for example, in NRA cross-examination of industry witnesses at the 
Cotton Textile hearings about the divisibility of the work of special 
crews. But the purposive approach was all too rarely at the fore in 
279. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48. 
280. OCCUPATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 267, at xxi. 
281. Later editions of the Dictionary have also been controversial. For a critique of the 
1965 third edition of the Dictionary, which was based on a "functional job analysis" that turns 
on the degree to which people work with data, people, and things, see ScoVILLE, supra note 
65, at 7-8; see also COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION & ANALYSIS, NATIONAL 
REsEARCH CoUNcu., WoRK, JoBs, AND OcCUPATIONs: A CruucAL REvmw OF THE 
DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 188 (Ann R. Miller et al. eds., 1980) (critiquing third 
edition and noting sex bias in job ratings). 
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the NRA period. Within the code-making process, industry was in 
almost complete control of the factual record. Any real spirit of 
adversarialism in fact-gathering - which would have been neces­
sary if NRA officials were to use the hearing process as its source of 
empirical evidence - was stymied by the lack of meaningful repre­
sentation of workers in general, and of white-collar and upper-level 
workers in particular. Thus, it is no surprise that NRA labor policy 
combined an "I know it when I see it" quality with heartfelt calls 
for scientific analysis. Pound was right that administrative agencies 
were not necessarily places where the calm of scientific inquiry pre­
vailed. Thus it was possible for a critic of the NRA to complain that 
the agency had failed to concern itself "with questions such as 
these: Is employment increasing? Are the unemployed being ab­
sorbed? Is purchasing power expanding?"282 Events moved too 
quickly for genuinely purposive policymaking. 
The NIRA materials suggest that, for the most part, NRA offi­
cials were engaged in a descriptivist project. At times, officials 
seemed to think that a pre-existing consensus existed and could 
safely guide their deliberations. For example, in the Cotton Textile 
hearings, Johnson seemed to think that the elevated status of super­
visors was widely accepted and that the boundaries of the category 
were easy to draw. But only a few months later, Johnson made the 
aggressive attempt to impose the PRA's definition of "executives," 
with its duties and salary-minimum tests, on all industrial codes. 
That move acknowledged that there were disagreements between 
the administration and some industries regarding the category's 
proper boundaries, and therefore that no easy consensus existed af­
ter all. Similarly, officials seemed to realize that whatever the tradi­
tional cultural saliency of the collar-color line, it was losing its 
descriptive accuracy. 
In the early 1930s, a period in which there was growing aware­
ness of flux in the class system in the United States, a careful 
descriptivist would have seen how anachronistic the traditional sta­
tus lines between blue- and white-collar, supervised and supervisor, 
or hourly and salaried had become. But for some very good and 
persistent reasons, the circumstances of the NRA made it difficult 
for administrators to exercise the independence needed to engage 
in a sensitive descriptivist analysis. In part, the problem was that 
the business community spoke loudly, and only rarely did anyone 
282. Press Release No. 3513, Press Memo No. 10, at 1 {Mar. 1, 1934) (LC, Richberg 
Container 47, Press Releases 2-3/1934) {describing testimony of Francis J. Gorman, United 
Textile Workers of America). 
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speak for the white-collar workers. When the only way a group can 
obtain a statutory benefit is to embrace the view that it has slipped 
in the status hierarchy, the decision to come forward is a difficult 
one - even once the group has surmounted the ordinary obstacles 
to political participation. The Newspaper Guild did so, but it was 
the exception. Thus, NRA officials bore on their own shoulders 
most of the burden of understanding the white-collar workforce. 
Furthermore, resisting the business community's view of the 
world also carried with it a significant burden of administrability. A 
class system in flux tends to generate class lines that are fuzzy and 
therefore difficult to administer - hence the overriding concern 
with the possibility of "fraud" and "evasion" with regard to the "ex­
ecutive" exemption. But if the government could adopt a classifica­
tion scheme that the business community supported, the very fact 
of that support would point toward a higher level of voluntary 
compliance. 
· 
Within the political constraints facing the NRA, then, it should 
not come as a surprise that it failed to achieve true independence of 
judgment on the question of exemptions from hours regulation. 
What seems remarkable in retrospect is that independent descrip­
tivist judgment was ever exercised, and that the purposive approach 
was present at all. The question is thus whether the Department of 
Labor was able to improve on this situation in the formulation and 
enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act. We shall see that it 
was not. We shall see that the same constraints on independent 
factfinding and the same oscillation between purposive and descrip­
tive approaches to class line-drawing continued to plague govern­
mental class line-drawing in the sphere of hours-regulation under 
the FLSA. 
III. THE EARLY YEARS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr 
The demise of the NRA left the federal government without a 
comprehensive program of wage and hour legislation. There were 
widespread calls for the introduction of new legislation, not least of 
all from businesses for which "the threat of the NRA paled beside 
the threat of no regulation at all," and which saw in federal labor 
law "some means of compelling their market rivals (and them­
selves) to observe fair standards of competition."283 For the 
Roosevelt administration, "the primary purpose was to make it pos­
sible for more workers to be added to the pay roll. It was thus 
283. GORDON, supra note 122, at 201-02. 
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designed in part as a compulsory 'share-the-work' program."284 
This continuity of goals made the FLSA the true heir to the NRA's 
program of hours regulation. 
A. Statutory Drafting and Passage (1937-1938) 
In preparation for the seventy-fifth Congress, which met in Jan­
uary 1937, intense activity took place behind the scenes in the 
Roosevelt administration (centering on Secretary of Labor Frances 
Perkins) and between Roosevelt and the chairmen of the House 
and Senate labor committees.285 By the end of April, a confidential 
draft had been produced. As drafted, the bill provided that em­
ployers would be "exempt" from the hours provisions of the act if 
they paid their workers time and one-half for overtime, but this 
"exemption" could be withdrawn administratively on an industry­
by-industry basis.286 Unlike the PRA, the draft made no distinction 
between office and factory workers. The draft excluded from the 
definition of "employee" - and therefore from any protection 
under the statute - "any person employed in an executive or su­
pervisory capacity."287 By May 12, the upper-level exclusion in­
cluded "any person employed in an executive, administrative, [or] 
supervisory . . .  capacity."288 The term "administrative" had not 
been common in the NRA industrial codes,289 although Alexander 
Sachs had used it in his pre-NRA memorandum, and the meaning 
284. Paul H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (pt. 1), 
53 PoL. Ser. Q. 491, 491 (1938); accord Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, supra note 1, at 1381. 
285. See John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 464 (1939). 
286. See id. at 483. 
287. Fair Labor Standards Bill, Confidential Revised Draft § 2(a)(7) (April 30, 1937) 
(National Archives, Record Group 174, Department of Labor, Records of Secretaries, Fran­
ces Perkins [hereinafter NA/DOUPerkins], Box 12). 
288. Fair Labor Standards Bill, Confidential Revised Draft § 2(a)(7) (May 12, 1937) (NA/ 
DOUPerkins, Box 12, FLS Bill, 1937) (emphasis added). 
289. When Leon C. Marshall proposed conducting a comparative analysis of labor provi­
sions in the industrial codes, his spreadsheet listed the most co=on exemptions. "Adminis­
trative" was not one of them. Exemption categories for hours were "executive and 
supervisors," "professional and technical," "all employees receiving more than stated salary," 
"office and clerical,'' "outside salesmen," "scarce, skilled or key worker," "continuous pro­
cess operators," "repair and maintenance," "watchmen,'' "firemen," "electricians," "engi­
neers," "cleaners and janitors,'' delivery, shipping and stock, child labor, auxiliary and 
general. My search of the records did not show completion of Marshall's study. His corre­
spondence relating to the study is found in Office Frles of Leon C. Marshall, Frle NA/NRA/ 
CAF Entry 265, Box 3, Analysis (Various), No. 71, July 18, 1934. Another notation states 
that "[a]ll ofthis is turned over to [Harry] Weiss to push thru." Letter from Leon C. Marshall 
to Harry Weiss et al. 2 (Aug. 30, 1934) (NA/NRA/CAF, Entry 265, Office Frles of Leon C. 
Marshall, Box 3, Misc. Letters, No. 72). 
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of the term was not immediately clear. But it did have precedent in 
post-NRA federal wage and hour policy: it appeared as a basis for 
exemption in an Executive Order under the Emergency Relief Ap­
propriation Act.290 By May 20, the word "professional" had been 
added into the upper-level exclusion list.291 It was in this form that 
the bill was introduced on May 24 as S. 2475 in the Senate by 
Senator Black, and by Rep. William P. Connery as H.R. 7200. 
Almost immediately, the introduced bill began to provoke criti­
cism within the Labor Department and in the labor movement. 
Katherine Lenroot, Director of the Children's Bureau and a close 
adviser to Perkins, was opposed to the "supervisory" category that 
had been part of the original administration draft. She argued to 
Perkins that "it would be very undesirable to specify 'supervisory' 
as outside the definition of 'employee.' These exclusions should be 
very carefully limited to bona fide executives."292 The problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that the Black-Connery bill, unlike the 
PRA, contained no minimum salary required before a supervisor 
could be deemed an "executive" - although, of course, there was 
no guarantee that a salary line would serve to identify the "bona 
fide executive" as Lenroot meant the term. The "supervisory" lan­
guage was eventually dropped from the bill. 
The 1937 legislation died in the House Rules Committee. 
Perkins declined the invitation of her staff to take the lead in ap-
290. Exec. Order No. 7046 {1935) {"Proscribing Rules and Regulations . . .  Under the 
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935"). The Executive Order is interesting for other 
reasons as well. The Order called for all work under the order to be on a monthly salary 
basis - an innovative step possibly aimed at fostering reliability of improved purchasing 
power - with differentials by region, size of community, and kind of work. Separate mini­
mum wages were set for different categories of work: unskilled, intermediate work, skilled 
work, professional and technical work. Supervisory and administrative employees were not 
covered by the wages provision. The maximum hours provision set an eight-hour day and a 
forty-hour week, but exempted "supervisory and administrative employees." Certain types 
of projects permitted a longer workweek "for manual labor" but not for "clerical and other 
non-manual employees." This Executive Order combined a number of themes that had been 
debated during the NRA period: skill differentials, community-size differentials, distinctions 
between office and manual work. Not all of these distinctions found their way into the 
FLSA, although the "administrative" category did find its way in. Note that this was a pro­
gram that had the relief of unemployment among technical and professional workers as one 
of its specific goals, which might be why their traditional mode of pay - salaried as opposed 
to hourly - was adopted under the Executive Order. It is not clear why "administrative and 
supervisory" workers were not seen as needing similar protection. 
291. See Fair Labor Standards Bill, Confidential Revised Draft § 2{a)(7) {May 20, 1937) 
(NA/DOUPerkins, Box 12, FLS Bill, 1937). At this point, a lower-level exclusion for agricul­
tural workers had been introduced. The NRA codes had used lower-level exclusions as well 
- e.g., for "outside" workers in the cotton textile code. For more on lower level exclusions, 
see the many articles of Marc Linder on the subject, supra note 1. 
292. Memorandum of Katherine Lenroot to Frances Perkins 1 (June 1, 1937) (NA/DOU 
Perkins Box 12) {"Notes Regarding the Black-Connery Bill"). 
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pointing an internal committee within the department to draft a 
new bill.293 Instead, she waited while Representative Norton, the 
new House Labor chair after the death of Representative Connery, 
had the original House bill discharged from the Rules Commit­
tee.294 Subsequently a number of significant changes were made. 
One was the move from a true maximum hours bill to a bill that 
permitted unlimited overtime hours so long as a time-and-one-half 
wage premium was paid for overtime hours. One might have ex­
pected, from a purposive standpoint, that the addition of flexibility 
to permit employers to work their employees extra hours would 
have alleviated the need for upper-level exemptions. But the ex­
emptions remained. As amended, the House passed the bill on 
May 24, 1938.29s 
None of the different FLSA drafts included special provisions 
for "white-collar workers" or "salaried workers." While the legisla­
tion was being considered in the Senate, Perkins received an in­
quiry from Senator Sheppard, seeking to understand why, "[i]f a bill 
of this sort must be passed," it could not "exempt from its provi­
sions those who are employed on the basis of monthly wages and 
have it apply exclusively to those working on an hourly basis. "296 
Her response was strangely literal: 
If it were possible to avoid the wage and hour bill by employing on 
a monthly basis . . .  many employers would no doubt hire on such a 
basis. In addition to affording protection to the flow of goods in inter­
state commerce, one of the purposes of wage and hour legislation is to 
spread employment and increase purchasing power. It is difficult to 
see why employees working on an hourly, daily, weekly or monthly 
basis should not be given the same protection against oppressive 
wages and oppressive hours of employment.297 
Perkins, an experienced labor hand, must have understood that the 
division between "hourly" versus "salaried" workers was not 
merely random - that there was a tradition of paying factory 
workers of all skill levels on an hourly rate and office, supervisory, 
and professional staff regardless of duties on a salaried basis. What 
the Senator was in effect asking was whether it was necessary to 
adopt the same wage and hour provisions across the collar-color 
293. See Memorandum from Mary La Dame to Frances Perkins (Nov. 8, 1937) (NA/ 
DOIJPerkins Box 118). 
294. See PERKINS, supra note 93, at 260. 
295. See 83 CoNG. REc. 7181, 7449-50 {1938). 
296. Letter from Frances Perkins to Senator Sheppard 1 {May 17, 1938) (NA/DOU 
Perkins, Box 10, Special Ftle: Wage & Hour Bill, 1937-38) (quoting unnamed constituent) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
297. Id. The question was forwarded by Sheppard, but asked by a constituent. 
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line. Perkins's answer, assuming that she must have understood the 
true nature of the question, was that the Roosevelt administration 
had strengthened its resolve that there was to be no collar-color 
distinction in the wage and hour laws.29s 
As signed by Roosevelt on June 25, 1938, the Fair Labor Stan­
dards Act contained a broad definition of "employee," but ex­
empted from the statute's maximum-hour provisions "executive, 
administrative, and professional" employees. These terms were not 
defined. Instead, the statute expressly authorized the Department 
of Labor to issue regulations interpreting these terms - making the 
choice to locate the decision in the agency rather than in the courts. 
Responsibility for interpretation and enforcement of the FLSA was 
placed in the hands of the Department's new Wage and Hour 
Division. 
B. Model State Legislation (1938) 
The creation of the Wage and Hour Division did not mean that 
Perkins and her core advisors ceased their involvement in class line­
drawing issues. During the period in which the Wage and Hour 
Division was preparing to promulgate its interpretive regulations, a 
related issue came to the fore in the upper levels of the Labor De­
partment. The FLSA, due to constitutional constraints, could not 
reach purely intrastate activities. Interstate business, however, 
faced competition from intrastate enterprises that were not subject 
to the FLSA. The Labor Department thus hoped that states would 
follow Congress's lead and enact "little FLSA's,"299 modeled on the 
federal statute. By September 1938, a month before the FLSA's 
effective date, the Department of Labor had formed a committee to 
draft language for model state legislation supplementing the FLSA. 
The committee proceeded by reviewing each provision of the FLSA 
and proposing revisions that seemed appropriate for the states. 
This became an occasion for rethinking controversial provisions of 
the FLSA itself. 
One participant, on the staff of the Bureau of Labor Standards, 
said of the FLSA's "executives" exemption: "I don't much like [it]; 
they would all be holding executive or supervisory positions and we 
would have to all the time determine whether they were or not, and 
298. This strengthened resolve may have related to the fact that the economic situation of 
upper-level white collar workers was worsening through the Depression as they exhausted 
their savings. 
299. The phrase is mine, parallel to "little Norris LaGuardia's." 
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there would be no workers."300 This comment echoed Lenroot's 
concern in the early stages of drafting the FLSA that only "bona 
fide executives" be exempted.301 The problem was whether small­
scale changes in the language of the exemption could meaningfully 
reduce the opportunities for fraud and evasion. Even if the term 
"supervisor" was eliminated, the term "executive" would remain 
problematic. As was the case under the NRA, the lack of a stable 
consensus on the boundaries of supervisory or executive work 
made it difficult for the government to draw clear and politically 
acceptable lines. 
These criticisms reflected the view that the executive exemption 
was too broad. But the harshest criticism came from the other di­
rection, once the model legislation was approved by the Depart­
ment of Labor's Fifth Annual National Conference of Labor 
Legislation. The approved draft had upper-level exemptions for 
employees "engaged in [an] executive or professional capacity"302 
- language more limited than the FLSA, which also had the less­
precedented term "administrative" on the list. On a confidential 
basis, Perkins's special assistant, Mary La Dame, asked Charles 
Wyzanski, Perkins's former Solicitor of Labor who had returned to 
private practice (and later became an esteemed federal judge), to 
engage in a "critical review" of the model state statute.303 At a 
meeting, Wyzanski issued a sweeping critique that, while aimed at 
the state statute, would in some respects apply to the FLSA itself. 
Wyzanski stated that the state laws "should exempt employees in 
the higher wage brackets who are not in executive or administrative 
posts. "304 He thought it wrong that the proposal statute would not 
exempt "a purchaser of steel getting about $8,000 whose only assis­
tant may be a secretary, authority for whose employment and dis­
charge rests with the personnel office. "305 Similarly, he contended 
300. Transcript of Committee to Prepare Suggested Language for State Legislation Sup· 
plementing the Federal FLSA {Sept. 12, 1938) {NA/DOLJPerkins Box 103) (testimony of Pat 
Murphy). 
301. See supra text accompanying note 292. 
302. Reports of Committees and Resolutions Adopted by Filth National Conference on 
Labor Legislation, Bulletin 25-a, at 7 {Nov. 14-16, 1938) {NA/DOLJPerkins, Box 45) (summa­
rizing proposed bill). 
303. See Letter from Mary La Dame to Charles Wyzanski (Dec. 13, 1938) (NA/DOU 
Perkins Box 118). 
304. Summary of Conference re: Draft of State FLS Bill 1 (Dec. 30, 1938) {NA/DOU 
Perkins Box 118). Wyzanski apparently read the "executive or professional" language in the 
model state statute to include "administrative" employees. 
305. Wyzanski didn't seem to see the capacity of interpreting the term "administrative" 
to include such a worker - which is odd, since he went to the trouble of interpolating that 
term into the model state statute. 
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that "[t]he time and a half provisions should apply only to lower 
paid employees."306 Wyzanski's views met with considerable sym­
pathy from inside the Department and led to suggestions that the 
approved model state statute ought to be revised at the next 
conference.307 
Wyzanski and his supporters were not in the least motivated by 
the statutory goal of work-spreading. Why should the salary paid to 
a purchasing agent, to use Wyzanski's example, bear any relation­
ship to the question whether the work of purchasing could be done 
by more people working fewer hours? By recommending that the 
line be drawn solely on the basis of income, perhaps Wyzanski was 
adopting a purposive focus that emphasized increasing the purchas­
ing power of the already-employed. Or perhaps Wyzanski was 
adopting a descriptive approach, based on the cultural instinct that 
a high-paid employee is a high-status employee, regardless of what 
he does for a living. One cannot be sure. 
Exempting a broader range of employees on the basis of income 
alone, however, was not politically acceptable. Unlike during the 
NRA period, labor advocates showed signs of caring how upper­
level exemptions were drawn. The AFL had promulgated a model 
state statute that included exemptions for "executives" and "profes­
sionals," although not for "administrative" employees; the CIO's 
promulgated version exempted only "executives." The fact that the 
labor unions could not agree on language suggests that they, too, 
were perplexed by the line-drawing task. Indeed, the Labor Legis­
lation conference was moving away from the use of exemptions al­
together. It had a standing committee charged with expanding the 
application of the wage and hours laws to all employees.308 Absent 
a sound descriptivist or purposive basis for drawing lines, the "no 
upper-level exemptions" approach may have been the most sensible 
of all. But it never gathered support within the federal government. 
306. Su=ary of Conference re: Draft of State FLS Bill, supra note 304, at 1. 
307. See id. at 2. 
308. See Report of Committee on State Wage and Hour Legislation, Adopted by Filth 
National Conference on Labor Legislation 7 (Nov. 14-16, 1938) (NA/DOUPerkins, Box 45). 
The following year, the Sixth National Conference on Labor Legislation proposed that seri­
ous consideration be given to removing "professionals" from the exempt category, as the 
CIO was proposing. Report of Committee on State Wage and Hour Legislation, Adopted by 
Sixth National Conference on Labor Legislation 1 (Nov. 13-15, 1939) (NA/DOUPerkins, 
Box 45). 
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Elmer Andrews, an engineer who was head of the New York 
Industrial Commission (the state's department of labor), was ap­
pointed administrator of the new Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor on July 15, 1938. New York labor interests 
approved of Andrews. The regional director of the American Fed­
eration of State, County, and Municipal Employees (the AFSCME) 
said he "found Commissioner Andrews a Progressive administrator 
interested in the problems of employees and sympathetic to the 
needs of trade unions inside and outside of his department."309 
One of the most pressing items on his agenda was promulgating 
regulations to implement the upper-level exemptions. 
Until a final draft of regulations issued from Andrews's office 
on October 19, 1938, there was much speculation and concern 
about the meaning of the upper-level exemptions - more so, per­
haps, than their language warranted. For example, The New York 
Times reported on August 14 that, according to trade association 
representatives, 
the chief problem as to procedure under the Wage and Hour Act . . .  
is whether or not the law applies to such employees as office and cler­
ical workers, watchmen, firemen, outside workers, research workers, 
electricians, engineers, repair shop workers, maintenance men, etc. 
The law does not specifically answer this question, which, therefore, 
will depend on interpretation of the administrator and ultimately on 
court decisions. 310 
All of the listed categories of workers had figured prominently in 
debates over exclusions from various NRA codes. Thus the issue 
for the business community was whether the Fair Labor Standards 
Act would be interpreted as continuing the NRA's approach to oc­
cupational classification. That end could have been accomplished 
in one of two ways - either by the Administrator through his inter­
pretive regulations, or by the courts through a commerce-clause 
based restriction of the scope of the statute to "processed labor."311 
Both seemed at least plausible. 
309. Letter from Daniel Allen to President Roosevelt (July 19, 1938) (FDR/OF 3295, 
Wage & Hour Division, DOL Box 1, 1938 folder). 
310. Wage Law Evasion Seen in New Deal Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1938, at III 8:8. 
311. For the use of the term "processed labor" in the cotton textile hearings, see Tran­
script of NIRA Hearing No. 1 U-8 (June 27, 1933) (NA/NRA, Records Maintained By the 
Library Unit, Transcripts of Hearings 1933-35, Entry 44, Box 73). For the distinction between 
"direct" and "indirect" labor, with the latter category including "clerks, inspectors, tool crib 
men, repair operators, shipping-room employees, truckmen, drivers, firemen, [and] watch­
men," see NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, SUPPLEMENTAL BONUSES FOR 
WAGE EARNERS, SUPERVISORS AND EXECUTIVES 53 (1927). 
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The reported reason for the business community's concern is 
telling: 
Reuben C. Ball, secretary of the National Association of Hosiery 
Manufacturers, said that in the event that these workers are covered 
by the Wage and Hour Act, it may become necessary as a practical 
matter to employ more workers in such classification. Some of them 
may be working more than the maximum of forty-four hours provided 
in the law, and in such a case their employers would be required to 
pay them time and a half for any hours in excess of forty-four. It 
would be cheaper, he pointed out, to employ additional workers at 
regular rates than to pay the premium rates for overtime.312 
What this reveals, of course, is that at least some members of the 
business community understood that the logic of work-spreading 
did in fact apply to those categories of employees that had been 
frequently exempted from NRA hours regulations. Their position 
was that even with the flexibility to pay an overtime premium to 
avoid "doubling up," they would, in fact, find that the economics of 
the situation called for hiring additional workers. To the extent the 
NRA had been convinced otherwise in industry hearings, revised 
business opinion seemed to suggest it had been wrong - and that a 
purposive approach to exemptions that focused on work-spreading 
might, upon further investigation, reveal that the upper-level ex­
emptions made no sense. But the exemptions had now been en­
acted into law by the FLSA. Administrators did not have the 
option of concluding that the exemptions had been a mistake. 
The business community's view was, of course, that a wide range 
of white-collar workers should be exempted by the statute. 
Andrews himself did much to fuel speculation in the business com­
munity that he agreed. In September 1938, Andrews engaged in a 
question-and-answer session after a speech to the Southern States 
Industrial Council.313 He was asked whether the Division had yet 
issued definitions of the upper-level exemptions. This was 
Andrews's response: 
No. I have had that in mind more than anything else . . . .  I am very 
sympathetic toward your problem there, because I know a superinten­
dent is not a clock watcher, nor does he punch a time clock. Certainly 
if he was the sort of fellow that you would take care of if he is sick or 
312. Wage Law Evasion Seen in New Deal Plan, supra note 310, at 8:8. 
313. This group later filed a petition to change the upper-level exemptions, which was 
one of the events leading to the 1940 hearings discussed below. See Department of Labor, 
Press Releases No. R-712 (Apr. 2, 1940) (National Archives, Record Group 155, Wage and 
Hour Division [hereinafter NA/W&H]). 
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knocked out, if you think enough of him for that, I think that really 
indicates he is a part of the executive family.314 
Andrews was described by Business Week early on in his adminis­
tration as a "plain blunt man,"315 and he clearly was not embar­
rassed to rely on the traditional status of white-collar jobs and 
evoke the symbols of their exalted status. Upper-level workers 
were traditionally treated with greater dignity and with a longer­
term commitment from the employer. In return, the upper-level 
worker was expected not to be a "clock watcher" or a "clock 
puncher." The upper-level worker was a noncommodified worker: 
his labor was total, not divisible into fungible hour-long bursts of 
energy to be channeled into pre-set processes. Andrews's first and 
clearest instinct was that the FLSA, if applied to such workers, 
would demean them by recasting their labor as no different from 
that of the "processed labor" that draws its very definition from the 
clock. 
Andrews was a good descriptivist, in the sense that he hit on an 
image - that of the clock-watcher - that was so strong an icon 
that it could be used in advertising. Consider the following Busi­
ness Week advertisement, which, as it happens, ran in the middle of 
the magazine's big story on the FLSA.316 The advertisement is for 
Remington Noiseless Typewriters.317 The ad depicts a standing fe­
male secretary and a male boss seated behind his desk. The clock 
on the wall shows that it is 5:05. The secretary is smiling and hand­
ing her boss her finished work. The caption: "We no longer watch 
the clock." To be a clock watcher was the quintessential character­
istic of ordinary workers. The aim of good business management 
was to get from your workers the kind of performance you expect 
from non-clock-watchers, without having to pay for it.318 Without 
the distinction between those who live by the clock (secretaries) 
and those who do not (bosses) the advertisement would make no 
sense.319 
314. Press Releases, Transcript of the Record of the Question and Answer Period Follow­
ing the Speech of Elmer F. Andrews . . .  Before the Southern States Industrial Council, 
Birmingham, Alabama 3 (Sept. 29, 1938) (NA/DOUW&H) (hereinafter Press Releases fol­
lowing Speech of Elmer F. Andrews]. 
315. What's What in Wage-Hour Law, Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1938, at 17. 
316. Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1938, at 20. 
317. Id. Remington had a history of capturing cultural trends. For "Miss Remington" as 
a cultural icon of the working woman of the period, see ZUNz, supra note 37, at 147. 
318. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18 (discussing the Hawthorne experiments). 
319. Note that office employees were traditionally salaried. The message is that a good 
manager knows that unless he does something about it, his lower-level clericals - particu­
larly the women among them - will act like clock-watchers despite their salaried status, 
suggesting the downward movement in the cultural status of routine clerical work. 
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Unlike Marshall, then, Andrews did not manifest leanings to­
ward basing exemption decisions on the functional properties of 
jobs. He saw class line-drawing as a common-sense enterprise, and 
his descriptivist common sense was that of the business community. 
Andrews's comfort with embedding the culture of the business 
community into law did not, however, carry the day. The regula­
tions themselves, which were drafted by Division staff320 and 
promulgated on October 20,321 took a far harder line than that sig­
naled by Andrews's conciliatory tone. 
In a move Landis would have approved, the regulations de­
parted from the plain language of the statute. The statute lists "Ex­
ecutive, Administrative, and Professional" employees as the 
exempt categories of workers. The regulations defined only two ex­
empt categories: "Executive and Administrative" (defined as a sin­
gle category, with the term "Administrative" treated as a synonym 
for "Executive"), and "Professional."322 The decision to write the 
word "Administrative" out of the statute reflected both a desire on 
the part of the drafters to keep the exemptions narrow and a con­
cern with the administrability of the new term "Administrative," a 
term with no NRA track record from which to learn. 
The definition of the "Executive and Administrative" employee 
was functionally oriented. Executives and administrators were re­
quired to have the power to hire and fire; they must manage an 
establishment or department; they must customarily direct the work 
of other employees; they must exercise discretion; and they must do 
substantially no work of a non-exempt nature.323 Wyzanski's 
purchasing agent would not have qualified. As to professionals, the 
regulations required that they have "educational training in a spe-
320. Drafting took place under the leadership of Rufus Poole. See, e.g, Minutes of Meet­
ing 3 (July 28, 1938) (NA/DOIJPerkins Box 103, Wage & Hour, General) ("All members 
were instructed to leave any suggestions upon administration with Mr. Poole."). Poole was a 
1927 graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, did post-graduate work on legisla­
tion under Dr. Ernest Freund, and was in private practice and in government in the Interior 
Department before joining the Department of Labor as Associate Solicitor and then the 
Wage and Hour Division as Assistant General Counsel. See Press Releases following Speech 
of Elmer F. Andrews, supra note 314. He guided the FLSA through Congress, see PERKINS, 
supra note 93, at 261, and also drafted the model state legislation discussed in the previous 
section, see Memorandum from V.A. Zimmer to Frances Perkins (Sept. 20, 1938) (NAIDOLJ 
Perkins Box 103). Poole impressed Perkins early on, and she later urged his promotion to 
the Division's general counsel position. He was not promoted only because Andrews had 
promised the position to someone else. See Memorandum from Frances Perkins to Elmer F. 
Andrews (Apr. 29, 1939) (NA/DOIJPerkins Box 103, Wage & Hour Administration, An­
drews); accord What's What in Wage-Hour Law, supra note 315, at 18. 
321. 3 Fed. Reg. 2518 (Oct. 20, 1938). 
322. Id. 
323. See id. 
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cially organized body of knowledge," as distinguished from both "a 
general academic education" and non-academic training.324 Profes­
sionals' work needed to be "predominantly intellectual and varied 
. . . as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical or physical 
work."325 The regulations required professionals to be engaged in 
the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment as to both the 
manner and the time of performance, and their work needed to be 
"of such a character that the output produced or the result accom­
plished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of 
time."326 Professionals were also not permitted to do a "substantial 
amount" of non-exempt work. 
By distinguishing between lower-level and higher-level execu­
tives and professionals, the regulations took an aggressively in­
dependent stance. The regulations' requirement that professionals 
actually be doing work that cannot be standardized by the clock 
was the most clearly purposive element in the exemption regula­
tions - at least insofar as non-standardization suggests lack of 
amenability to work-spreading. Independence from industry was 
manifest at the descriptive level in the very fact that employers had 
to prove that particular employees actually possessed the status ac­
coutrements of upper-level status (for example, supervisory author­
ity, freedom from manual work, discretion). Yet in certain respects 
the regulations were less sure of themselves. First, the statutory 
minimum salary required to count as an "executive" was $30 a 
week - $5 a week lower than the minimum that had been stated 
under the NRA.327 Second, the regulations themselves announced 
that any party could apply for a revision of the regulations, and that 
"separate treatment for different industries and for different classes 
of employees may be given consideration. "328 It was as though the 
Division intended little more by these regulations than to foster de­
bate. Rufus Poole, the lawyer most involved in tbeir drafting, ex­
plained in a speech that the "professionals" category was 
"troublesome," but that all the definitions "were worked out in 
conference with representatives of employers and employees."329 




327. See id. 
328. Id. 
329. Press Release, Transcript of Address by Rufus G. Poole before the Associated In­
dustries of New York at its Annual Meeting 11 (Nov. 18, 1938) (NNW &H Press Releases). 
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Those who did not like our definition did not take the view that they 
could write a better definition. There is a statutory duty on the Ad­
ministrator to promulgate a definition. So we put out the best defini­
tion we could. . . . And we said that any aggrieved person could 
petition for a hearing to have the definition fixed up and if the Ad­
ministrator found that there was justification in the petition, a hearing 
would be held. We tried to be fair to everyone.330 
Basically, then, the Division's "line" on the regulations was to stress 
that they were a good-faith effort, and that the Division welcomed 
requests for revisions. As Andrews, the professional engineer, said 
in a later speech, the regulations "[are] not, in many ways, perfect, 
but as in the case of automobiles, refrigerators, and radios, the fu­
ture should bring many improvements. "331 
Even before the regulations were issued, interest groups entered 
into negotiations with the agency as to how they should be inter­
preted. For example, the Newspaper Guild - finding itself back at 
ground zero in the fight to avoid professional status - took the 
position that no employees within its jurisdiction were "profession­
als" for purposes of the Act. On October 15, only a few days before 
the regulations were released, Andrews met with a delegation from 
the Newspaper Guild that, inter alia, discussed "the reported efforts 
of organized publishers to exclude editorial workers from benefits 
of the act by having them de�lared 'professionals. "'332 The Guild 
received assurances from Andrews that "Andrews' definition of 
professional employees definitely excluded any newspaper worker 
eligible to Guild membership from exemption. "333 
Andrews was not at all at home in the world of his Division's 
regulations. Andrews communicated to the business community 
that he shared its unhappiness with the strictness of the exemptions 
and made it clear that he continued to take the business commu­
nity's views to heart. In mid-December, Andrews - true to the 
language and spirit of his Southern Industrial Council speech -
said that "business men . . . see no reason why the men in the 
higher-range of income should be classed with those who punch the 
time clock. . . . They say that these men can go fishing when they 
like and have other advantages."334 Andrews hinted that business 
330. Id. 
331. Address to the Illinois Manufacturers Association 2 (Nov. 25, 1938) (NA/W&H 
Press Releases). 
332. WSU/Guild, Wage-Hour Talk Set With Andrews, GUILD REP., Oct. 15, 1938, at 1. 
333. WSU/Guild, Andrews Rulings Seen Supporting Guild in Barring Professional 
Exemptions, GUILD REP., Nov. 1, 1938, at 1. 
334. May Bar Overtime for High Pay Group, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1938, at 4:2. 
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objections may lead to a suggestion to Congress that employees be 
classified by income - that a straight compensation test be substi­
tuted for the functional "duties" tests in the regulations, so that all 
salaried employees - all employees who "d[ o] not have to punch a 
time clock" - would be exempt if their incomes exceed the statu­
tory minimum.335 The question, of course, was ·how high he would 
set the required income. On that would turn whether Andrews was 
in agreement with his regulation-drafting staff that only the higher­
level employees within the "executive" or "professional" ranks 
ought to be exempt from the FLSA.336 
Andrews was ambivalent about whether the changes he sought 
should be accomplished by legislative amendment or by regulation. 
At first he thought he should proceed administratively, by holding 
hearings and drafting revised regulations.337 But on March 4, 1939, 
he announced that he was leaning toward proposing an amendment 
to the FLSA to deal with the problem, and then requested a closed­
door hearing before the House Labor Committee to consider a pos­
sible amendment "that 'white collar' workers . . . paid salaries 
above a certain level" would be exempt.338 Andrews must have 
known that the legislative route was risky. Legislation had already 
been introduced in the House to exempt all "clerical employees, 
such as bookkeepers, stenographers, pay-roll clerks, auditors, cost 
accountants, purchasing agents, statisticians, or other office help 
regularly employed on a straight salary basis and given vacations 
with pay" - a proposal that contained no salary minimum for the 
nonexempt class.339 Andrews likely concluded, however, that the 
constraints of the existing statutory language would not permit him 
to abandon a functional analysis based on the job categories "exec­
utive, administrative, and professional" in favor of a status-based 
system reflecting the traditional notion of white-collar privilege, 
shored up by a salary minimum. 
The other vexing question was where to draw the salary line. 
Andrews remained adamant that "the low-paid white-collar group" 
335. See May Ease Wage Act on Well-Paid Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1938, at 4:4 (quoting 
Elmer F. Andrews). 
336. Note that Andrews was not saying that income should be the sole determinant of 
coverage. Only among white-collar or salaried workers - he switched back and forth -
would his proposed income test qualify employees for exemption. 
337. See 2 Wage & Hour Report {BNA); 3-4 {1940). 
338. The discussions are described by Elmer F. Andrews, Address to Council for Social 
Progress (Apr. 5, 1939) {NA/W&H, Press Releases). 
339. H.R. 4363, 76th Cong. {1939) (introduced by Rep. Cox on Feb. 21, 1939); see also 
S. 2022, 76th Cong. § 1 (1939) (introduced by Sen. Miller on Mar. 31, 1939). 
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needed statutory protection; they were deemed to be clock­
watchers, Remington Noiseless Typewriters notwithstanding. But 
at what pay level did the high-paid white-collar worker begin? 
Vastly different numbers had been floated in discussions of a possi­
ble salary-level cap on FLSA coverage. On December 14, 1938, 
Andrews reported that in his travels, the amendment most fre­
quently suggested to him by businessmen "was that salaried em­
ployees guaranteed $150 a week or more and who have vacations 
with pay should be excluded from the [maximum-hours require­
ments]."340 He reported a week later that in thinking of a cutoff he 
was "talking about the worker with a guaranteed monthly wage of 
$300 to $400 a month."341 In a divisional memorandum on the sub­
ject, which appeared to have been developed in anticipation of An­
drews's proposed statutory amendment in March 1939, the dollar 
level was not specifically set; the memorandum said the number 
should be between $200 and $250 a month. Data developed within 
the division at the time suggested that "the $200 exemption would 
apply to about 5% of the male clerical workers but to less than one­
half of one percent of the female clerical workers;" the $250 figure 
would exempt less than one percent of male clericals and no female 
clericals. 342 
Andrews finally proposed $200 as the cutoff. In a letter to the 
President, Andrews recommended that the FLSA be amended to 
include "[a]n exemption of all employees receiving a guaranteed 
monthly salary of $200 (equivalent of $2400 per year)."343 He 
stated that the reason was "to· prevent evasion of the wage and hour 
standards and also to avoid unnecessary hardship" - presumably 
to employers.344 In discussions about the amendment, Andrews 
was characteristically noncommittal about the figure, suggesting al­
most immediately that $200 might be too low. He did, nonetheless, 
fervently pursue his proposed $200 cut-off in Congress. 
Andrews's reform bill was soon overshadowed by more sweep­
ing reforms to both upper- and lower-level exemptions proposed by 
340. May Bar Overtime for High Pay Group, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1938, at 4:4. 
341. May Ease Wage Act on Well-Paid Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1938, at 4:4. 
342. Memorandum on High Salaried Employees tbl.4 (National Archives, Records 
Group 174, Department of Labor, Records of Assistant Secretaries, NC 58 Entry 43-44, 
Records of Assistant -Secretary Charles McLaughlin, Box 9). 
343. Letter from Elmer F. Andrews to President Roosevelt 1 (Mar. 14, 1939) (FDR/OF 
3295, Wage & Hour Division, DOL, Box 1, 1939). 
344. Id. He also noted that "[t]he Secretary of Labor has approved these amendments 
which were prepared with the advice and counsel of Mr. Benjamin Cohen." Id. For a discus­
sion of Cohen, see WHITE, supra note 152, at 177-80, 189-90. 
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conservatives in Congress. Bills had been introduced that would 
have exempted all clerical workers regardless of salary, along with 
many other groups of employees. The most viable of all of these 
bills, proposed by Rep. Barden, would have exempted all workers 
receiving a guaranteed salary of $150. Andrews complained that 
the Barden proposal went too far: 
"[a] lower figure than $200 would undoubtedly exempt a considerable 
number of salaried workers to whom the overtime benefits of the Act 
should extend." Our studies indicate that employees in the salary 
classification from $150 to $200 a month have as much need for pro­
tection against long hours as any other class of workers. Further­
more, if this class of workers may be worked an unlimited number of 
hours without overtime compensation, the purpose of the bill to 
spread employment in this group will be defeated.345 
But what about workers whose salaries were over $200 a month? 
On what basis did he argue that those employees did not need the 
protection of the statute? None appears, in his speech or in the 
relevant archives. The studies to which he refers merely showed 
the percentage of clerical workers falling within specific salary 
ranges. Andrews did not propose any basis upon which to conclude 
that the work of the top five percent of male clerical workers was 
not susceptible to work-spreading. Despite a purposive vocabulary, 
little of the purposive approach was present in Andrews's analysis. 
Even as Andrews was opposing Barden's bill, he encountered 
opposition to his own bill from organized labor. The Newspaper 
Guild was the major source of opposition.346 The status of news­
papermen, and in particular of reporters, had been a theme from 
the beginning in the news coverage on Andrews's proposed salary­
based exemption.347 That should not be surprising; reporters, after 
all, were the ones doing the reporting. Andrews backed down as a 
result of the Guild's opposition. Plain, blunt Andrews observed 
that "organized labor has done such a swell job of fighting my battle 
for me that I think it would be very unethical for me to press that 
amendment if they are opposed to it."348 
345. Letter from Elmer F. Andrews to Representative Mary T. Norton, Chairwoman, 
House Committee on Labor 2 (July 15, 1939) (FDR/OF 3295, Wage & Hour Division, DOL, 
Box 1, 1939 folder) (quoting Report of the Labor Committee on H.R. 5435). 
346. See WSU/Guild, Andrews Bars Change of Hours Act, GUILD REP., Aug. 1, 1939, at 1. 
347. See, e.g., Amendment, Seeks to Avoid Sweeping Floor Revisions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
16, 1939, at 7:4 (noting suggestions from Congress and the Labor Department "that 'white­
collar' workers, which classification would include newspapermen and other groups paid sal­
aries above a certain level" would be exempt). 
348. WSU/Guild, Andrews Bars Change of Hours Act, GUILD REP., Aug. 1, 1939. 
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The Newspaper Guild's blockage of Andrews's white-collar 
amendment might be the first time a white-collar union won a polit­
ical battle - and it was a battle to block legislation aimed at valo­
rizing the traditional white-collar claim to superior status. The 
activism of the Newspaper Guild on this issue triggered coverage in 
the popular business press of the post-Wagner Act organizing suc­
cess among some white-collar unions, with the Newspaper Guild 
described as "one of the most successful" among them.349 The liter­
ature reflected an understanding of why it was possible for such 
white-collar employees as reporters, teachers, and nurses to organ­
ize, while it remained the case that the office staffs of factories were 
unorganizable as a practical matter. "In the factory, the feeling that 
the white collar is superior to the overall - that class prejudice on 
which white-collar organization drives have frequently foundered in 
the past - is apt to militate against a successful campaign."350 But 
the same was not true of fields in which white-collar workers 
predominate.351 The collar-color line was thus being portrayed in 
the press as an inappropriate basis for understanding class hierar­
chy in predominantly white-collar sectors of the economy, while, at 
the same time, the business community and its congressional sup­
porters continued to urge that collar-color should determine eligi­
bility for overtime under the FLSA. 
D. First Regulatory Amendments (1940) 
Once the Roosevelt Administration succeeded in defeating the 
Barden Bill,352 the Administration's reform activity shifted from 
the legislative to the administrative arena.353 The Wage and Hour 
Division's 1939 Annual Report, published on January 8, 1940, re­
ported that the Division had a number of studies under way that 
might lead to recommendations for amendments, including a study 
349. White Collar Unions on Their Way, Bus. WK., Aug. 19, 1939, at 30. 
350. Id. at 31. 
351. See id. 
352. The bill reared its head again in 1940, when as proposed, "[i]t would exempt all 
employees, including manual workers, receiving a guaranteed monthly salary of $150 or 
more." Letter from Frances Perkins to President Roosevelt {Apr. 16, 1940) (FDR/OF 3295, 
Wage & Hour Division, DOL, Box 1, 1940 folder). 
353. There was concern that the Barden Bill would be brought back. Another bill was 
introduced by Rep. Kramer which would have exempted from the maximum hours provision 
any employee - regardless of collar color or duties - who earned the equivalent of $200 a 
month and was guaranteed employment for at least 40 hours a week. See H.R. 8624, 76th 
Cong. {1940). Andrews's earlier $200/month proposal had pertained only to white-collar 
workers. 
2302 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:2212 
on "the effect of the law on higher-paid salaried employees."354 In 
response to a January 9, 1940 letter from a businessman expressing 
the view that "young men in an office or in a clerical capacity" 
should not be subject to maximum hours requirements, Perkins 
stated that "I think you will be interested to know that a committee 
has just been appointed to study revision of the rules and defini­
tions of the Wage and Hour Act."355 In early March, Perkins wrote 
to Philip Fleming, Andrews's successor, that "before holding any 
public hearings," it would be best for a departmental meeting to be 
held "to arrange a tentative program. "356 At some point in this 
process, industry groups began filing petitions to revise the regula­
tions. Their proposed definitions differed from one another, but all 
went in the direction of broadening the exemptions. Even the busi­
ness press seemed skeptical about the breadth of some of the rec­
ommended changes.357 
The Wage and Hour Division's plan was to schedule separate 
hearings for different industry groups, and the agency made clear 
that it was open to considering the use of different definitions for 
different industries. "There is such a wide variation in the work and 
functions performed by executive, administrative and professional 
employees in different industries, especially in the administrative 
and professional classes, that . . .  a definition for one of these classi­
fications in one industry is not necessarily to be treated as a prece­
dent in others."358 The first hearing was noticed in March 1940 and 
held in April of that year, focusing on the Wholesale and Distribu­
tive Trades. Next came Manufacturing and Extractive Trades in 
June; and then the two fields which likely held the largest number 
of white-collar workers, "Banking, Brokerage, Insurance, Financial 
and Related Institutions" and "Publication, Communication, Public 
Utility, Transportation, and Miscellaneous Industries" - both of 
which were noticed in June and held in July.359 
354. WAGE & HOUR DN., U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMIN· 
ISTRATOR OF THE WAGE AND HOUR DNISION FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1939, at 129 
(1940). 
355. Letter from Barcalo Manufacturing Co. to Frances Perkins (Jan. 9, 1940) and Fran· 
ces Perkins's Response (Jan. 12, 1940) (NA/DOUPerkins, Box 168, Wage & Hour Division, 
General 1940). 
356. Memorandum (n.d.) (NA/DOUPerkins, Box 168, Wage & Hour Division, General 
1940). 
357. See Who's an Executive?, Bus. WK., Apr. 20, 1940, at 34. 
358. Press Release from U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, No. R-712, 
at 4 (Apr. 2, 1940) (NA/W&H, Press Releases). 
359. United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, "Executive, Adminis­
trative, Professional . . .  Outside Salesman Redefined," Report and Recommendation of the 
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On the eve of the first scheduled hearing, representatives of the 
Newspaper Guild objected to the Division's plan to restrict testi­
mony at each hearing to witnesses from the industries under consid­
eration at the hearing. The Guild had apparently learned from the 
NRA the tendency of early precedents to become templates. In 
partial response to that objection, the Division decided to hold off 
on recommending any regulatory changes until all the hearings 
were complete.360 
While these hearings were in progress, the House voted (by a 
close vote) to open the FLSA for amendments.361 Barden once 
again proposed exempting all employees earning "a guaranteed 
monthly salary of $150 or more," and the President issued a state­
ment in opposition to the amendments and in support of the FLSA. 
The statement was exceedingly hesitant and measured, much in the 
spirit of Poole's earlier defenses of the initial regulations: 
The Wages and Hours Act is in an evolutionary stage where we are 
learning by practical experience in the field as to whether and how it 
should be amended. It is too early to form definite conclusions except 
to note that on the whole the principle and objective are excellent and 
have done much to stabilize wages and hours and bring wages up for 
the lowest paid workers. It is being administered with discretion and 
no substantial groups of employers have been damaged . . . .  In view 
of all the circumstances I think it would be a great mistake to adopt 
the Barden amendments. By another year we shall know a great deal 
more about the subject.362 
There was here no overarching statement of a policy or purpose. 
The best Roosevelt could say after seven years of intensive focus on 
hours regulation was "give us another year to work it out." 
Presiding Officer at Hearings Preliminary to Redefinition, Effective Oct. 24, 1940, at 1-2 
[hereinafter Stein Report]. 
360. That decision was not entirely voluntary. Early in the process, the Newspaper Guild 
- the union that had scuttled Andrews' legislative proposal - objected to the segregation of 
the hearings by industry. Abraham Issennan of the Guild insisted on the right to testify at 
the Wholesale and Distributive Trades hearing, arguing that his union needed to be there to 
co=ent on "the question of linking up one or more of these definitions with monthly earn­
ings of employees." As a result of Issennan's inquiry, the format of the hearings permitted 
non-industry organizations to file briefs, but not to submit evidence at the hearings outside 
their own industry. See Press Release from U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Divi­
sion, No. R-712, supra note 358, at 3 (appending correspondence). Had the agency promul­
gated any regulatory changes before all parties were heard, surely there would have been 
major objections. By the time of the published Report and Reco=endation, Presiding Of­
ficer Harold Stein reported that the division of hearings into industry groups was "purely for 
administrative convenience." Stein Report, supra note 359, at 1. 
361. See Telegram from S.T Early to President Roosevelt (Apr. 25, 1940) (FDR/OF 3295, 
Wage & Hour Division, DOL, Box 1, 1940 folder). 
362. FDR/OF 3295, Wage & Hour Division, Box 1, 1940 folder, Apr. 25, 1940. 
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Ultimately, the Wage and Hour Division decided to promulgate 
uniform amended regulations for all industry groups. The presiding 
officer of the hearings, Harold Stein, heard 127 witnesses at the 
hearings, and received 180 briefs, written statements, and memo­
randa. The product of this process was a published and widely dis­
seminated Report and Recommendation.363 
Exempting all white-collar workers. The most dramatic change 
proposed by industry was to exempt all white-collar employees 
from hours regulation.364 Industry spokesmen argued that "compli­
ance with the act may lead employers to change many of their em­
ployees from a weekly or monthly salary to a straight hourly pay 
basis."365 In other words, by long-standing practice, white-collar 
workers were paid on a salaried rather than an hourly basis, and 
were not required to punch a time clock - a distinction that helped 
sustain the ideological position that even the most routine white­
collar work is of high social status. Once employers were required 
to keep track of the hours of their non-exempt white-collar work­
ers, employers argued, it would no longer make administrative 
sense to keep them on the salaried payroll; as a result, their social 
status would suffer. 
Stein had a dual response to this argument, one purposive and 
one descriptive. On a purposive level, Stein presented evidence 
that regulating the hours of white-collar workers had in fact suc­
ceeded in shortening their hours and decreasing unemployment -
meaning that work-spreading worked for white-collar workers.366 
He also denied that paying overtime to white-collar workers neces­
sitated switching to an hourly wage. Stein argued that "[it] does not 
appear why there should be a reluctance to make occasional or 
even frequent overtime payments to salaried workers . . . . Extra 
payments by way of bonuses have long been common and are not 
considered inconsistent with salaried status."367 Here Stein failed 
to see that bonuses to salaried workers were not traditionally based 
on hours worked, and therefore did not turn salaried workers into 
"clock-watchers" the way federal hours regulation did. 
363. See Stein Report, supra note 359. The briefs and hearing transcripts seem no longer 
to exist: neither the relevant collections in the National Archives or the Department of La­
bor has them, nor do the majority business and labor archives I contacted. 
364. See id. at 6. 
365. Id. at 7. 
366. See id. 
367. Id. at 7-8. 
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Another problem was also implicit in Stein's purposive response 
to the proposed collar-color line. In defending the statutory deci­
sion not to exempt all white-collar workers, Stein argued that 
white-collar workers could benefit from the statute's work­
spreading goals. But what if it could have been shown that the stat­
ute's work-spreading goals also made good sense empirically for the 
categories of workers the statute clearly exempts? If by paying sal­
aried workers overtime "[l]iving conditions can be improved and 
work spread even where wages are comparatively high,"368 and a 
relatively well-paid clerical worker can praise the statute for reduc­
ing long hours ("we . . .  owe our leisure to the Wage-Hour Act"), 
why are there upper-level exemptions at all?369 Why does the logic 
of work-spreading and the preservation of leisure not apply across 
the board? A purposive analyst operating within an administrative 
agency must, at least to some degree, operate within the constraints 
of the statutory scheme. If the statutory scheme does not itself 
stand up to purposive analysis, the purposive analyst must either 
ignore the statute - as the initial regulations did when it came to 
interpreting the term "administrative employees" - or must justify 
the conflict between empirical realities and their statutory represen­
tation (or misrepresentation). It is perhaps for this reason that 
Stein quickly abandoned the purposive approach and moved to de­
scriptive justifications for his position. 
Stein's descriptive response to industry's argument that the pay­
ment of overtime would jeopardize the social status of white-collar 
workers. He provided data supporting the emergent view that the 
status of routine white-collar workers was in decline. He argued 
that 49.4 percent of clerical workers were women - an argument 
that, contrary to the business community's view, clerical work was 
not high-status370; that vacations with pay were not universal; that 
an "astonishingly large percentage of these workers" were paid low 
wages; and that working conditions in white-collar work were often 
unhealthful.371 Stein thus replaced the image of the white-collar 
worker as the ambitious young man who volunteers to work unpaid 
overtime in order to move up by studying his employer's business372 
with the image of the female clerical worker working long hours in 
368. Id. at 8. 
369. See id. 
370. See id. at 4. The status increase from feminization of the environment in white-collar 
settings was never enough to make up for the status-lowering effect of a predominance of 
women. 
371. See id. at 9. 
372. See id. at 7. 
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a dead-end, unsafe job. Stein's point was that the law could not 
ignore the substantial status rift that divides white-collar workers 
from each other. 
But the problem implicit in Stein's descriptive defense was that 
it fueled the argument that the FLSA should only protect employ­
ees who worked in low-wage jobs in exploitative conditions. This 
was industry's view of the FLSA's goal, not the agency's. Undue 
reliance by the agency on the plight of low-wage white-collar work­
ers would tend to support industry proposals to exempt all white­
collar workers earning over a certain (relatively low) salary - the 
approach Andrews had abandoned under political pressure from 
the Newspaper Guild. 
Defining "administrative" employees. Stein observed that the 
most frequent criticism of the original regulations was their failure 
to promulgate separate definitions for the separate statutory terms 
"executive" and "administrative."373 Stein rejected the notion that 
the Administrator had a statutory obligation to provide separate 
definitions, arguing on weak grounds that "'executive' and 'admin­
istrative' are used synonymously in common speech and in court 
decisions."374 He decided, however, that "the best conclusion" is 
that the two terms ought to be defined separately. 
He took a descriptive approach to defining the term "adminis­
trative" by referring to its use in contemporary business practice. 
The term "executive," he explained, "applies with particular apt­
ness to persons who are commonly called 'bosses,"'375 but there is 
another group of business employees to whom the term "adminis­
trative" could apply. 
In modern business there has been an increasing use of persons whose 
authority is functional rather than departmental. Primarily they de­
termine or affect policy or carry out major assignments rather than 
give orders to individuals. Examples of this type of employee are ex-
373. Id. at 3. 
374. That seems a weak point, given how rarely the word "administrative" was used in 
wage and hour legislation, and given the presumed tendency of legislatures not to use redun­
dant language in lists such as these. His authority was also weak. Stein relied on Saint v. 
Allen, 126 So. 548 (La. 1930), a case in which the term is used to say that the state highway 
department, an "administrative office," is in the executive branch of government, and which 
quotes references to the "administrative, legislative, and judicial functions" of government, 
as opposed to the usual "executive" functions. In In re Heafy, 285 N.Y.S. 188, 192 (1936), the 
issue again is branches of government: "When a judge appoints a clerk, he does an adminis­
trative or executive act, not a judicial act." These sources don't show an established practice 
of using the terms interchangeably in the employment setting. 
375. Stein Report, supra note 359, at 4. 
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ecutive assistants, travelling inventory men, purchasing agents, tax ex­
perts, and safety directors.376 
After observing that a "large group". of these employees are not 
"executives" in the narrow sense, Stein concluded that "it does no 
violence to the common understanding of the words to apply 'exec­
utive' to the person who is a boss over men and to apply 'adminis­
trative' to the person who establishes or affects or carries out policy 
but who has little or no authority over the specific actions of other 
individuals. "377 
A sign of Stein's discomfort with the new "administrative" cate­
gory is that fact that he offered no purposive justification for the 
special treatment of "administrative" employees. Stein did not ex­
plain why it would not be worthwhile to use an overtime premium 
to encourage employers to hire as many purchasing agents or tax 
experts as are necessary to get the job done in forty hours per week; 
he offered no evidence that unemployment was significantly lower 
among administrative employees than among routine white-collar 
workers. Given the newness of the "administrative" category - its 
absence in occupational statistics and in the NRA codes - the em­
pirical data necessary to launch a purposive analysis of the category 
would have been sorely lacking in any event. 
Instead, Stein's approach to this category of employees was de­
scriptive. Stein's assumption seems to have been that the adminis­
trative employee deserves to be on the "exempt" side of the line 
because "administrative" employees were recognized as more akin 
in status to executives and professionals than to ordinary white­
collar workers. As confirmation, Stein noted that "in many busi­
nesses the weekly pay roll is characteristically the pay roll for the 
production, maintenance, and clerical workers, while the monthly 
pay roll is characteristically the pay roll for the company officials, 
executives, and administrative employees:"378 The message implicit 
in the "administrative" definition was that there existed a culturally 
recognized status distinction between factory and back office, or be­
tween staff work and line work, or between production and nonpro­
duction functions, that warranted the drawing of an exemption line. 
The problem, however, was that many businesses used the salaried/ 
hourly distinction to separate all white-collar from all blue-collar 
376. Id. 
377. Id. at 4-5. Later in the report, though, the description is no more specific than "per­
sons performing a variety of miscellaneous but important functions in business." Id. at 24. 
378. Id. at 33. 
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workers. Why was payroll practice dispositive here, if it was ig­
nored when it came to lower-level white-collar workers? 
Precisely because the concept of the "administrator" was rela­
tively new, Stein recognized that it would be difficult to tell the dif­
ference between a "bona fide" administrator and "a mere cog in a 
large industrial wheel."379 Job titles would not suffice, Stein con­
cluded, because depending on the size and nature of the business, 
people with the same job title - he gave the examples of "claims 
agent," "statistician," and "personnel director" - do vastly differ­
ent types and levels of work.380 But beyond the requirement that 
the work be nonmanual in nature and that it require the exercise of 
discretion, Stein's definition had few specifics.381 Because of defini­
tional uncertainty, Stein's operational definition of "administrator" 
relied upon a high salary minimum as the "principa[l]" safeguard 
against abuse:382 a salary minimum of $200 per month, as opposed 
to the $120 per month minimum for executives. Stein made every 
effort to be empirically rigorous in setting the minimum salary level 
for administrators. But the data available to him pointed to differ­
ent answers, and in the end the best he could offer was a compro­
mise solution.383 
379. Id. at 25. 
380. See id. at 24-25. Stein says elsewhere that "[t]itles can be had cheaply and are of no 
determinative value." Id. at 25. 
381. Subcategories of the definition exempted workers who "regularly and directly as­
sis[t]" administrative employees, so long as their work is sufficiently discretionary, thereby 
covering the executive secretary who is primarily valued for "her ability to distinguish be­
tween callers at the office and to carry out other special and important duties"; there was an 
exemption for employees whose discretionary work is "directly related to management poli­
cies" and another for heads of "functional departments" where the function of the depart­
ment is "directly related to general business operations." Id. at 27. 
382. See id. at 26. 
383. The only data available to him on "administrative" salaries came from the Federal 
Personnel Classification Board, which distinguished between "clerks" and "administrators" 
and provided data for federal employees in both categories. According to these data, which 
were already nine years out of date and failed to reflect intervening pay increases, "in Gov­
ernment practice the turning point between the clerk and the administrative official" was on 
average $2700 per year ($225 a month). Stein Report, supra note 359, at 31 & n.106. Stein 
feared, however, that in low-paying regions of the country, administrative employees would 
have far lower salaries than those paid by the federal government. See id. at 32. The alterna­
tive approach was to look at national average salaries of non-exempt white-collar occupa­
tions and set the minimum salary for "administrative" status above their level. In the interest 
of this kind of calculation, the Wage and Hour Division sponsored a study of clerical em­
ployee salaries. The study showed that 5% of stenographers earned over $1,800 a year ($150 
a month) but only 1 % earned over $2,400 a year ($200 a month). See id. at 31. Looking at 
bookkeepers, "one of the most routine of all the normal business operations," id. at 32, only 
8% of them earned more than $200 a month, while almost 50% of accountants and auditors 
(groups that Stein wanted to exempt) made over $200 a month. But Stein offered no expla­
nation why the salary minimum should be set at a level at which only 50% of the accountants 
and auditors in the United States would qualify for exemption. Stein's experience was that 
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Aside from the arbitrariness of the salary minimum, the weak 
definition combined with a salary minimum provides little defense 
against the claim that all white-collar workers earning over that sal­
ary minimum should be exempt. If the emergent concept of the 
"administrative employee" has so little specific content, why should 
such important policy consequences be made to turn on it? Why, 
instead, should the government not leave it to the market to iden­
tify the most important, highest-status white-collar jobs simply by 
setting levels of compensation for them? Absent a better purposive 
grounding, the treatment of administrative employees was inevita­
bly incoherent. 
Defining professional employees. The main criticism of the orig­
inal regulations' treatment of "professional" employees was their 
failure to include employees in "the more modem professions, in 
the quasiprofessions and in artistic callings," who cannot be classed 
as either executive or administrative, but who are commonly 
thought to be akin to executive or administrative employees in so­
cial status.384 Stein noted that "profession" or "professional" were 
not yet precise cultural terms; he pointed out that in "common 
speech," the term is "sometimes used humorously so as to apply to 
every occupation that man undertakes."385 Again, then, the prob­
lem was how to pin down an emergent cultural phenomenon in le­
gally administrable terms - how to "draw a line beyond which the 
term 'professional' may not be extended."386 
The proposed amended regulations distinguished between the 
"artistic" and the "learned" professions, applying some uniform re­
quirements to all professionals and some distinct requirements to 
each category. Thus, for example, the uniform part of the regula­
tion required that the work of the professional be " [p]redominantly 
intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine."387 The 
problem with this requirement was that many occupations tradi­
tionally viewed as "professions" did not meet it. What about the 
chemist who performs the same operation time and again, or the 
doctor who does twenty physical exams and performs the same tests 
absent regional adjustments, no salary cutoff could serve as a good substitute for a meaning­
ful definition of the category "administrative employees." 
384. See id. at 34; see also, e.g., REsEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL TRENDS, supra note 
63, at 301 (noting "[i]ntemal changes in the professional group," including the steady growth 
of some of the older professions and the rapid expansion of newer ones, such as "[ d]esigners, 
draftsmen, and inventors" and the new "profession of librarian"). 
385. Stein Report, supra note 359, at 34. 
386. Id. 
387. Id. at 33. 
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and procedures at each - or, on the artistic side, the actor who 
performs the same role in a long-running Broadway play for two 
years? The answer Stein gave is that "the work of the true profes­
sional is inherently varied even though similar outward actions may 
be performed."388 But would the agency be capable of recognizing 
work outside the well-established traditional professions that only 
appeared to be routine? Or was this flexibility intended to operate 
as a one-way ratchet, as an assurance that no occupation tradition­
ally viewed as a profession would be ousted from the category? 
Stein also compromised on the relationship of the professional's 
work to the clock, the aspect of the definition with the greatest pur­
posive implications. The original version of the regulation provided 
both that professional work must involve "the consistent exercise of 
discretion and judgment both as to the manner and time of per­
formance" and that the professional employee's results or output 
"cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time. "389 
Stein agreed to drop the first time requirement, because "a doctor 
or a lawyer or any other typical professional employee must fre­
quently keep perfectly regular office hours or hours in court and 
cannot perform his work at will."39° He did not see similar difficul­
ties with the second time requirement. But the difficulties existed. 
If a lawyer works in court, then why is the day in court not a stan­
dardized unit of output? Or, for the doctor, why is the fifteen­
minute office visit not a standardized unit of output? Stein did not 
address this, although his underlying assumption was most likely 
that the lawyer or doctor spends many hours in preparation for 
each increment of time spent in contact with the client. But, for all 
that preparation, the doctor does not get paid unless he interacts 
with the patient, and the preparation is amortized in the fee. The 
doctor is compensated for the office visit, not for the cure, and doc­
tors who have lighter caseloads work fewer hours. Therefore, re­
turning to purposive thinking for a moment, if doctors were not 
permitted to work as many hours, there would be room in the econ­
omy for more doctors. The belief that the professional's work re­
lates to time in a nonstandardized way was, and is, important on a 
cultural level. But even in the 1930s, it was possible to see an ele-
388. Stein Report, supra note 359, at 36. Another example was Stein's agreement to 
delete from the uniform definition of "professional" the requirement that the professional's 
work not be "subject to active direction and supervision," because he saw that some "recog­
nized professional occupations" would not qualify as professions if the requirement re­
mained. See id. at 36-37. 
389. Id. at 37. 
390. Id. 
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ment of standardization in professional life - particularly for pro­
fessionals working in-house in corporations under the control of 
bureaucratic work organization. Here again, Stein ignored the pos­
sibility that the assumptions behind both the status superiority of 
the professional and the inappropriateness of work-spreading poli­
cies to professionals were being undermined in emerging social 
practice. 
One of Stein's innovations was the creation of the category of 
the "artistic professions." "Artistic" work was defined as being 
"original and creative" and the product of "invention, imagination, 
or talent."391 Again, Stein started with and expanded upon the con­
sensus he thought existed in the culture - that, for example, visual 
artists and musicians are "artists" rather than craftsmen. But why is 
a musician who plays the same charts in a dance band week after 
week an artist? Could that musician be distinguished from the sym­
phony orchestra musician who plays the same symphonies year af­
ter year? As before, it seemed as though the statutory criteria were 
not to be used to oust "traditional" arts, but only to evaluate new 
ones. Thus, Stein said that it is "not believed" that animators are 
"creative," while it is believed that photographers are392 - with no 
distinctions drawn among types 9f animators or types of photogra­
phers. Journalists and writers also presented categorization 
problems. Stein suggested that only the "persons holding the more 
responsible and better-paid positions in the editorial departments 
of newspapers or in advertising agencies" would qualify for the ex­
emption.393 But Stein did not explain why only the minority of re­
porters depend on "invention, imagination, or talent," while all 
musicians, painters, and actors do, regardless of how aesthetically 
tawdry or repetitive or unchallenging their work. 
Stein was not prepared to fashion a definition of the profes­
sional that would deal with all the obvious problems of categoriza­
tion. Instead, he turned once again to a salary minimum, for all 
professions except law and medicine. This reflects the fact that, 
whether on purposive or descriptivist terms, Stein's careful analysis 
could not yield a definition of "professional" work that would stand 
on its own as the basis for an exemption. 
Defining executive employees. Turning to the definition of "ex­
ecutive" employees, Stein's project was to determine what makes 
391. Id. at 41. 
392. See id. 
393. Id. 
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for a "true executive" in light of changes in modern industrial prac­
tice. Because "the function of hiring is frequently delegated to a 
personnel department or director," Stein determined that the regu­
lations could no longer require executives to have the authority to 
hire.394 But he found it "difficult to see how anyone, whether high 
or low in the hierarchy of management, can be considered as em­
ployed in a bona fide executive capacity" if that person does not at 
least have the power to recommend hiring or firing.395 To Stein, 
executives were "bosses," and a boss who had no power over the 
job tenure of his employees hardly seemed a boss at all. Yet a 
reader of contemporaneous personnel literature could easily envi­
sion the centralization of all hiring and firing recommendations 
through the use of standardized testing techniques. Again, Stein's 
descriptivist reading of emerging cultural trends might have been 
too conservative - a conservatism perhaps necessitated by his 
need to defend a status-based statutory line between "executives" 
and other employees. 
Similarly, Stein determined that a bona fide executive must be 
in charge of a "department or recognized subdivision thereof." It 
was not sufficient for an employee to "supervise miscellaneous 
groups of employees not constituting a customarily recognized de­
partment or subdepartment of an establishment. "396 His reasons 
related solely to status. "It would seem improper to give as impos­
ing a title as 'executive' to a person who supervises a collection of 
men performing a job, or a series of jobs, but whose responsibilities 
do not include the kind of permanent status that is properly associ­
ated with the management of a recognized department."397 "Fun­
damentally and properly" a line must be drawn at "the supervision 
of a unit with a permanent status and function."398 Stein insisted on 
this even though he recognized the growing practice in large depart­
ments of distributing "the supervision . . .  among two or three em­
ployees, conceivably among more."399 He did not explain why 
divided authority in an established department was necessarily of 
higher status than undivided authority over a series of flexibly or­
ganized workgroups. 
394. See id. at 12. 
395. Id. 
396. Id. at 10. 
397. Id. at 11. 
398. Id. 
399. Id. at 12. 
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As for the use of a salary minimum, Stein found that "[t]here 
was . . . surprisingly wide agreement that a salary qualification" is 
an "index to the 'bona fide' . . .  executive character [of the employ­
ment]. . . .  The basis of this agreement is easily explained. The term 
'executive' implies a certain prestige, status, and importance." If 
they are to be denied overtime pay, "[i]t must be assumed that they 
enjoy compensatory privileges and this assumption will clearly fail 
if they are not paid a salary substantially higher" than the minimum 
wage. "[T]he best single test of the employer's good faith in attrib­
uting importance to the employee's services is the amount he pays 
for them. "40° 
When it came to deciding the appropriate salary level, Stein's 
initial inclination was to maintain "an adequate differentiation be­
tween the salary normally earned by a worker for a standard work­
week who is employed as a craftsman or machine operator or 
tender and the salary of a person whose exemption is sought as an 
executive."401 But the salary level he chose - $120 a month - fell 
far short of his stated goals because "the weekly earnings of a 
skilled craftsman who does no supervising work" were on the 
rise.402 Stein came to hold the view that even in the absence of a 
substantial salary differential, executive work would retain its high 
status because it had non-wage "compensating advantages": "au­
thority over people, a privilege generally considered desirable to 
possess," greater opportunity for promotion, paid vacation and sick 
leave, and greater job security during slow periods.403 But Stein 
failed to see the trend that many non-executive "salaried" workers 
received paid vacation and sick leave, that lower-level supervisors 
were closed out of promotions by the growing preference for plac­
ing college men in managerial jobs, and that many skilled workers 
with union representation were catching up with their bosses on the 
"comparative advantages" of employee benefits and layoff protec­
tion. His approach was descriptive, but his cultural antennae were 
weak. By assuming the comparative advantages without requiring 
employers to prove on a case-by-case basis both that these benefits 
were given to "executives" and that they were not given to ordinary 
workers, Stein failed to detect the trends that were undermining 
lower-level executives' claims to high status. 
400. Id. at 19. 
401. Id. at 20. 
402. Id. at 21. 
403. See id. at 21-22. 
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Possibly because Stein recognized that he had failed to mount 
an adequate descriptivist justification for the executive exemption, 
he also attempted a purposive defense. He asserted that an over­
time penalty for executives "would not usually have any considera­
ble effect in spreading employment because in many instances the 
executive's work cannot be shared."404 But this contradicted his 
earlier observation that supervisory authority was often shared. He 
also asserted that executive work was less responsive to work­
spreading incentives than was administrative or professional 
work.405 But he did not explain why, for example, the work of a 
company's chief :financial officer (an "administrative" position) is 
any more divisible than the work of its head of human resources (an 
"executive" position). The purposive justification for the executive 
exemption was offered almost as an afterthought and with little 
care. 
In sum, Stein's report was a serious effort to justify the Divi­
sion's position following weeks of arduous hearings. Only because 
of its seriousness and high quality does it serve as a useful basis for 
examining the different approaches to class line-drawing and their 
consequences. The strength of Stein's descriptive approach is that 
he did achieve sufficient independence to resist reversion to an old 
and increasingly contested consensus on the high status of all white­
collar work. In that sense, the report and regulations took a stance 
against the dominant views of the business community and thereby 
advanced public debate on the changing class order. But the weak­
ness of Stein's approach is that absent the capacity to do independ­
ent empirical work, the descriptive approach is only as good as the 
quality of the government's cultural antennae. It is not easy to de­
tect the emergence of new cultural understandings. Stein was quick 
to recognize new claims of high status by groups in society. He was 
far slower to recognize that social transformations were threatening 
the long-term ability of many traditional "executives" and "profes­
sionals" to sustain their existing claims of high social status. 
Given the obviously time-consuming nature of the hearing pro­
cess, the descriptive approach has another problem. When the so­
cial order is in flux, accurate descriptive maps can become 
inaccurate in short order. It is difficult to imagine frequent enough 
amendments to keep pace with the shifting distribution of supervi­
sory authority, discretion, intellectuality, and bureaucratic control 
404. Id. at 22. 
405. See id. 
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within the American labor market. Within certain tolerances, these 
changes are not a problem; case-by-case adjudication under existing 
standards can resolve some of these issues. But more fundamental 
changes require rethinking the entire scheme - and that is difficult 
to accomplish when the relevant evidence is of a cultural nature and 
is therefore difficult to gather and interpret. 
All in all, the public would have been better served had Stein 
been able to use a purposive approach. Had there been a commit­
ment to purposive analysis, the Wage and Hour Division would 
have collected data to determine whether unemployment was a 
problem among certain types of executives, professionals, and ad­
ministrators. Changes in the regulatory scheme could have been 
made on a pilot basis, if necessary, to determine whether in fact the 
employers of upper-level employees would respond to hours limita­
tions by spreading work.406 Because the Division's decisions would 
have been so clearly based on a set of technical and quantitative 
judgments, they would have had far less impact on public concep­
tions of the changing class hierarchy than would explicitly cultural 
determinations by government agencies as to who is above whom in 
a universal status hierarchy. 
The problem with a purposive approach would have been, and 
would now be, that the lessons to be 1eamed from the data might 
push beyond the limits of the agency's authority. As we have seen, 
the FLSA itself was not the product of careful purposive analysis. 
The Division might have revealed, had it used a purposive ap­
proach, that there was no justification under a work-spreading the­
ory for any exemption for executives, professionals, and 
administrators. What, then, could it have done, except appeal to 
the Department to sponsor legislation to repeal the exemptions or 
begin to articulate a new set of rationales for the statute and its 
exemptions and hope to prevail in the courts? 
CONCLUSION 
It was no small feat for New Deal government actors to resist 
industry efforts to saddle maximum hours laws with an anachronis­
tic model of contemporaneous class structure - one in which the 
lines of relative privilege were drawn at the collar-color line. To 
406. This is the claim the Newspaper Guild made in its criticism of the new rules: "Bas­
ing definitions on salary earnings appears to us to ignore one of the stated purposes of the 
FLSA, to spread employment, something which can be done . . .  by limiting hours in the 
higher brackets as in the lower." WSU/Guild, Pasche Assails Redefinitions in Hours Law, 
GUILD REP., Nov. 1, 1940, at 1. 
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that extent, government actors successfully resisted embedding in 
the law an already-contestable orthodoxy of universal white-collar 
privilege that was coming under attack in both labor-union practice 
and in the technology of the bureaucratization of work. This is the 
value of a descriptive approach to class line-drawing, when it is 
done with a healthy measure of independence. 
The upper-level exemption regulations are under attack today 
in large part because it is the virtue of sophisticated descriptivist 
approaches that they do not always comport with what powerful 
private interests put forward as "common sense." The regulations 
reflect that by the late 1930s the highest-level executives, adminis­
trators, and professionals drew their high social status from their 
role as the engineers of the industrial process; the lower-level mem­
bers of their ranks were, like ordinary workers, being engineered by 
it. The upper-level exemption regulations, in sum, were predicated 
on an understanding that if an upper-level line must be drawn, it 
needed to be drawn within the ranks of those who were viewed as 
professionals, executives, and administrators. That understanding 
is as appropriate today as it was in the 1930s, and it is no more 
popular with the business community today than it was in the 1930s. 
It should not be abandoned. 
Over the years, the regulations have been subject to demands 
for simplification. To the extent those demands have been heeded, 
the result has been a movement away from precisely the aspects of 
the agency's interpretations that were the most sensitive to emerg­
ing cultural trends. The creation in 1947 of an "upset test" - a 
higher salary level at which duties will no longer be closely scruti­
nized - has tended to place undue emphasis on income, while at 
the same time not diminishing the general view that being "ex­
empt" means working in a job that has high social status. The "up­
set test" has also held the Wage and Hour Division hostage to 
successful Congressional efforts to thwart the increases in the upset 
salary levels necessary to reflect not only inflation, but also the in­
creasing earnings inequalities between upper-level and lower-level 
white-collar workers. 
As the upset salary levels have become less realistic bases for 
drawing class lines, entirely too much emphasis has been placed on 
the aspect of the regulations we have discussed the least: the re­
quirement that exempt employees be paid on a "salary basis." The 
salary-basis test provides, inter alia, that exempt employees who 
work on a particular day cannot be docked for hours not worked on 
that day. Its philosophy is tied to the claim that the work of true 
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upper-level employees is non-commodified, that it cannot be sub­
jected to the time clock. Recall Andrews saying "they can go fish­
ing when they want to." But the trend that began in the 1920s and 
1930s of imposing bureaucratic control on all forms of work means 
that employers have come to see all of their employees as working 
subject to the clock. Employers for years have been unprepared to 
allow all but their highest upper-level employees to take advantage 
of the :flexibility that was customarily one of the "comparative ad­
vantages" of upper-level status. That is why employers object to 
being robbed of their ability to dock their upper-level workers' pay 
for partial-day absences. 
Perhaps the salary-basis test can be used to reverse this incur­
sion into the privileges of upper-level status. But it is not the job of 
descriptivist government actors to resist cultural trends. If in fact 
business practice has succeeded in eroding this traditional accoutre­
ment of upper-level status, such that we as a culture now readily 
accept the notion that upper-level employees file time reports and 
have :fluctuating paychecks, then a descriptivist Wage and Hour Di­
vision must eventually yield. If it does not, then its actions appear 
arbitrary - a sure sign that it has lost whatever legitimacy comes 
from being able to claim that the law's conception of class has its 
basis in the culture. This is another limitation, then, of the descrip­
tivist approach. 
One might ask, why is the business community able to imple­
ment its own view of upper-level employment if what it has chosen 
to do is rendered illegal by the FLSA? The government, after all, 
does not merely promulgate images of class. It promulgates regula­
tions with all the force of law. The answer, of course, is that to the 
extent the law is enforced, it does provide a meaningful check on 
the ability of business to deviate from the government's view of the 
true indicia of upper-level status. But the FLSA is, like so many 
laws, underenforced. And the enforcement of the upper-level ex­
emptions requires individual employees to come forward and de­
mand that they no longer be categorized as exempt - a change that 
is still experienced as a status loss. The Newspaper Guild remains 
in the vanguard in its willingness to take that position, but many 
white-collar workers cling fiercely to their claims to high status. 
Let me close this discussion of the limits of the descriptivist ap­
proach with a true story. While I was writing this Article, a former 
star student of mine called to ask what she needed to do to enter 
the law-teaching market. This was a student who had been very 
anxious to get a quick start on her career as a management-side 
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labor lawyer in a large firm. When I asked her why she was un­
happy in practice, part of her reason for wanting to leave was the 
long hours she was working. We then turned to talking about the 
teaching market, and - after disclosing that her hours would not 
necessarily get any shorter - I asked her whether she had in mind 
a possible topic for a "job talk" or a first article. She expressed 
interest, to my delight, in the white-collar exemptions to the FLSA. 
I asked her what position she would take, and she started to express 
her outrage at the thought that highly paid, high-status profession­
als and executives would ever expect to be paid overtime for their 
long hours of work. I pointed out to her that the theory behind the 
overtime premium was work-spreading and reminded her that she 
was about to leave law practice because of the long hours (which 
quie.ted her sense of outrage a bit). 
I then asked my former student whether she'd given any 
thought to why lawyers are asked to work such long hours. Specifi­
cally, I asked her whether she thought it had to be this way, 
whether the nature of the work made it impossible to hire more 
lawyers at lower pay and allow them to work fewer hours. She an­
swered (to my surprise, given her initial viewpoint) that the "it has 
to be this way" argument was utterly absurd. Without saying more, 
I encouraged her interest in the FLSA and in teaching. And I came 
away all the more convinced that as members of an elite which is 
clinging to its own elevated status, we cannot be trusted accurately 
to assess our own status demise. Descriptivism is attractive, but it 
asks more of government actors than their own biases permit them 
to deliver. It is far easier to see past those biases when the ques­
tions that are being asked are purposive - when they are self­
consciously tailored to meet specific statutory goals. 
The FLSA is long due for a purposive overhaul. If work­
spreading remains the goal of the statute, there is grave reason to 
doubt that a time-and-a-half overtime premium is large enough to 
serve as a work-spreading incentive.407 I doubt that the framers of 
the FLSA would have ever imagined workers striking to avoid be­
ing forced to work excessive hours at the time-and-a-half rate.40s 
They did not anticipate that the high costs of employee training and 
of non-wage employee benefits such as health and pension plans 
would raise the costs of hiring additional workers to the point at 
407. For a critical review of proposed legislation to increase the overtime premium, see 
RoNALD G. EHRENBERG & PAUL L. SCHUMANN, LoNGER HouRs OR MoRE Joss? AN JN. 
VESTIGATION OF AMENDING HOURS LEGISLATION TO CREATE EMPLOYMENT 133-37 (1982). 
408. See, e.g., Five Big Strikes: Issues, Outcomes, NEWSDAY, Aug. 20, 1997, at A37. 
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which a time-and-a-half premium is the far cheaper choice for many 
employers. In that light, and in light of the growing tendency of 
employers to use part-timers and/or independent contractors to 
meet their labor needs, the FLSA as currently constituted may no 
longer be able to meet work-spreading goals. 
Ifwe are prepared to create a meaningful work-spreading incen­
tive, the question of whether upper-level workers should be exempt 
should be reconsidered in its entirety. At least some "ordinary" 
work is regaining the exercise of autonomy and discretion through 
flexible specialization and cooperative management.409 At the 
same time, the well-publicized wave of layoffs of executive, admin­
istrative, and professional employees through corporate downsizing 
suggests that the use of "best practice" management techniques to 
control the work of upper-level employees is, to borrow a phrase, 
once again "taking the starch out of' upper-level white collar work­
ers.410 There is good reason to suspect, then, that the trend of con­
vergence in the work structure and working conditions of upper­
level and ordinary workers continues apace. The assumption that 
upper-level work is (and is uniquely) noncommodified and 
nondivisible deserves to be freshly reexamined.411 
Finally, it is time to consider whether the FLSA should be 
shifted off of its work-spreading foundation and explicitly moved 
onto alternative moorings - for example, the protection, for all 
workers, of leisure or of their right to function simultaneously as 
workers, parents, and citizens.412 It is, in short, time to genuinely 
409. Again, however, "best practice" is slower to disseminate in the world than in the 
literature. See, e.g., Paul Osterman, How Common is Workplace Transformation and Who 
Adopts It? Internal Labor Market Innovations, 47 INous. & LAB. REL. REv. 173 (1994). 
410. Examples of journalistic and popular responses to white-collar downsizing in the 
1990s abound. See, e.g., More and More, Joblessness Wears a Business Suit, Bus. WK., Feb. 
28, 1994, at 22; White Collar Wasteland, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 28, 1993, at 42. 
There are likewise numerous claims within the business community that white-collar down­
sizing is necessary for economic growth, see, e.g., Edwin A. Fmn, Jr., White-Collar Bloat, 
FORBES, Oct. 17, 1988, at 34; Thane Peterson, Can Corporate America Get Out from Under 
its Overhead?, Bus. WK., May 18, 1992, at 102, and that the trend will be towards the erasure 
of "the rigid distinction between white- and blue-collar workers," see Richard Rosecrance, 
Can We Make White-Collar Workers More Productive?, USA TODAY: THE MAGAZINE OF 
THE AMERICAN SCENE, Sept. 1, 1991, at 37. 
411. It might also be worth reconsidering other assumptions about the extent to which 
the responses of blue-collar and white-collar wages and working conditions to economic vari­
ables are similar. See, e.g., David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, The Determination 
of White-Collar Pay, 42 OXFORD EcoNoMic PAPERS 356 (1990) (examining British data). 
412. An advantage of the purposive approach is that governmental definitions of social 
problems, once identified, can be changed. "[S]erious attention to a given definition is an 
outcome of significance, as it legitimates some strands of political argument, mobilizes some 
participants, and invites people to see public issues differently. In its multiple roles, problem 
definition constitutes a source of both stability and flexibility in the policy process." Janet A. 
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rethink the FLSA and its upper-level exemptions, not merely to 
"simplify" them or remake them to maximize employer "flexibil­
ity."413 As Hugh Johnson said at the cotton textile hearings, the 
government has the power to require employers to change their 
personnel practices to meet the public policy goals of government 
programs. When government goals change, it is legitimate for gov­
ernment demands on private actors to change as well.414 
In rethinking the FLSA from a purposive standpoint, we must 
be cognizant of the fact that revising the FLSA will require a new 
wave of class line-drawing. Whether motivated by a descriptivist 
or a purposive rationale, overtime exemptions send working people 
powerful messages about their class position - a message that is 
reiterated with every paycheck. True, purposive government regu­
lation does not set out to map or to alter the class system or even to 
send any particular messages about class. But the messages we re­
ceive are not necessarily the ones the sender sent. The class struc­
ture of contemporary American society is at least as uncertain and 
contested as it was in the pre-New Deal period. Any government 
action that draws lines on the basis of class-like criteria - income, 
occupation, education level, and so forth - is likely to have a sig­
nificant effect on how we experience and debate the issue of class. 
Adopting a purposive approach thus does not get the govern­
ment off of the cultural hook. The purposive legislature or agency 
must maintain a high level of cultural awareness in the course of 
program design and implementation. This means that someone in a 
position of authority must take on the job of understanding how the 
government's regulatory scheme replicates or challenges existing 
cultural assumptions, and the extent to which it puts the govern­
ment on one or another side in ongoing cultural debates. Where 
possible, these cultural insights should be taken into account in pro­
gram design - for example, by avoiding drawing controversial lines 
that are of limited programmatic efficacy. More often, the govern­
ment will not be able to avoid controversy. In such cases, the gov­
ernment must do everything it can to make clear to the regulated 
community that its classification scheme is "correct" only for the 
limited purposes for which it was designed. It is no news that the 
Weiss, The Powers of Problem Definition: The Case of Government Papenvork, 22 POLY. Sci. 
97, 118 (1989). 
413. Here I allude to the proposed introduction of compensatory time under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. See Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1, 105th Cong. (1997). 
414. An aggressive approach will, however, require a hefty budget for education and en· 
forcement - something the Wage and Hour Division and the NRA have sorely lacked. 
August 1998] Class Line-Drawing 2321 
government needs to be vigilant about the unintended conse­
quences of government programs. It may be news that sometimes 
those consequences are cultural. The purposive approach therefore 
must not be culture-blind. When done right, it is culturally aware, 
and for that reason adopts a posture of cultural self-restraint and 
political self-disclosure. The time has come to give it a try. 
